NEW: #Russian forces made marginal gains around #Bakhmut today, but Russian forces remain unlikely to have advanced at the tempo that Russian sources claimed.
2/ Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces made marginal advances southeast of #Bakhmut but @TheStudyofWar remains unable to confirm most other claimed gains around Bakhmut made since November 27.
3/ Some Russian milbloggers made unsubstantiated claims that Russian forces broke through the Ukrainian defensive line south of #Bakhmut along the T0513 highway to advance towards Chasiv Yar.
4/ A breakthrough along the T0513 highway would cut one of two remaining main Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to #Bakhmut, but such claims are likely part of a continuing Russian information operation and are premature, as @TheStudyofWar has previously assessed.
5/ ISW continues to assess that the degraded Russian forces around #Bakhmut are unlikely to place Bakhmut under threat of imminent encirclement rapidly.
The Minister of Defense of #Belarus made comments likely in support of ongoing information operations, and some Russian sources reframed those comments so as to place further pressure on Belarusian officials to support #Russia’s war in #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Belarusian Minister of Defense Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin stated on November 30 that the actions of bordering NATO members suggest that preparations are underway to conduct military operations in the eastern direction (i.e., against #Belarus).
3/ While Khrenin’s comments incorporate several possible types of military operations, Russian media and a milblogger reported his comments as saying explicitly that NATO is preparing for offensive operations in the eastern direction (which is a nonsensical accusation).
The #Kremlin continues efforts to stifle domestic dissent through legislation that broadens the definition of “foreign agents” and those amenable to foreign influence. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Russian media began reporting on November 23 that the Russian government approved new restrictions on the ability of those deemed “foreign agents” to post materials created by foreign-influenced sources and conduct public activities, which will enter into effect on December 1.
3/ The Russian Ministry of Justice expanded the list of “individual-foreign agents” on November 27 on the basis of those individuals conducting unspecified political activities.
Russian state nuclear power company #Rosatom stated that the former chief engineer of the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (#ZNPP) has become the new director of the ZNPP. isw.pub/UkrWar113022
2/ Rosatom advisor Renat Karchaa announced on November 30 that Yuriy Chernichuk has become the new ZNPP director and the first deputy general director of the Joint Stock Company “Operating Organization of the ZNPP..."
...which is the entity that Rosatom formed on October 3 to essentially replace Ukrainian company Energoatom as the plant’s operator and to oversee the “safe operation” of the ZNPP and manage personnel activities within the plant.
NEW: #Russian efforts around #Bakhmut indicate that Russian forces have fundamentally failed to learn from previous high-casualty campaigns concentrated on objectives of limited operational or strategic significance.
2/ Russian forces have continually expended combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar has previously observed, Russian efforts to advance on Bakhmut have resulted in the continued attrition of Russian manpower and equipment, pinning troops on relatively insignificant settlements for weeks and months at a time.
A 🧵on ISW Afghanistan Researcher Peter Mills' just-released report on armed opposition to Afghan Taliban rule since the disintegration of the Afghan Republic more than 15 months ago. 1/6
Anti-Taliban groups fall into two main categories: Islamic State–aligned groups and non–Salafi-jihadi resistance groups.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the primary Islamic State affiliate in South Asia. By 2019, US and Taliban offensives largely destroyed ISKP’s …
… ability to control territory in Afghanistan. Thus, ISKP’s attacks primarily aim to undermine the Taliban efforts to build a government and consolidate control over Afghanistan by targeting Taliban fighters, officials, and religious leaders. ISKP does not yet appear strong ...
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 29 that Russian forces have likely stopped deploying battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the past three months. isw.pub/UkrWar112922
2/ The UK MoD stated that the BTGs‘ relatively low allocation of infantry, decentralized distribution of artillery, and the limited independence of BTG decision-making hindered their success in Ukraine.
3/ @TheStudyofWar assessed starting in April that Russian BTGs were degraded in various failed or culminated Russian offensives, including the attacks on Kyiv, Mariupol, Severodonetsk, & Lysychansk, and later efforts to reconstitute these BTGs to restore their combat power failed