Some observations on Putin's recent speeches, especially his conversation with journalists on 22 December. A longer thread this #ChristmasEve on #Putin’s interpretation of the #UkraineWar
📌Over the past three months, fatigue has clearly accumulated, optimism has noticeably disappeared, and discouragement has come in its place. No anxiety yet, but sadness and disappointment.
📌There is a very pronounced misunderstanding on Putin’s part as to why Ukraine does not give up, as to why there are no internal disputes about the need to capitulate, because it seems to him that they are doomed.
To Putin it looks like the further it all drags on, the more unnecessary sacrifices there will be on both sides, and the more expensive the “price” of the future Russian victory will be, in which he still believes. This upsets him greatly.
📌The same misunderstanding concerns the West: is the desire to crush Russia so strong that they will fight to the last Ukrainian? There is disappointment and pain because everything is not going as it seems logical to him: disagreements between Western countries are not…
intensifying, a more conservative and nationally oriented intra-Western opposition is not rising, a revolt of the masses is not born, and so on. Even if it all seems to be there, it is happening far too slowly.
📌The war with Ukraine has now definitely become perceived as a civil war between brotherly peoples: Putin openly blames the Americans for “first pulling us [Russians and Ukrainians] apart, separating us, and then pitting us against each other.”
Another very revealing phrase: “No one wants the unification of the Russian people.” There is a strong sense of fatalism, of doom, and of loneliness. Putin has not shown himself like this for a long time. Or maybe never.
📌However, he is not ready for any sort of peace. “Our goal is not to spin this flywheel of a military conflict, but, on the contrary, to end this war” - this phrase should not be perceived as a change of position and readiness for negotiations.
It is rather a manifestation of internal shock about the fact that the West is so “wasting” “our” Ukraine (yes, that's how he sees it), multiplied by emotional rejection and a misunderstanding of external hostility; we came to save, the historical truth is ours, but …
justice fails to prevail in any way. He doesn't blame himself for anything.
📌An important evolution: if at the beginning of the war it seemed to Putin that he had now taken everything into his own hands and was reshaping the world, now he again feels like a victim of circumstances.
The war is a result of the systematic efforts of the United States, which brought Russia to this “stage” of fratricidal war.
📌There is no regret about his actions. “We had no other way out”, “we have nowhere to retreat….” All this is already pronounced with sadness, but there is no doubt for him that it is necessary to continue.
“The chicken pecks grain by grain" - this is his view of how Russia will behave in the coming months. That is, to slowly crush and strangle Ukraine, avoiding large-scale fighting. There is a sense of readiness for a protracted confrontation.
Although there is “bitter” emotion about the human victims, in his perception the existence of Russia is at stake, which means it is impossible to stop.
📌 The feeling of guilt towards the military is noticeable. The fact that he has to throw soldiers into the “furnace” of war clearly causes him moral pain, and that is much more pronounced than a sense of responsibility to mothers.
But he places the main blame, of course, on the West; if Kyiv had not been supported, everything would have already ended.
📌He is significantly emotional about the patriots. His words about the fact that the patriotism of young people makes him cry are clear evidence of how his administration, in general, has learned to touch the right strings.
But at the heart of this is a sense of guilt that he has drawn millions into this war and that it went the way it went. This feeling “asks” for collective solidarity and constant support. Otherwise, the burden becomes unbearable.
📌 Lastly, there is a clear division in Putin's perception of the real patriots, for whom he has a very reverent attitude, and the non-patriots, whom he sees as a threat.
This lays the foundation for the development of a more complex and ruthless system of recognizing the “friend” and the “enemy” - a mechanism of protection against the latter. That’s to say that things are moving towards more mass repressions and a more developed state ideology.
The conclusion to the post above is that Putin is getting more upset over what is happening. I have always argued with the thesis that Putin is cornered, that he is lost, and does not know what to do. And I continue to argue with this.
But there is a noticeable change in his emotional background from moderate optimism (recall his summer “we haven't started anything yet”) to depression. Even if there is victory tomorrow, he will not be especially happy - too heavy a price has been paid, and it’s far from over.
He still knows what to do, refuses to revise the “plan”, and simply does not understand what the alternative might be. He doesn't see it. But in his current situation, he is uncomfortable, too.
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An elite split in #Russian politics? A thread 🧵. For a very long time I have been writing that there is no split between the Russian elites. Well, or, at least the internal divisions are not reaching the point of fierceness that they threaten the regime.
But recent military defeats are making a difference and the situation is changing. Now, to oversimplify, we can say that a strategic split is forming very quickly (and the surrender of #Kherson has sharply exacerbated it) around the question of "what’s next".
On the discussion of #Putin's rationality: Is Putin prepared to think rationally and adequately? In my opinion, this is not a very correct formulation of the question. Rationality is a very situational concept. 1/
Putin, whoever he thinks he is, is a mere mortal who is subject to emotions, has an occasional lapse of judgement and may act irrational. But he has also not lost the ability to calculate, to rationalise, and to make sober and sane decisions. 2/
He may be angry and unjustifiably stubborn in some circumstances and extremely pragmatic and rational in others. And this can be true for the same situations, as in the case of #Ukraine. 3/
🌾 The Ministry of Defence today announced that #Russia is renewing its participation in the "grain deal". The pretext: Moscow has received guarantees from Kyiv not to use the humanitarian corridor for military purposes.
This, of course, in no way implies a softening of relations with Ukraine or the appearance of some kind of willingness to receive guarantees from Kyiv (by no means). But this is a damning confirmation of the not very convincing thesis that Putin can and does back down when needed
So, what happened? The Kremlin itself fell into a trap from which it did not know how to get out. The deal was suspended, but it turned out that the Kremlin does not have the leverage to stop grain exports.
‼️Exclusive opportunity! ✅
R.Politik is excited to announce that we will open the access of our most recent bulletin 18 (104) 2022, issued on 25 October, to the public! rpolitik.com/wp-content/upl…
We have redacted the most sensitive information of the bulletin, which remains available only through subscription, but are nevertheless excited to share this issue of the bulletin with you.
The bulletin consists of three major topics:
📌 Martial law in the four annexed Ukrainian regions and the specifics of regimes introduced in Russia proper.
Russia has suspended the grain deal. In our latest bulletin we explained that for Putin, the main goal here is not to close the deal per se, but to ‘sell’ prolongation for as high a price as possible. rpolitik.com/the-bulletin/b…
That explains the fact that it was not terminated but ‘suspended’, with the possibility to pull the West into the bargain. In the Kremlin’s understanding, the deal gives Russia two advantages.
Firstly, it is leverage, in a more general context, a way to draw the West into a scheme in which Russia believes it can affect Western interests and coerce it to cooperate.
A longer thread 🧵 on the question of #Putin and the possible use of #nuclearweapons: During his Valdai-speech, Vladimir Putin dedicated a substantial time to convince the world that Russia is not ready to use nuclear weapons. 1/
He said that Russia is not interested in using a “dirty bomb”: “it makes no sense for us, neither politically nor militarily”. 2/
He also made it clear that Russia does not plan to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power, except in cases prescribed in the Russian Military Doctrine. 3/