Three features of the situation at the beginning of 2023. A short thread 🧵 on the near future of #Russianpolitics
1. #Putin's dependence on the #Russian military has sharply increased. At the same time, the military itself is completely "subjugated" to the political leadership and does not have subjectivity, which means that we should not expect it to try to influence the president.
But all of Putin's "legacy,” all of his grandiose plans to restore historical justice, not to mention his own future and physical security, now directly depend on the people fighting at the front.
Judging by the flow of appreciation and gratitude, even fawning over the military, Putin is acutely aware that this imbalance that has formed is not in his favour.
2. Russia's initiative has been lost. If you look at Putin's speeches at the end of February and compare them with current statements, especially with his very revealing press conference on December 22, it becomes clear how the initiative has slipped out of the Kremlin's hands…
in this geopolitical war. Now, in order to win, Russia needs to wait for changes where it has no control (many assume that it will not be possible to put an end to the conflict by military means).
That is, the West should collapse, and Ukraine should capitulate. Russia is not very good at promoting this, to put it mildly. Hence the increasingly active game of mercy, truce, and the attempts to persuade the world to force Ukraine to abandon its offensive.
This is the number one task today. I'm not sure it's going to work.
3. Creeping militarisation has begun. No matter how well Putin has persuaded himself that there would be no militarisation (as he said during the expanded board of the Ministry of Defense), it is already actively on people’s minds, including on the president’s.
On his part, promises not to militarise are deceptive. Reality takes its toll and dictates more adequate behaviour to the authorities, which is normal. Therefore, militarisation will be one of the main trends for at least the first half of 2023.
The war will come into professional, cultural, and educational everyday life... Everyone will be “on the front” in one way or another, if not physically, then psychologically.
It's hard to predict, but Putin will have to change his attitude towards Ukraine one way or another and become more realistic. This gives hope, albeit a very fragile one.
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To better understand the Christmas truce, we need to distinguish between the two approaches that are guiding #Putin at the same time.
The first is strategic: according to him, #Ukraine must be forced to surrender, whether that's in six months or in two years, it’s only a matter of time...
Putin believes that there is nowhere for Ukrainians to go, their only option is to capitulate. To anticipate it, he continues to count on the bombing of infrastructure.
#Putin's Christmas #ceasefire, which was announced today, fits well with his logic, in which #Russia acts on the good side of history and fights for justice. This is of course how he understands it. 1/4
But, moreover, it is also partly a consequence of Ukraine destroying the technical college in Makiivka on New Year's Eve, which resulted in dozens or hundreds of Russian casualties, most of which were recently mobilised. 2/4
Putin really does not want a repetition of that on (Orthodox) #Christmas Day. And we must not forget the noble publicity game: ... 3/4
For R.Politik’s last tweet of the year, we would like to offer some final thoughts on the difficulties of 2022, the war in Ukraine, and the future development of Russian politics.
When summing up 2022, many people stick to stark adjectives, calling the year monstrously terrible or similar. The war has caused emotional shock, pain and a sharp sense of irreparable loss.
It is hard to argue with this perspective: it is a terrible and ongoing tragedy for millions of people.
Some observations on Putin's recent speeches, especially his conversation with journalists on 22 December. A longer thread this #ChristmasEve on #Putin’s interpretation of the #UkraineWar
📌Over the past three months, fatigue has clearly accumulated, optimism has noticeably disappeared, and discouragement has come in its place. No anxiety yet, but sadness and disappointment.
📌There is a very pronounced misunderstanding on Putin’s part as to why Ukraine does not give up, as to why there are no internal disputes about the need to capitulate, because it seems to him that they are doomed.
An elite split in #Russian politics? A thread 🧵. For a very long time I have been writing that there is no split between the Russian elites. Well, or, at least the internal divisions are not reaching the point of fierceness that they threaten the regime.
But recent military defeats are making a difference and the situation is changing. Now, to oversimplify, we can say that a strategic split is forming very quickly (and the surrender of #Kherson has sharply exacerbated it) around the question of "what’s next".
On the discussion of #Putin's rationality: Is Putin prepared to think rationally and adequately? In my opinion, this is not a very correct formulation of the question. Rationality is a very situational concept. 1/
Putin, whoever he thinks he is, is a mere mortal who is subject to emotions, has an occasional lapse of judgement and may act irrational. But he has also not lost the ability to calculate, to rationalise, and to make sober and sane decisions. 2/
He may be angry and unjustifiably stubborn in some circumstances and extremely pragmatic and rational in others. And this can be true for the same situations, as in the case of #Ukraine. 3/