#Prigozhin directly attacked Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s presidential administration and insinuated that some officials working there are traitors who want #Russia to lose the war in #Ukraine—one of his boldest attacks against the #Kremlin to date. isw.pub/UkrWar011823
2/ #Prigozhin weighed in on an ongoing Russian policy debate about banning YouTube and stated that some officials in the #Kremlin oppose banning YouTube because it would undermine their effort to have the US & Russia reestablish relations after #Russia loses the war in #Ukraine.
3/ #Prigozhin criticized the MoD’s new guidelines for Russian troops in #Ukraine that restrict the use of certain personal electronic devices in combat zones and set stricter guidelines for men’s grooming standards on January 18.
4/ #Prigozhin defended Russian line soldiers who do not adhere to grooming standards and claimed that soldiers’ use of smartphones and tablets is necessary for modern warfare.
5/ #Prigozhin stated that "war is the time of the active and courageous, and not of the clean-shaven who turned in phones to the warehouse."
6/ #Prigozhin further criticized out-of-touch Russian MoD officials who must "develop along with the development of modern warfare, learn how to effectively kill the enemy and seize territories," and not "comb everyone under your ridiculous rules, principles, and whims."
7/ #Prigozhin’s statement was the latest of several designed to undermine confidence in the MoD and promote Prigohzin as the face of the Russian "special military operation" in #Ukraine.
8/ #Prigozhin’s comments reflect a cowboy approach to war that is unsuited to the development and maintenance of an effective large-scale and disciplined modern military. isw.pub/UkrWar011823
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The #Kremlin is intensifying its information operation to promote a false narrative that the war will escalate if #Ukraine receives weapons capable of striking Russian forces in occupied #Crimea. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ #Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 19 to a @nytimes report that US officials are considering providing Kyiv with weapons capable of striking Russian military infrastructure in occupied #Crimea and southern #Ukraine. nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/…
3/ Peskov stated that Western provisions of long-range weapons to #Ukraine that can threaten Russian forces in #Crimea will bring ”the conflict to a new qualitative level, which will not go well for global and pan-European security.”
Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near #Svatove on January 19. Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near #Kreminna. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counteroffensive to capture #Novoselivske (15km northwest of #Svatove) and advanced to the railway station in the eastern part of the settlement.
3/ A milblogger said that Ukrainian forces are waiting for reinforcements to continue the counteroffensive to liberate #Kuzemivka (15km NW) of #Svatove), which they claimed is not under Ukrainian or Russian control, but ISW makes no assessments about future Ukrainian operations.
The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a new Russian attack against #Ukraine from #Belarus in early 2023 seems less likely given current Russian military activity in Belarus. A new MDCOA of an attack from Belarus in late 2023 seems more plausible, though still unlikely.🧵
2/ Russian forces currently deployed in #Belarus are undergoing training rotations and redeploying to fight in eastern #Ukraine.
3/ There are no observed indicators that Russian forces in #Belarus have the command and control structures necessary for the winter or spring 2023 attack against #Ukraine about which Ukrainian issued warnings in late 2022.
NEW: Senior #Kremlin officials continue holding high-level meetings with Belarusian national leadership – activity that could be setting conditions for a Russian attack against #Ukraine from #Belarus, although not necessarily and not in the coming weeks. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ Russian Def. Minister Sergey #Shoigu and Belarusian Def. Minister Viktor Khrenin in a 19 JAN call discussed unspecified bilateral military cooperation, unspecified strategic deterrence measures, &“progress in preparing” the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Troops.
3/ Russian Foreign Minister Sergey #Lavrov also met Belarusian President Alexander #Lukashenko in Minsk and discussed an unspecified Russo-Belarusian “shared vision” for #Russia’s war in #Ukraine on January 19.
#Lavrov’s equations of the West with Nazi Germany and its support for #Ukraine with an effort to exterminate the Russian people are ludicrous and almost certainly aimed at a domestic Russian audience. isw.pub/UkrWar011823
2/ #Ukraine has never threatened to invade or seize territory beyond the internationally recognized borders of 1991. Neither NATO as an alliance nor any individual member state has threatened to invade #Russia, let alone to pursue the destruction of Russians as a people.
3/ The purpose of #Lavrov’s outrageous and absurd comparison was very likely meant to complement #Putin’s rhetoric and other Russian efforts to persuade the Russian people that #Ukraine and its Western backers pose a real and imminent threat to #Russia and to the Russian people.
2/ #Putin visited workers at the Obukhov State Plant—part of the Almaz-Antey Russian state-owned defense industrial company—on January 18.
3/ #Putin stated that the Russian defense industry currently can produce more than it could previously in an unspecified past time frame and stated that #Russia will achieve the defense industrial production level that Russia needs.