#Lavrov’s equations of the West with Nazi Germany and its support for #Ukraine with an effort to exterminate the Russian people are ludicrous and almost certainly aimed at a domestic Russian audience. isw.pub/UkrWar011823
2/ #Ukraine has never threatened to invade or seize territory beyond the internationally recognized borders of 1991. Neither NATO as an alliance nor any individual member state has threatened to invade #Russia, let alone to pursue the destruction of Russians as a people.
3/ The purpose of #Lavrov’s outrageous and absurd comparison was very likely meant to complement #Putin’s rhetoric and other Russian efforts to persuade the Russian people that #Ukraine and its Western backers pose a real and imminent threat to #Russia and to the Russian people.
4/ Russian governments, the Wagner Private Military Company, and the Russian military have dug trenches and established militias in areas bordering #Ukraine for months, ostensibly to defend against the nonexistent threat of a Ukrainian invasion. These efforts, together with...
...Putin’s & Lavrov’s statements wrapping themselves in the banners of the Red Army waging the Great Patriotic Special Military Operation are meant to galvanize support for protracted mobilization and suffering in pursuit of Putin’s unprovoked aggression and territorial conquest.
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The #Kremlin is likely intensifying its efforts to present #Russia’s invasion of #Ukraine as an existential war to set informational conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
2/ Russian and social media sources circulated images on January 19 and 20 showing Russian officials installing air defense systems on the roof of the Russian Ministry of Defense building in Moscow and elsewhere near the city.
3/ The Kremlin likely deployed the air defense systems in Moscow to generate inflammatory images that portray the war as more threatening to the Russian public. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
The Wagner Group appears to be struggling to present itself as an effective parallel military structure, thus increasingly proving to be a parasitic paramilitary entity. isw.pub/UkrWar012023
2/ US intelligence confirmed the rivalry between the Russian Ministry of Defense and Wagner Group which @TheStudyofWar has long reported.
3/ Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin’s quest for legal recognition of the #Wagner Group may also trigger further factionalization within the Russian government.
The #Kremlin is intensifying its information operation to promote a false narrative that the war will escalate if #Ukraine receives weapons capable of striking Russian forces in occupied #Crimea. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ #Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded on January 19 to a @nytimes report that US officials are considering providing Kyiv with weapons capable of striking Russian military infrastructure in occupied #Crimea and southern #Ukraine. nytimes.com/2023/01/18/us/…
3/ Peskov stated that Western provisions of long-range weapons to #Ukraine that can threaten Russian forces in #Crimea will bring ”the conflict to a new qualitative level, which will not go well for global and pan-European security.”
Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near #Svatove on January 19. Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions near #Kreminna. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a counteroffensive to capture #Novoselivske (15km northwest of #Svatove) and advanced to the railway station in the eastern part of the settlement.
3/ A milblogger said that Ukrainian forces are waiting for reinforcements to continue the counteroffensive to liberate #Kuzemivka (15km NW) of #Svatove), which they claimed is not under Ukrainian or Russian control, but ISW makes no assessments about future Ukrainian operations.
The most dangerous course of action (MDCOA) of a new Russian attack against #Ukraine from #Belarus in early 2023 seems less likely given current Russian military activity in Belarus. A new MDCOA of an attack from Belarus in late 2023 seems more plausible, though still unlikely.🧵
2/ Russian forces currently deployed in #Belarus are undergoing training rotations and redeploying to fight in eastern #Ukraine.
3/ There are no observed indicators that Russian forces in #Belarus have the command and control structures necessary for the winter or spring 2023 attack against #Ukraine about which Ukrainian issued warnings in late 2022.
NEW: Senior #Kremlin officials continue holding high-level meetings with Belarusian national leadership – activity that could be setting conditions for a Russian attack against #Ukraine from #Belarus, although not necessarily and not in the coming weeks. isw.pub/UkrWar01192023
2/ Russian Def. Minister Sergey #Shoigu and Belarusian Def. Minister Viktor Khrenin in a 19 JAN call discussed unspecified bilateral military cooperation, unspecified strategic deterrence measures, &“progress in preparing” the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Troops.
3/ Russian Foreign Minister Sergey #Lavrov also met Belarusian President Alexander #Lukashenko in Minsk and discussed an unspecified Russo-Belarusian “shared vision” for #Russia’s war in #Ukraine on January 19.