Russian forces continued ground attacks northwest of #Svatove and near #Kreminna on February 25. Geolocated footage posted yesterday shows Ukrainian forces shelling Russian infantry in Dzherelne (15km west of Svatove). isw.pub/UkrWar022523
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful offensive action near Masyutivka (51km NW of Svatove). isw.pub/UkrWar022523
3/ #Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian forces attempting to advance with heavy equipment in the #Svatove area.
4/ Geolocated footage posted on February 24 shows Ukrainian forces shelling Russian infantry in Dzherelne (15km west of #Svatove). A BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) unit claimed that Russian forces disrupted a Ukrainian counterattack near Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove).
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Nevske (18km NW of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and in the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna).
6/ Haidai claimed that Russian forces suffered heavy losses in an assault near #Kreminna with 70 killed in action and about 70 wounded in the course of a three-company assault.
7/ A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 25 purportedly showing elements of the 98th Guards Airborne Division operating in the #Kreminna direction. isw.pub/UkrWar022523
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🧵#Russia likely began to run out of combat-ready forces by May 2022, forcing Russian President Vladimir #Putin to make a consequential choice between launching a volunteer recruitment campaign or ordering an unpopular involuntary reserve call-up. (1/25) isw.pub/UkrWar022623
2/ The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had likely advised Putin that he needed to declare mobilization as soon as possible to ensure that Russia had sufficient combat power to continue offensive operations past the capture of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk line over the summer.
3/ Putin likely rejected the Russian military’s advice to order an involuntary reserve call-up because of the unpopularity of the move, the fact that he had not set informational conditions for it, and possibly also because of his growing distrust of the Russian MoD.
NEW: Tonight's abbreviated #Ukraine update focuses on #Putin’s attempt to avoid ordering involuntary mobilization in #Russia by launching a series of irregular volunteer force generation campaigns since late May 2022 and the consequences of that attempt. isw.pub/UkrWar022623
2/ Putin sought to satisfy the need for replacements following defeats around Kyiv by conducting a voluntary recruitment campaign building on the existing campaigns already underway by quasi-official ultranationalist groups such as the Donetsk/Luhansk People’s Republics & Wagner.
3/ #Putin unsuccessfully attempted to establish new all-volunteer formations over the summer that competed with other existing quasi-official formations.
Russian forces made marginal territorial gains around #Bakhmut and #Avdiivka and continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line. 🧵(1/20)
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Pivnichne (21km southwest of Bakhmut).
3/ Yevgeny #Prigozhin claimed that his #Wagner Group fighters captured #Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut) and posted a picture of Wagner fighters posing near the settlement’s welcome sign that was later geolocated, indicating that Wagner fighters likely captured the settlement.
UK, French, & German officials are reportedly preparing a NATO-Ukraine pact that falls far short of the protections Ukraine would receive from NATO membership & could reflect a desire to press Ukraine to accept a negotiated settlement on unfavorable terms. isw.pub/UkrWar022523
2/ @WSJ reported that the exact provisions of the pact are undecided, but the officials indicated that it will provide advanced military equipment, arms, & ammo to #Ukraine, but not Article V protection or a commitment to station NATO forces in Ukraine... wsj.com/articles/natos…
3/ ...and falling short of #Ukraine’s aspirations for full #NATO membership. The officials stated that the pact aims to provision Ukraine so that Ukrainian forces can conduct a counteroffensive that brings #Russia to the negotiating table and deter any future Russian aggression.
A Russian source capitalized on #China's release of a 12-point peace plan to inaccurately portray China as supporting #Russia's war on #Ukraine on February 24. isw.pub/UkrWar02242023
2/ #China on 24 FEB released a “Position on the Political Settlement of the #Ukraine Crisis" that called for Ukraine and #Russia to respect each other's sovereignty, cease hostilities, resume peace talks, reduce strategic risks, and cease unilateral sanctions.
3/ Advisor to the #Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Rodion Miroshnik falsely asserted that #China's peace plan insinuated that #Ukraine and the West are the aggressors, supporting #Russia's framing of the war.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks NW of #Svatove and near #Kreminna on 24 FEB.
Russian sources confirmed that Russian forces have split certain Airborne force formations across at least two axes of advance. isw.pub/UkrWar02242023
2/ A #Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on February 23 that unspecified elements of the Russian 76th Airborne Division are operating in unspecified positions on the #Svatove-Kreminna line and that VDV units operate along the entire Svatove-#Kreminna front.
3/ The Russian MoD claimed that unspecified elements of the 76th and 106th Airborne Divisions are operating in the #Bakhmut area in #Donetsk Oblast, confirming ISW's assessment that the 76th and likely the 106th are not deployed as full division-level formations in either area.