#Russian forces would have to choose between two diverging lines of advance after capturing #Bakhmut that are not mutually supporting, and degraded Russian forces would likely have to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success. (1/4) isw.pub/UkrWar030723
2/ #Russian forces could attempt to push west along the T0504 highway towards Kostiatynivka (about 20km from #Bakhmut) or northwest along the E40 highway towards the #Slovyansk-#Kramatorsk area in NW #Donetsk Oblast (about 40km northwest of Bakhmut. isw.pub/UkrWar030723
3/ Degraded #Russian forces would likely have to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success - though Russian commanders have repeatedly stretched their forces too thin across multiple axes of advance throughout the invasion of #Ukraine.
4/ #Ukrainian forces have also heavily fortified both of these routes, which are supplied by numerous ground lines of communication running deep into the Ukrainian rear, and any #Russian attempt to advance down these roads would likely be highly costly. isw.pub/UkrWar030723
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US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated on March 8 that #Putin likely recognizes the #Russian military’s current limited capability to sustain a short-term offensive and may pursue a protracted war in #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar030823
2/ Haines stated on March 8 that Putin is likely only temporarily focused on pursuing short-term military objectives in Ukraine and may believe that prolonging the war will increase the likelihood of achieving his strategic goals. isw.pub/UkrWar030823
3/ ISW has continuously assessed that #Putin maintains maximalist war goals in #Ukraine despite #Russian forces’ currently limited capabilities to achieve those goals. isw.pub/UkrWar030823
Russian forces have not yet completed a turning movement around Bakhmut and may be conducting a high pace of operations well NW of Bakhmut to spoil future Ukrainian counterattacks that could relieve pressure on Ukrainian forces.🧵isw.pub/UkrWar030823
2/ The #Ukrainian General Staff reported that #Russian forces conducted more than 30 assaults near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of #Bakhmut), roughly thirty percent of the total Russian offensive operations that the General Staff reported in #Ukraine on March 8.
3/ The reported high pace of Russian assaults around Orikhovo-Vasylivka is likely too far NW of #Bakhmut to effectively aid in the attempted Russian turning movement around Bakhmut, given Orikhovo-Vasylivka is over 8km from the closest Ukrainian supply route through Khromove.
#Russian forces additionally likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond #Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare. (1/7) isw.pub/UkrWar030723
2/ Recent #Russian advances within urban areas of #Bakhmut demonstrate that Russian forces can secure limited tactical gains with infantry-led frontal assaults. They likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to exploit roads (which are likely highly fortified) west of Bakhmut.
3/ As @TheStudyofWar has recently reported, Russian forces are increasingly relying on “assault detachments,” a battalion-size element optimized for frontal assaults on fortified areas, rather than for maneuver warfare.
#Prigozhin has ramped up efforts to disseminate #Wagner’s militarism and ideology in #Russia via its role in Bakhmut. He is among the most extreme of the pro-war nationalists & the severe degradation of elite Wagner forces would have positive ramifications beyond the battlefield.
2/ The #WagnerGroup has recently opened several recruitment centers at sports clubs throughout #Russia, opened a youth branch, and is visiting schoolchildren to lecture them about #Wagner’s structure and show them unfiltered combat footage from Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar030623
3/ #Wagner’s success in #Bakhmut thus far has given #Prigozhin a major advantage in the information space, bolstering his reputation and increasing his popularity in a way that will likely have long-term impacts in the #Russian domestic sphere.
Some Western reports have recently suggested that Ukraine is expending its own elite manpower & scarce equipment in #Bakhmut on mainly Wagner prison recruits who are mere cannon fodder, noting that such an exchange is to Ukr's disadvantage even at high ratios of Ru to Ukr losses.
2/ That observation is valid in general, although the pool of #Russian convict recruits suitable for combat is not limitless and the permanent elimination of tens of thousands of them in #Bakhmut means that they will not be available for more important fights.
3/ #Ukrainian intelligence has supported @TheStudyofWar's assessment that #Russian forces near #Bakhmut have recently changed tactics and committed higher-quality special forces operators and elements of conventional forces to the fight. isw.pub/UkrWar030623
Russian forces continued ground attacks in & around Bakhmut on March 6 and secured gains but still have not succeeded in encircling the city. 🧵(1/7) isw.pub/UkrWar030623
2/ Geolocated footage posted on March 6 shows #WagnerGroup infantry hanging a #Wagner flag and posing in front of the T-34 tank monument in eastern #Bakhmut, confirming the Wagner has advanced westward along Maksyma Horkoho street towards Bakhmut’s city center.
3/ Ukraine reported on March 6 that Russian forces are storming Bakhmut despite continued losses and that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; near Zalizianske (7km NW), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km NW), and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km NW); and Ivanivske (5km west).