2/8 I look at #GLOBSEC from the perspective of how "small states" in Central & Eastern Europe set out to improve their positions within the social hierarchy of the Western community after they had joined the EU & NATO. Slovakia is a particularly interesting case for two reasons:
3/8 First, after 1992 it had to cope with two challenges at once, state-building and democratization. Second, the political struggle between the elites in the 1990s (Mečiarism) delayed integration into Western institutions, at least when compared to the other Visegrad members.
4/8 When Slovakia finally joined the EU and NATO in 2004, it found itself within a different coordinate system of power and identity: it had to reinvent itself as useful, special and advance within informal networks that remain(ed) dominated by elites from larger Western states.
5/8 The Bratislava Global Security Forum or short, GLOBSEC, allows Slovakia to contribute to and shape Western strategic debates, which precede bureaucratic decision-making processes. Established in 2005, GLOBSEC has been the first of its kind in Central & Eastern Europe.
6/8 Based on interviews, my article tells the story of GLOBSEC, which is special, because it originally evolved as a students' project rather than an official event. Today, there are many similar platforms in the region, many of which have been directly modelled after GLOBSEC.
7/8 GLOBSEC's success derives from initial US support and transatlantic networks but it also depends on representing the entire region in the West rather than just Slovakia. Nevertheless, social hierarchies of international conferencing endure with the @MunSecConf at the top.
8/8 Check out the volume for more details, and many more great contributions on various aspects of small state politics covering all world regions by, among others, @RevePedi and @AndersWivel, Iver Neumann, Wouter Veenendaal, Edith Kauffer, @BaldurThorhalls and many more.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Much has been said about Medvedev's increasingly radical rhetoric. Some say he's going with the times, others see it as evidence that his liberalism has always been fake. But there is more to it than that. A🧵 1/14
2/14 About 35 years ago, Medvedev was a law student at Leningrad State University and assistant to his supervisor Anatoly Sobchak. When Sobchak got elected mayor of Leningrad in '90, Medvedev, then in his mid-20s, followed him but remained affiliated with the university.
3/14 Medvedev had actively campaigned for Sobchak's election. He liked the new politics. At the mayor's office, he met Putin, 13 years his senior, who would eventually become his boss. When Putin became Prime Minister in 1999, Medvedev followed him to Moscow.
Worth repeating that the #war against #Ukraine is not about territory, ethnicity or language. It is about both, #Russian identity and power in Europe. Because #Putin sees himself in the realm of loss, he has become risk-seeking. To him, it is not about expanding, but defense 1/6
2/6 This is what Putin meant in 2021, when he argued that "Russia has nowhere to retreat". NATO and EU enlargement (membership and partnership) are about the power to define rules, norms & values, but great power postures depend on the ability to project power where it matters.
3/6 After 2014, Russia kept losing influence in Ukraine, which the Minsk agreement was designed to prevent long term. It didn't. Ukraine's identity had changed irrevocably. Poroshenko and Zelenskiy moved ahead with curbing the Kremlin's power assets in the country.
The #Russian gov system has been in crisis since 2008/9. The elite has been looking for ways to generate political legitimacy & economic growth but w/o changing the domestic political order & the system of rent distribution. A struggle against decline. An (im)possible task. 1/20
2/ There have been several attempts of reform. In order to stimulate innovation, Putin, similar to Soviet times, decided to tap state resources and strengthen the military-industrial complex. Large conglomerates (Rostec, Rosnano etc) were supposed to enable civilian conversion.
3/ Simultaneously, #Putin deliberately selected Dmitri Medvedev as his successor to open the possibility for political change. But #Medvedev turned out to be a weak leader, who lost essential constituencies on which Putin's system of power depended.
Critics of #Mearsheimer seem to be more concerned with the moral implications of his argument and the implicit course of alternative action than whether it captures an important (though not the only) part of reality. 1/14 🧵
2/ Mearsheimer's argument that prospective NATO enlargement caused the Russian invasion in #Ukraine is about structural not immediate causes. Critics are right to point out that it can neither explain the exact timing, nor the explicit rhetoric and operational course of action.
3/ Mearsheimer's argument is about power, not security, however. Offensive realism expects Russia as a great power to strive for regional hegemony. As a result, Ukraine moving conclusively into the Western camp (NATO being just one aspect) is viewed as a threat to such ambitions.
Since the "#Moskva" battle cruiser sank, here is an #armscontrol story: the ship was launched in 1979. Until 1996 it was known as "Slava". In July 1989 the Slava took part in a unique, joined US-Soviet scientific collaboration: The Black Sea experiment. 1/5
2/5 The experiment tested the use of helicopter-borne neutron detectors to detect nuclear warheads on the Slava. At the time the issue of naval nuclear weapons was salient. More particularly, long range SLCM had become a contentious issue in the START negotiations.
3/5 The Black Sea experiment was part of a series, which produced mixed results: two helicopters flew by the Slava at close range (30 snd 80 meters) to detect emissions from plutonium in a warhead. Still, the political problem was ultimately solved.
What is the endgame, the strategy of #victory, or to put it differently, the vision for #conflict#resolution in #Ukraine? What are feasible scenarios of future relations between #Russia and the #West? Some thoughts. Highly speculative and simplified.🧵1/9
2/9 Scenario 1: Putin wins militarily in Ukraine and achieves his political goals: regime change and demilitarization. Oppression in Russia increases. Western sanctions intensify, aiming at regime change in Russia. European division becomes permanent. foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukrai…
3/9 At the moment this scenario seems very much possible, unfortunately. The question is at what costs. Total destruction? Ukrainian statehood as we knew it will be lost but partisan warfare and sanctions over time may lead to an intra-elite coup in Russia as well (Scenario 3)