2/ #Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on May 7 that 1,552 people (including 632 children, 145 patients from neuropsychiatric centers, and 10 people with limited mobility) have relocated from areas included in evacuation orders.
3/ Russian forces and occupation authorities are setting conditions to make life unbearable in occupied #Zaporizhia Oblast to accelerate forceful evacuations.
4/ Ukrainian #Zaporizhia Oblast officials stated on May 6-7 that Russian forces and occupation authorities are intentionally sparking panic in occupied #Tokmak and #Enerhodar by withholding humanitarian supplies and raising the prices of food and other goods in stores.
5/ Ukrainian #Zaporizhia Oblast officials also stated that the Russian occupation authorities are removing medical equipment from hospitals and discharging patients early, offering them continued medical care if they evacuate to territory deeper in the Russian rear.
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2/ Geolocated footage published on May 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely made further marginal advances north of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) in an area where ISW assesses Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack as of April 30. isw.pub/UkrWar050923
3/ Ukrainian forces likely conducted a successful limited counterattack in western #Donetsk Oblast.
Geolocated footage published on May 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Novodonetsk (50km SW of Donetsk City) and made marginal advances in the area.
#Prigozhin also announced that #WagnerGroup will not withdraw from #Bakhmut by the previously stated deadline of May 10 despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) failing to resolve the claimed “shell hunger.” isw.pub/UkrWar050923
2/ #Prigozhin continued to blame high casualties and the slow pace of advance in #Bakhmut on other Russian irregular formations in an attempt to frame #Wagner as the only competent force operating in the area.
3/ #Prigozhin’s failure to abide by the withdrawal threat he made on May 5 indicates that he is cognizant of his dependence on the Russian MoD. isw.pub/UkrWar050923
2/ #Prigozhin referred to a “happy grandfather” figure who “thinks that he is good” during a discussion of ammunition shortages and #Russia’s future prospects in #Ukraine.
3/ #Prigozhin then rhetorically asked what #Russia and future generations should do and how Russia can win if the “grandfather” turns out to be a “complete asshole.”
#Putin declined to use his #VictoryDay address to make any significant rhetorical changes and reiterated existing narratives, preparing for a protracted war & framing #Russia as successfully resisting the entire West.
2/ #Putin similarly declined to use recent notable events such as his annual New Year’s Eve address or his February 2023 address to the Federal Assembly to offer any concrete vision on how to reverse #Russia's military’s setbacks in #Ukraine or reframe the war.
3/ #Putin has instead used these events to reinforce long-standing rhetorical lines aimed at preparing the Russian public for a protracted war in #Ukraine by evoking the memory of World War Two without calling on Russian society to support full mobilization.
#Putin is attempting to use the #Moscow#VictoryDay parade to show #Russia’s continued influence in Central Asia but the late announcement of Central Asian leaders’ attendance likely indicates their reticence to show direct & public support of the war.🧵⬇️isw.pub/UkrWar050823
2/ Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon are reportedly attending the #VictoryDay parade in #Moscow on May 9.
3/ #Kremlin-affiliated news outlet Vedemosti reported Japarov’s visit to #Moscow for #VictoryDay on April 23, while Russian media reported Tokayev’s, Mirziyoyev’s, and Rakhmon’s visits on May 8, only one day before the #VictoryDayParade in Moscow.
#Gerasimov's apparent need to negotiate with subordinate commanders and those commanders’ ability to force his hand suggests that chain of command problems are significantly impacting the Russian military’s ability to conduct coherent theater-wide operations.
2/ ISW has assessed that the RU military command had likely recently decided to reprioritize efforts & resource allocation to prepare to receive potential UKR counteroffensive operations but did not set conditions to appease Prigozhin/offset Wagner’s likely degradation in Bakhmut
3/ The subsequent upheaval over the de-prioritization of Bakhmut and the Russian military command's reversal on supplying Wagner is likely to undermine this theater-wide effort.