Dr. Jonathan Schroden Profile picture
May 18 22 tweets 9 min read Twitter logo Read on Twitter
Today, the #Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an evaluation report of its contribution to the Resolute Support mission in #Afghanistan that *pulls no punches.*

I'll string together its primary findings in this THREAD. 1/n Image
(You can find the full report and an executive summary here: english.iob-evaluatie.nl/results/public…) 2/N
Before the findings, a quick comment: the Dutch MFA produced this report b/c "Dutch contributions to missions under Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution are subject to an obligation to evaluate the deployment after it's been completed"

Wish the US had a similar requirement. 3/n
1st Finding: "The main objective of RSM—to create a self-reliant Afghan security apparatus that could permanently resist the #Taliban—was not realised. The immediate reason for this was the unilateral decision by the US to withdraw all of its troops from #Afghanistan..." 4/n
"...thus terminating RSM de facto, even though it was known that the #ANDSF were not yet capable of providing security on their own." 5/n
2nd Finding: "During the mission, RSM was also not on track to achieve its objectives. The #Taliban gained control of more & more territory during the entire period of the mission..." 6/n
"..., and there is no evidence that the self-reliance or professionalism of the Afghan armed forces and police improved structurally over the course of the mission." 7/n
3rd Finding: "Dutch advisers took small steps to help improve the professional skills of individual officers. Most progress in this regard was observed in the training of the Afghan Special Security Forces unit ATF-888 by Dutch & German #SOF, starting in 2018..." 8/n
"...However, these steps did not lead to any structural progress in the self-reliance of the #ANDSF." 9/n
4th Finding: "the international coalition tried to build an Afghan state based on a Western model that did not fit the Afghan reality—a state over which both the population & govt officials felt limited ownership. The large influx of foreign money created a rentier state..." 10/n
"...that fostered patronage networks, nepotism & large-scale corruption. The poor security situation made it especially difficult to build a security apparatus, because soldiers & police officers were needed to fight even as they were still being trained...." 11/n
"...#ANDSF were equipped w/modern, maintenance-intensive weapons systems, w/the result that they remained dependent on foreign troops & contractors w/specialist knowledge. These factors were known before RSM started & they made it unlikely that RSM would achieve its objs..." 12/n
"...However, in the decision by the Cabinet to take part in RSM, the question to which extent it could be expected that RSM would achieve its stated objectives played a secondary role...." 13/n
"...More important to the Cabinet were the wish to show solidarity to its allies and to cooperate with #Germany. The mission was also seen as relatively safe, limited in scope, and entailing little political risk." 14/n
5th Finding: "Several problems w/mission design & execution hampered the effectiveness of RSM: a lack of specific objectives for the advisers & their Afghan counterparts; a lack of appropriate guidance & monitoring of progress by NATO; ..." 15/n
"...too few moments of contact between advisers & their counterparts; & a lack of motivation among many Afghan counterparts. In addition, Dutch advisers, like those from several other countries, were usually deployed for a period of 6 months, too short to be effective." 16/n
"6th Finding: W/in @NATO & also in the #Netherlands, the progress achieved in strengthening the #ANDSF & the developments in the security situation in #Afghanistan were presented more positively than was warranted by the facts..." 17/n
@NATO "...A collective wishful thinking emerged in which staff w/in the @NATO organisation & in participating countries stuck to the same positive narrative even though the evidence did not support this, & in which they did not pay enough heed to the signs that not all was well." 18/n
@NATO 7th Finding: Dutch goals for participation in RSM were too ambitious & "they were also based on assumptions about the effects of the mission contribution—assumptions that were not substantiated by the cabinet and that were, in some cases, questionable." 19/n
@NATO Overall, this is the most objective & forthright lessons learned report that I've seen issued by a country's government to date. Kudos to the #Dutch for both conducting & publishing it. I can only hope the US #Afghanistan War Commission adopts a similar approach. 20/20
@NATO (Also, my thanks to the #Dutch MFA for citing my two papers on the #ANDSF published via the @CTCWP Sentinel. Was glad to see they found them useful in their effort.)

ctc.westpoint.edu/authors/jonath…

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More from @JJSchroden

Oct 12, 2022
Today, the @JoeBiden admin released its National Security Strategy. I’ll summarize its major points & put some thoughts on #terrorism & #Afghanistan specifically in this THREAD. 1/n
@JoeBiden (You can find the full text of the document here: whitehouse.gov/wp-content/upl…) 2/n
@JoeBiden The strategy exists in 5 parts: (1) overview of the problem; (2) sources of US strength (solutions); (3) global priorities; (4) strategy by region; (5) conclusion.

Oddly, part 1 starts on page 6. Nitpicky, I know, but still weird--who counts the cover as page 1? 3/n
Read 29 tweets
Sep 15, 2022
Today the @StateDept held a presser and there were questions about today's announcement of the "#Afghanistan Fund." I'll string those together in this THREAD. 1/n
@StateDept (The link to the full presser is here: state.gov/briefings/depa…)

And here's a link to the announcement: home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel… 2/n
@StateDept Q: When is the soonest that this money could actually get to people or to organizations that could help people in #Afghanistan?

MR PRICE: The establishment of the Afghan Fund was recently finalized; it was announced publicly today early this morning... 3/n
Read 78 tweets
Aug 8, 2022
Thread. In the immediate aftermath of #Afghanistan’s collapse, I attended a virtual event featuring Petraeus & Crocker on what went wrong. Their comments are best summarized as “things were bad until we got there, then they improved until we left & others effed it up.” 1/n
In this article, P4 adopts a similar tone. The “we” he uses is not a “royal we” that includes himself, but a we of “others.” The parts that he describes as having been done right are the parts that he did—aligning resources, getting HQs in place, etc. 2/n
Count the number of times he uses “I” & the associated context. Overwhelmingly these refer to policies that he recommended but weren’t adopted (& were the “right” ones), not mistakes that he personally made. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
Aug 1, 2022
As I think about the strike on #alQaeda’s Zawahiri, we know what the “finish” portion looked like: a drone strike in Kabul. What about the “find & fix” portions though? 1/n
We don’t *know* anything about that yet, though surely the Biden admin will release details to keep this in the news cycle as the midterms approach, so we’ll learn more. Still possible to speculate on the possibilities now, though. 2/n
First they had to *find* Zawahiri. Analysts like @asfandyarmir have argued for a while that he was likely in #Afghanistan somewhere. And there have been steady reports from Afghans of US drones flying over AFG post-withdrawal, to include over Kabul. 3/n
Read 12 tweets
Aug 1, 2022
Well, this is quite the development in #Afghanistan: the #Taliban spokesman has stated that the explosion in Kabul yesterday was the result of a US drone strike against #ISIS-K targets👇
I'm surprised the US would do this (& esp in Kabul) now, given ongoing discussions w/the #Taliban on a host of other issues. Suggests the US calculated the benefit of target removal to outweigh the costs w/the TB (eg in ongoing talks) for conducting the strike. 2/n
One has to wonder if the #Taliban gave tacit approval for the strike, which would present the US with a lower cost to factor into its calculation, as the benefit of the target's removal doesn't immediately appear to be resoundingly high (though more info could emerge on that).3/n
Read 4 tweets
Jun 1, 2022
Today, @SIGARHQ released its 12th lessons learned report, titled "Police in Conflict: Lessons from the US Experience in #Afghanistan

I'll summarize its findings & recommendations in this THREAD. 1/n
@SIGARHQ (You can find the full report on @SIGARHQ's website here: sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslea…) 2/n
@SIGARHQ After reviewing the history of police development in #Afghanistan in detail since 2001, @SIGARHQ ID'd 11 key findings:
1. The US approach to police assistance in AFG resulted in an overmilitarized police force incapable of protecting citizens from internal & external threats. 3/n
Read 23 tweets

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