2/ The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and did not conduct offensive operations in the Kreminna area.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Masyutivka, although ISW has still not seen visual confirmation of these advances nor confirmation that Russian forces control Masyutivka.
4/ Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna) from the northeast and are trying to encircle Ukrainian forces in the area. ISW has not seen visual confirmation supporting a Russian advance near Bilohorivka, either.
5/ The #Kreminna area is one of the few areas along the front line where RU forces continue routine offensive operations, and RU forces may be concentrating offensive capabilities in this area to set conditions for a potential offensive toward #Siversk. isw.pub/UkrWar052923
6/ Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike on Almazna in #Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 28 showed the aftermath of the strike. isw.pub/UkrWar052923
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2/ The Russian MoD is reportedly continuing to recruit prisoners from regional penitentiaries. An independent RU outlet reported that Russian Penitentiary Service employees opened recruitment points in prisons and are recruiting prisoners who committed less serious crimes.
3/ The #WagnerGroup continues to weaponize social media to facilitate global recruitment campaigns. @POLITICOEurope, citing UK disinformation research group Logically, reported that #Wagner is using Twitter and Facebook to recruit personnel.
2/ #Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed on May 30 that Ukrainian forces are striking roads and bridges in Russian-occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and struck the road connecting Russian-occupied Vasylivka and Dniprorudne.
3/ Rogov also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka (about 45km north of #Melitopol) on May 30. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces struck Mykhailivka on May 29 and 30.
#Russia deployed more S-400 air defense systems (probably at least a battery) to #Belarus on May 28. These systems will likely enter service with the Belarusian military but under #Russian operational control. ⬇️ isw.pub/UkrWar052923
2/ The Belarusian Ministry of Defense released a video on May 28 showing a train with S-400 systems deploying to an unspecified area in #Belarus. These systems will likely enter service with the Belarusian military but under #Russian operational control.
3/ #Russia’s and #Belarus’ Joint Regional Air Defense System (established in 2009 and operational in 2016) effectively subordinates Belarus’ air defense assets to the Russian Western Military District.
#WagnerGroup financier #Prigozhin claimed that the Russian relief in-place operation in #Bakhmut may continue past his initial June 1 deadline & last until June 5. The tempo of Russian operations around Bakhmut remains notably low. isw.pub/UkrWar052823
2/ #Prigozhin appears to have again indirectly undermined Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s authority and regime. Prigozhin may be attacking Putin for failing to give Prigozhin some promised reward for seizing #Bakhmut.
3/ The #WagnerGroup held a reportedly illegal pro-#Wagner rally in #Yekaterinburg, #Russia on May 28 despite the reported banning of the rally by Yekaterinburg authorities.
Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about 🇷🇺 state media banning any discussions re: Wagner forces ... then gave advice to an unnamed official: “If you are starting a war, please have character, will, & steel balls—& only then you will be able to achieve something.” 2/
#Prigozhin implied that accomplishing real achievements would let the official avoid lying about the construction of new buildings, metro stations, and bridges in an effort to look good. 3/
The Russian Ministry of Justice registered the civil society group “Council of Mothers of Wives” as a foreign agent on May 26, likely to curb resistance to #Russia's ongoing and future force generation efforts. isw.pub/UkrWar052723
2/ The “Council of Mothers and Wives” routinely advocated for their relatives serving in the Russian military by reaching out to local officials following the start of partial mobilization in late September 2022.
3/ #Putin previously tried to dull the informational impact of the group’s criticism of mobilization in late November 2022 by attending a meeting with hand-picked women in the Russian political sphere falsely presented as mothers of mobilized personnel. isw.pub/UkrWar112522