2/ #Prigozhin’s press service published a video on June 4 showing a #Wagner fighter interrogating a Russian soldier who identified himself as Lieutenant Colonel Roman Venevitin of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps).
3/ Venevitin admitted on camera that he ordered his unit to fire on a #Wagner vehicle while intoxicated due to his own “personal animosity” towards Wagner and appeared to have sustained facial injuries during the time of his capture by Wagner.
4/ Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner personnel engaged in a small skirmish with Russian MoD personnel in Semihirya (15km southeast of Bakhmut) on May 17 after the MoD personnel fired on Wagner fighters when they tried to stop the MoD personnel from laying mines in Wagner’s rear.
5/ As ISW has previously assessed, #Prigozhin continues to inject such anti-MoD narratives into the Russian information space in order to retain his status in the info space following the culmination of #Wagner’s #Bakhmut offensive and Wagner’s withdrawal from combat in #Ukraine.
6/ The suggestion that units operating under the Russian MoD are actively firing on Wagner while intoxicated strengthens Prigozhin’s argument that the Russian MoD is a combat-ineffective and somewhat nefarious force. isw.pub/UkrWar060523
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Near-infrared imagery captured at 0400 am ET on June 7 indicates that flooding is heavily disrupting prepared Russian defensive positions on the east bank of the #Dnipro River – especially affecting Russian first-line positions in Hola Prystan & Oleshky. isw.pub/UkrWar060723
2/ The flooding has destroyed many Russian first-line field fortifications that the Russian military intended to use to defend against Ukrainian attacks. isw.pub/UkrWar060723
3/ Various sources reported that Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Kozacha Laheri, and Dnipryany are almost entirely flooded with water levels rising to the height of one-story buildings in some areas.
1/ Damage to the #Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam in the early hours of June 6 caused massive flooding of the #Dnipro River delta, river wetlands, estuaries, and shoreline settlements in #Kherson Oblast.
2/ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and #Ukrainian officials stated that the drop in the water level at the #Kakhovka Reservoir should not affect the safety of the #Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
3/ #Ukrainian officials stated that #Russian forces intentionally destroyed the KHPP dam and suggested that the Russian military did not prepare for subsequent flooding.
ISW is not ready to assess who or what is responsible for destroying the #KakhovkaDam in #Kherson but notes that we forecast in October 2022 that the Russians would do so.
That forecast was inaccurate at the time, but the reasoning supporting the forecast was & remains valid. 🧵
2/ ISW assessed on October 19, 2022, that Russian forces would blow the #KakhovkaDam to cover their withdrawal from #Kherson Oblast and to prevent Ukrainian forces from pursuing Russian forces deeper into left (east) bank Kherson, likely blaming #Ukraine. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
3/ #Russia's "continued preparation for a false-flag attack on the #KakhovkaDam is also likely meant to distract from reports of Russian losses in Kherson Oblast," we assessed on October 20. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct…
Ukrainian forces made limited advances north and southwest of #Bakhmut on June 5.
#Prigozhin claimed that UKR forces captured part of Berkhivka, and a UKR military official claimed UKR forces advanced 200-1600m in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka. isw.pub/UkrWar060523
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the direction of #Soledar (12km NE of #Bakhmut), likely referring to the wider area north and northeast of Bakhmut.
3/ One milblogger claimed that Russian forces fought Ukrainian forces near Rozdolivka (19km NE of #Bakhmut). Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked Russian positions in an unspecified location in the Siversk (31km northeast of Bakhmut) area.
ISW is committed to helping policymakers and the public understand what is occurring in #Ukraine without reporting details that would in any way compromise Ukraine’s ability to liberate its occupied lands.
Follow-up 🧵on ISW policy and what to expect from us ⬇️
2/ We will remain conservative in mapping and assessing Ukrainian advances given that control of terrain may rapidly change during mechanized operations.
3/ ISW will not compromise Ukrainian operational security or report on anything the Russians don’t already know based on our extensive and detailed study of Russian publicly available sources.
Russian and Ukrainian officials are signaling the start of the Ukrainian #counteroffensive. ISW has observed increased combat activity in different sectors of the frontline and assesses that Ukrainian forces are making territorial gains despite Russian claims to the contrary.🧵⬇️
2/ The signals include Russian MoD claims that Ukrainian forces launched an unsuccessful “large-scale offensive” on June 4 & Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar’s June 5 statement that Ukrainian forces are “transferring to offensive actions” in some unspecified areas.
3/ Russian officials have historically immediately claimed that Ukrainian counter-offensives failed even when the counter-offensives ultimately succeed.