Thread by @VladLupan

As ex-negotiator with #Russia in #Moldova & intl mediator in #Georgia, I see a number of problems with recent article on #Ukraine negotiations - from data interpretation & perceptions to causal effects. Reasons why Charap’s prior analysis was so criticized foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-…

2. Due to lack of time, I will try to post my observations throughout the day. So, this is a developing thread. And as many of my concerns have been already covered by others, my observations may come too late. Still, kindly bear with me throughout this developing thread.

3. As a Govt negotiator on Russian troops withdrawal (and 2 Transnistrian conflict commissions) I witnessed Russians use of lies in talks about their troop numbers, even when we knew they were briefed. Therefore taking Russian statements at face value always presents a problem.

4. Presumably authors correlated what Russia told Ukraine&West. However, from direct experience, by 2014 (& earlier) EastEurope was warning the West that Rus used different information, language (threats) in negotiations with West vs East.Europe = possible information discrepancy

5. Even in a jointly negotiated environment there can be discrepancies, since parts of multilateral negotiations are actually & initially bilateral. We had a case when Russian diplomats agreed with us to continue negotiations but misinformed the West that an agreement was reached

6. In that case some Western govts were concerned about getting to any agreement on conflict resolution & suspected that WE’re unrealistic when we signaled Russian use of misinformation during negotiations & pressured us. Knowledge of prior practices matter in negotiations.

7. So, when Moscow wanted to stall negotiations & blame others for it, it would submit unacceptable draft changes, then in a multi-track negotiations environment with different information supplied to each party, it’d use confusion for deniability & lay blame on others/target.

8. Now add to 👆why the sources authors used (in a war negotiations environment) may not all be bona fide - in negotiations, public interviews serve as messaging channels to domestic public or the other side. Otherwise why give interviews about confidential negotiations!?

9. Btw, the “domestic public” is usually enlisted for war negotiations to strengthen one side point - the Russians themselves referred to the ‘will of donbass people’ for quite a while to push their interests. Did we believe such Kremlin statements? I think not.

10. Speaking of the domestic public, Ukraine is not an autocratic state like Russia & its leadership decisions need to consider popular reaction - remember that in 2014 Ukrainians ousted their President as he accepted Russia request to stop free visa & trade (jobs) talks with EU.

11. So, to negotiate a deal with Russia in 2022, Zelensky still needed public support. It wasn’t there &he could’ve ended worse than Yanukovich. He needed to prepare Ukrainians for a deal. While messages abt negotiations were spread, there were no signals of an IMPLEMENTABLE deal

12. Now, let's have a look at the unspecified claim “Others have dismissed the significance of the talks ENTIRELY, claiming that the parties were merely going through the motions & buying time for battlefield realignments or that the draft agreements were unserious.”

13. In fact, initially Zelensky immediately called for talks, but Putin declined & then, when Russia didn't "take Ukraine in 3days" Ru became more "flexible". That is a proof that talks were attempted, but the conflict dynamics didn't favor negotiations

https://x.com/VladLupan/status/1663904881902600197

14. Historically we have seen such examples even when one of the most important international relations events took place - Mazarin attempted to stall negotiations ahead of the Westphalia Treaty negotiations in hope from "profiting from military success".
journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.108…

15. The tactics of mimicking negotiations by stalling them with unacceptable proposals for potential gains (revolutions in Central Europe) is something that the nascent Soviet Union has done in Brest Litovsk.

europecentenary.eu/the-strategy-o…

16. Stalling negotiations & opening when losing (to avoid losing gains) isn't a good faith negotiation. If you've done peace negotiations, then you know that a ceasefire is a major prerequisite for peace talks => No ceasefire in Ukraine 2022 first half...
peacemaker.un.org/thematic-areas…

17. The fact that Russia turned towards a ceasefire only when it started losing invaded Ukraine territory only strengthens the above point - the indicators are that the 2022 peace negotiations seem to have been tactical stalling
cepa.org/article/give-p…

18. Remember how the 1st invasion of #Ukraine happened in 2014. During that President Putin denied Russia's involvement. Then denied he'll invade in 2022 and then invaded again. Consider "good faith" negotiations in Feb-May 2022 against such a background
apnews.com/article/russia…

19. From prior negotiations with Russia I observed that Putin entrusted actual breakthrough agreements to close trustworthy figures: in case of my country it was ex-GRU Head of Putin's administration Dmitri Kozak, not some ex-culture minister Medinski...

https://x.com/Sasha_Etkind/status/1780195231817732568

20. Content: an important indicator that Ukraine faced Russia alone in negotiations (talks were bilateral, no USA, as I suggested👆) is that Kyiv included US as a guarantor for a future treaty, an impossible provision that US would have rejected, if it was there...

21. Charap's and Radchenko's article may create the impression of Ukraine's overconfidence and Western failure, without taking into account domestic political factors or the goal of protracted negotiations, as in protracted conflicts (Moldova, previously Georgia)

22. However, along my prior points, I agree with @ulrichspeck that seemingly "Russia was hoping to force Ukraine into a settled surrender through talks. They knew that the West would not sign anything that entailed the obligation to go to war with Russia"

https://x.com/ulrichspeck/status/1780146640210329942

@ulrichspeck 23. And now revisit a game theory approach by @ameliahadfield1 from March 2022 reflecting on the same negotiations on #Ukraine. Have a look if the game theory has relevance today from this below, but also outcomes in this indeed moving conflict.

theconversation.com/ukraine-war-wh…

@ulrichspeck @ameliahadfield1 P.S. @threadreaderapp unroll please