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Recent
Roger Froikin @rlefraim wrote, "Democrats are already seeking to make criminal accusations against Trump for grabbing Venezuela’s President Maduro.
1)
1)
But some of us remember when Democrat presidents did much worse, all without informing Congress under the War Powers Act, and with absolutely no reason that touched on American interests.
2)
2)
Bill Clinton, without consulting Congress, near the end of his term in 1999, viciously bombed Serbia, destroying much of its capital’s infrastructure, damaging hospitals and civilian residences, and killing up to 25,000 people, all civilians.
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3)
A Republic In Name Only: How Republics End Without Officially Dying
“A republic has a longer life and a greater stability than a principality, because it can adapt itself better to the diversity of circumstances.”
— Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Discourses on Livy, Book III, Chapter 9
————————————————————
🧵1/7: When President Donald Trump shared images purporting to show Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in U.S. custody, the moment carried a warning larger than the image itself. It suggested a form of power that no longer waits for law, deliberation, or institutional consent to act.
History offers a name for this condition.
Republics do not always collapse when authority escapes their institutions. Sometimes they endure—courts speaking, legislatures meeting, elections proceeding—long after the rule of law has become ceremonial, and power has learned to operate beyond it.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
“A republic has a longer life and a greater stability than a principality, because it can adapt itself better to the diversity of circumstances.”
— Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), Discourses on Livy, Book III, Chapter 9
————————————————————
🧵1/7: When President Donald Trump shared images purporting to show Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in U.S. custody, the moment carried a warning larger than the image itself. It suggested a form of power that no longer waits for law, deliberation, or institutional consent to act.
History offers a name for this condition.
Republics do not always collapse when authority escapes their institutions. Sometimes they endure—courts speaking, legislatures meeting, elections proceeding—long after the rule of law has become ceremonial, and power has learned to operate beyond it.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
2/7: When President Donald Trump posted on Truth Social images purporting to show Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, in U.S. custody—eyes and ears covered, the scene framed as a completed capture—they functioned less as information than as proof. They did not explain a process, establish jurisdiction, or argue a case. They presented domination as already accomplished.
Whatever their factual or procedural status, their purpose was unmistakable: not to persuade, but to render authority legible by staging power as a visible fact.
What mattered was not accuracy but effectiveness. The image was not governance on display, but power performing itself. Its audience was domestic. Its message was simple and old: authority works, enemies can be subdued, and strength can be condensed into a single, graspable scene. Complexity disappeared. What remained was the assurance of capacity: we did this; we could do it again.
This instinct—to convert domination into visibility—is not a modern invention. It is a political technology that predates mass media and survives every change in communications infrastructure. Wherever republics hollow without collapsing, authority learns to announce itself not through deliberation or law, but through scenes that present outcomes as settled before any institution is asked to speak.
Rome understood this logic long before algorithms or feeds. It learned that domination no longer requires persuasion once it can be seen, and that a single image of subjugation can do the work of a thousand arguments. The ancient world had no screens, but it had crowds—and Rome knew how to feed them.
When Julius Caesar defeated the Gauls, he paraded their leader, Vercingetorix, through Rome in chains before executing him as the culminating note of a triumph. It is difficult, from a modern distance, to reconstruct what that meant to a Roman crowd. It was not a policy debate. It was not even an argument. It was proof. A conquered man made visible is a conquered future made believable.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
Whatever their factual or procedural status, their purpose was unmistakable: not to persuade, but to render authority legible by staging power as a visible fact.
What mattered was not accuracy but effectiveness. The image was not governance on display, but power performing itself. Its audience was domestic. Its message was simple and old: authority works, enemies can be subdued, and strength can be condensed into a single, graspable scene. Complexity disappeared. What remained was the assurance of capacity: we did this; we could do it again.
This instinct—to convert domination into visibility—is not a modern invention. It is a political technology that predates mass media and survives every change in communications infrastructure. Wherever republics hollow without collapsing, authority learns to announce itself not through deliberation or law, but through scenes that present outcomes as settled before any institution is asked to speak.
Rome understood this logic long before algorithms or feeds. It learned that domination no longer requires persuasion once it can be seen, and that a single image of subjugation can do the work of a thousand arguments. The ancient world had no screens, but it had crowds—and Rome knew how to feed them.
When Julius Caesar defeated the Gauls, he paraded their leader, Vercingetorix, through Rome in chains before executing him as the culminating note of a triumph. It is difficult, from a modern distance, to reconstruct what that meant to a Roman crowd. It was not a policy debate. It was not even an argument. It was proof. A conquered man made visible is a conquered future made believable.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
3/7: Caesar’s conquest did not weaken Rome economically—it flooded the state with wealth—but it broke the Republic by concentrating military loyalty, money, and legitimacy in one man. Even if the damage was not immediate, Gaul marked the point at which Rome learned that unchecked victory made republican governance structurally untenable. A republic can survive mediocre leaders and routine corruption. It cannot survive a permanent engine that manufactures men larger than the state itself.
This is the first mechanism by which republics end without ending: the slow displacement of institutional legitimacy by personal legitimacy, until the institutions remain—named, staffed, ritualized—while the decisions that matter migrate elsewhere. This transfer of authority away from offices and toward individuals is the central dynamic of republican erosion: legitimacy migration.
Modern readers sometimes imagine propaganda as a uniquely contemporary disease, a byproduct of mass literacy, broadcast networks, or algorithmic feeds. Rome had none of these, but it had public space, rumor networks, and a political culture that treated visibility as authority. Pompeii’s surviving walls make this plain—electoral notices, endorsements, insults, rivalries—politics on plaster, as recognizable as any modern comment thread.
The triumph converted violence into legitimacy. It taught the public what power looked like, who possessed it, and what obedience should feel like. It was governance by demonstration: not persuasion, but registration.
What Caesar learned in Gaul was not merely how to conquer territory, but how victory itself could relocate legitimacy away from institutions and into the hands of the man who delivered it. And once legitimacy migrates, it does not easily return.
By the time Julius Caesar was assassinated in 44 BC, the Roman Republic was already structurally hollow. Decades of civil war, elite paralysis, and widening inequality had eroded trust in senatorial governance. Caesar’s conquests had concentrated military loyalty, wealth, and legitimacy in a single individual, and his murder removed the man without restoring the institutions his rise had eclipsed. The Senate could eliminate Caesar. It could not retrieve the authority that had already slipped from its grasp.
That failure mattered more than the murder itself.
The conspirators believed that removing Caesar would restore the Republic—that the system, once relieved of a tyrant, would reassert itself through custom, law, and precedent. What they failed to grasp was that Caesar had not overthrown the Republic so much as exposed its incapacity. Killing him did not reverse that exposure. It made it undeniable.
Caesar remained widely popular even as he dismantled republican norms. To Romans exhausted by corruption, debt, and instability, he appeared less as a destroyer of institutions than as their corrective.
He delivered land to veterans, relief to debtors, visible results to the urban poor, and victory to a society that equated conquest with greatness. Constitutional erosion mattered less than outcomes that could be seen and felt. What the Senate experienced as the collapse of republican governance, many Romans experienced as the restoration of order and pride.
Institutions fail first.
Legitimacy erodes second.
Power consolidates only afterward.
The error of the conspirators was to treat Caesar as the cause rather than the consequence of institutional failure. Once legitimacy had migrated to a single figure, removing that figure could not return it to the Senate. It could only reveal how little authority the institutions retained.
The aftermath confirmed the mistake. Rome did not rally around the Senate. It fragmented. Violence resumed. Alliances hardened. The vacuum left by Caesar’s death did not invite restoration; it invited competition. Power, once personalized, does not depersonalize itself voluntarily.
In the years following the assassination, Rome entered a brief and illusory interregnum. Mark Antony—Caesar’s closest political ally—and Octavian—his adopted heir—initially feared a decisive response from the assassins. When none came, they turned instead on those they believed threatened them. The result was not a return to republican deliberation but the Second Triumvirate: a legally sanctioned regime of violence that deployed proscriptions—state-approved political killings paired with mass confiscation of property.
Terror was not an aberration. It was a tool, normalized through law.
The Republic still existed on paper. Magistracies were filled. Laws were passed. Rituals continued. But authority no longer flowed from deliberation. It flowed from force, and from the promise of protection against that force. The institutions had become a shell—still standing, still named, still ritualized, but no longer sovereign.
The question after Caesar was no longer whether the Republic could be restored. It was who would learn to rule a system whose authority had already migrated beyond its forms.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
This is the first mechanism by which republics end without ending: the slow displacement of institutional legitimacy by personal legitimacy, until the institutions remain—named, staffed, ritualized—while the decisions that matter migrate elsewhere. This transfer of authority away from offices and toward individuals is the central dynamic of republican erosion: legitimacy migration.
Modern readers sometimes imagine propaganda as a uniquely contemporary disease, a byproduct of mass literacy, broadcast networks, or algorithmic feeds. Rome had none of these, but it had public space, rumor networks, and a political culture that treated visibility as authority. Pompeii’s surviving walls make this plain—electoral notices, endorsements, insults, rivalries—politics on plaster, as recognizable as any modern comment thread.
The triumph converted violence into legitimacy. It taught the public what power looked like, who possessed it, and what obedience should feel like. It was governance by demonstration: not persuasion, but registration.
What Caesar learned in Gaul was not merely how to conquer territory, but how victory itself could relocate legitimacy away from institutions and into the hands of the man who delivered it. And once legitimacy migrates, it does not easily return.
By the time Julius Caesar was assassinated in 44 BC, the Roman Republic was already structurally hollow. Decades of civil war, elite paralysis, and widening inequality had eroded trust in senatorial governance. Caesar’s conquests had concentrated military loyalty, wealth, and legitimacy in a single individual, and his murder removed the man without restoring the institutions his rise had eclipsed. The Senate could eliminate Caesar. It could not retrieve the authority that had already slipped from its grasp.
That failure mattered more than the murder itself.
The conspirators believed that removing Caesar would restore the Republic—that the system, once relieved of a tyrant, would reassert itself through custom, law, and precedent. What they failed to grasp was that Caesar had not overthrown the Republic so much as exposed its incapacity. Killing him did not reverse that exposure. It made it undeniable.
Caesar remained widely popular even as he dismantled republican norms. To Romans exhausted by corruption, debt, and instability, he appeared less as a destroyer of institutions than as their corrective.
He delivered land to veterans, relief to debtors, visible results to the urban poor, and victory to a society that equated conquest with greatness. Constitutional erosion mattered less than outcomes that could be seen and felt. What the Senate experienced as the collapse of republican governance, many Romans experienced as the restoration of order and pride.
Institutions fail first.
Legitimacy erodes second.
Power consolidates only afterward.
The error of the conspirators was to treat Caesar as the cause rather than the consequence of institutional failure. Once legitimacy had migrated to a single figure, removing that figure could not return it to the Senate. It could only reveal how little authority the institutions retained.
The aftermath confirmed the mistake. Rome did not rally around the Senate. It fragmented. Violence resumed. Alliances hardened. The vacuum left by Caesar’s death did not invite restoration; it invited competition. Power, once personalized, does not depersonalize itself voluntarily.
In the years following the assassination, Rome entered a brief and illusory interregnum. Mark Antony—Caesar’s closest political ally—and Octavian—his adopted heir—initially feared a decisive response from the assassins. When none came, they turned instead on those they believed threatened them. The result was not a return to republican deliberation but the Second Triumvirate: a legally sanctioned regime of violence that deployed proscriptions—state-approved political killings paired with mass confiscation of property.
Terror was not an aberration. It was a tool, normalized through law.
The Republic still existed on paper. Magistracies were filled. Laws were passed. Rituals continued. But authority no longer flowed from deliberation. It flowed from force, and from the promise of protection against that force. The institutions had become a shell—still standing, still named, still ritualized, but no longer sovereign.
The question after Caesar was no longer whether the Republic could be restored. It was who would learn to rule a system whose authority had already migrated beyond its forms.
…eintellectualistofficial.substack.com/p/a-republic-i…
KIELCE POGROM
After the German occupation ended, antisemitic violence against Jews in Poland did not cease. In the years 1944–1946, between 1,000 to 2,000 Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were murdered in postwar pogroms, mob attacks, and
1)
After the German occupation ended, antisemitic violence against Jews in Poland did not cease. In the years 1944–1946, between 1,000 to 2,000 Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were murdered in postwar pogroms, mob attacks, and
1)
acts of banditry carried out by Polish civilians and armed groups. These crimes reflected deep-rooted antisemitism that persisted even after the Holocaust ended.
2)
2)
The most notorious of these attacks was the Kielce pogrom of July 1946, when a mob murdered 42 Jews who had survived Nazi persecution.
Photo: Funeral procession for victims of the Kielce pogrom, Kielce, Poland, July 1946.
3)
Photo: Funeral procession for victims of the Kielce pogrom, Kielce, Poland, July 1946.
3)
Everybody needs to save this article to their computer, because the original publisher is now down.
If you do not understand the relationship between the Intel Agencies and investment banks, you're missing the big picture:
archive.ph/GVHEY
If you do not understand the relationship between the Intel Agencies and investment banks, you're missing the big picture:
archive.ph/GVHEY
Investment Banks are basically the modern form of Merchant Banks, which have basically facilitated international trade for centuries, carrying on the ways of, e.g., the Phoenicians.
Rev 18:
Rev 18:
Actually, I'm going to just take screenshots and post the whole thing here as another backup--it's that important.
Ehud Barak's sent email 125 (Hyperion) was sent to Udi Knaani of FWMK Law; it concerns an agreement between GMF Capital and FST Biometrics. There's also mention of "Renova."
Let's take a step back and understand what's going on here: certain people with government connections are using their privileged intel to make investments. THAT'S what I mean when I say that the intel agencies and investment bankers go hand-in-hand: archive.ph/GVHEY
Once you control the government, you control the outcomes. That's why people/corporations making investments along places where the New Silk Road was supposed to be built are suspect--because it seems to me like that was the big conspiracy the globalists were part of:
y'all think you're are the experts in trauma ?
Uh huh..
Uh huh..
🎶
I watch my mother every day ..
Enoch Cree Nation is a band of 2,028 people in Alberta
Since 2015, each household has effectively received $2.2 million in government (taxpayer) funding
And I ask when will it end? 🧵
Since 2015, each household has effectively received $2.2 million in government (taxpayer) funding
And I ask when will it end? 🧵
Enoch Nation is part of @CPC Member of Parliament @billymorinECN
In fact, Billy was Chief for many years, as was his Father
The 2,028 person Enoch Nation has received $1.1 Billion in government funding since 2015
Is MP Morin in a conflict of interest?
In fact, Billy was Chief for many years, as was his Father
The 2,028 person Enoch Nation has received $1.1 Billion in government funding since 2015
Is MP Morin in a conflict of interest?
As I understand, Morin is a very common last name in Enoch parts, but hopefully MP Billy Morin will advise if his council was a family affair or not, when he and his Father was Chief?
8 of 10 Councillors named Morin
8 of 10 Councillors named Morin
Ehud Barak's sent email 119 (Hyperion) was an email forwarded to his wife; it was from Dr. Andor Nagy - TLV, and copied to Moran Sinay, and concerns Hungary's Central Bank, its employees, and Victor Orban:
I'm not sure which agency of Ehud Barak's they mean when they say this line:
"...hey were unfortunately unable to accept the conditions of your agency in the US."
In any case, it's an intriguing email--instead of giving a lecture, EB would be speaking directly to the bank.
"...hey were unfortunately unable to accept the conditions of your agency in the US."
In any case, it's an intriguing email--instead of giving a lecture, EB would be speaking directly to the bank.
It appears that Moran Sinay is currently the head of Ehud Barak's operations, with 16 years of experience working for him:
linkedin.com/in/moran-sinay…
linkedin.com/in/moran-sinay…
Ehud Barak's sent email 118 involve a conversation between himself (and his wife Priell Nili, as usual), Gili Ovadia, and Zafrir Asaf. They relate to plans for Barak to meet a delegation in Vietnam.
2nd half, with translation:
Here is the attached list of delegates ("YBA Delegation list to share(.)xls"
1).
„If Ukraine was to try to go after Pootin, it would have to know where to target in the first place. Pootin’s movements are often kept secret, or else made deliberately misleading.
„If Ukraine was to try to go after Pootin, it would have to know where to target in the first place. Pootin’s movements are often kept secret, or else made deliberately misleading.
2).
At least three of his residencies – Dolgiye Borody, Novo-Ogaryovo outside Moscow and Cape Idokopas on the Black Sea – have an identical office space, so photos or video footage from inside cannot reveal his whereabouts.
At least three of his residencies – Dolgiye Borody, Novo-Ogaryovo outside Moscow and Cape Idokopas on the Black Sea – have an identical office space, so photos or video footage from inside cannot reveal his whereabouts.
3).
Putting all that aside, launching such an attack would be strategically counter-productive for Ukraine.
Putting all that aside, launching such an attack would be strategically counter-productive for Ukraine.
How Do Brain Functions Differ in Patients With Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)?
ASD involves complex neurobiological shifts across distinct functional domains.
While once viewed as a simple behavioural “deficit,” studies revealed a pattern of atypical connectivity and structural organisation that alters how the brain processes social and sensory data.
Meaning, the ASD brain follows a unique computational logic rather than a "broken" one.
Here’s a breakdown of the neurobiological substrate of ASD: 👇🧵
ASD involves complex neurobiological shifts across distinct functional domains.
While once viewed as a simple behavioural “deficit,” studies revealed a pattern of atypical connectivity and structural organisation that alters how the brain processes social and sensory data.
Meaning, the ASD brain follows a unique computational logic rather than a "broken" one.
Here’s a breakdown of the neurobiological substrate of ASD: 👇🧵
The Connectivity Paradox
ASD is characterised by a "disconnection syndrome" in how the brain organises information.
This stems from an imbalance where local neural circuits are over-developed at the expense of global integration.
• Long-range under-connectivity: Reduced communication between the frontal and posterior regions.
• Local over-connectivity: Excessive neural density in sensory zones.
This explains why patients excel at details but struggle with global behavioural integration.
ASD is characterised by a "disconnection syndrome" in how the brain organises information.
This stems from an imbalance where local neural circuits are over-developed at the expense of global integration.
• Long-range under-connectivity: Reduced communication between the frontal and posterior regions.
• Local over-connectivity: Excessive neural density in sensory zones.
This explains why patients excel at details but struggle with global behavioural integration.
The Salience Network (SN)
In ASD, the SN—the brain's "toggle" between internal thought and external stimuli—shows atypical functional organisation.
Hyper-connectivity here makes it difficult to filter "noise" from "signal," leading to:
• Chronic sensory overload
• Difficulty prioritising social info
• Intense "bottom-up" attention
This hyper-sensitivity creates a state where the brain cannot optimise attention, as it is biologically compelled to treat every stimulus as a high-priority alarm.
In ASD, the SN—the brain's "toggle" between internal thought and external stimuli—shows atypical functional organisation.
Hyper-connectivity here makes it difficult to filter "noise" from "signal," leading to:
• Chronic sensory overload
• Difficulty prioritising social info
• Intense "bottom-up" attention
This hyper-sensitivity creates a state where the brain cannot optimise attention, as it is biologically compelled to treat every stimulus as a high-priority alarm.
@LittleBrainz @HannaNotte @FT 1).
„[...] problematic is that invoking the spectre of an unavoidable war with Russia could fuel a spiral of escalation. European alarmism has already encouraged a growing chorus of Russian elites to engage in mirror imaging.
„[...] problematic is that invoking the spectre of an unavoidable war with Russia could fuel a spiral of escalation. European alarmism has already encouraged a growing chorus of Russian elites to engage in mirror imaging.
@LittleBrainz @HannaNotte @FT 2).
They claim that it is Europe, re-arming, that is preparing to wage war against Russia, with the aim of inflicting a »strategic defeat« on the country.”
Dec. 19, 2025
@FT archive.ph/YgvUY
They claim that it is Europe, re-arming, that is preparing to wage war against Russia, with the aim of inflicting a »strategic defeat« on the country.”
Dec. 19, 2025
@FT archive.ph/YgvUY
@LittleBrainz @HannaNotte @FT Please unroll @threadreaderapp. Thank you in advance 𓃠
