Thread by @Charles_Lister

This thread by @hxhassan is worth a read -- #HTS's violent response to #AlQaeda affiliate Huras Al-Din's overreach will have significant consequences.

A few additional notes of my own, to follow:

- This is all entirely consistent with #HTS/#JFS/#Nusra policy since ~2014.

@hxhassan My understanding of events leading up to the all-out fight differs somewhat -- #HTS's arrest of Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki
& Abu Malik al-Talli were *very* inflammatory to HaD. Both were crucial sources of finance & external networks. Plus, they came amid several escalatory accusations:

@hxhassan 1. After Abu Saloh's arrest, rumor swirled that #Turkey's MIT had transferred messages from #Moscow to #HTS, requesting his extradition via #Ankara in exchange for political & economic rewards.

Abu Saloh is accused of coordinating multiple attacks in #Russia in recent yrs.

@hxhassan 2. In the days following the US drone strike that targeted (& killed) Huras al-Din leader Khalid al-Aruri, #AlQaeda loyalists also accused #HTS elements of leaking Aruri's location (to #Turkey/#MIT) for targeting.

Why? Because Aruri had been working on recruiting #HTS defectors.

@hxhassan 3. Amidst (1) and (2), the paranoia that #HTS might become, or be part of sparking a "Sahwa"-type campaign against #AlQaeda loyalists gained ground.

Thus, HaD took the step to establish checkpoints west of #Idlib city on the roads leading to HaD's strongholds in N & W #Idlib.

@hxhassan The creation of new HaD checkpoints violated a years-old #HTS-HaD agreement.

That those new checkpoints were put together hurriedly, amid intensifying tensions & in close proximity to #Idlib Central Prison all sparked a night-time #HTS response.

And then HaD took the prison.

@hxhassan The #HTS-HaD fighting that followed was more intense than many expected -- and HaD did more damage & held on longer than predicted.

That brings us to what HaD represents, after all this. Has it been weakened? Absolutely. But it's more complicated than that. Here's why:

@hxhassan Unlike #HTS, which seeks to govern and command authority over swathes of territory, HaD wears a different face -- it seeks to be a tight-knit, elite, vanguard-like unit of special forces, who engage in shock attacks, operate behind enemy lines & sustain a guerrilla resistance.

@hxhassan Huras al-Din's loss of towns in close proximity to #Idlib city, like Arab Said, or long-term holdouts like Jisr al-Shughour remove urban basing -- BUT that's not necessarily a bad thing for HaD. In fact, it exacerbates a structural evolution we in the West should worry about.

@hxhassan In all likelihood, we'll now see Huras al-Din & its #AlQaeda-linked allies consolidate on border areas & in the mountainous NE #Latakia region.

Recent events may also engender an internal desire to launch a covert insurgency against #HTS, or even #Turkey's troops inside #Idlib.

@hxhassan A possible Huras al-Din anti-#HTS or anti-#Turkey insurgency in #Idlib raises another rumor that's been doing the rounds for weeks now -- that HaD elements have been behind a string of [very] small-scale attacks on #TSK, #HTS & #NLF positions around the strategic M4 highway.

@hxhassan Since March, #Turkey has slowly forced through joint patrols (w. #Russia) along the M4 -- now creeping increasingly close to the elevated approach to Jisr al-Shughour.

As that progress advanced in recent weeks, #HTS came under heavy pressure from #Ankara to prepare the ground.

@hxhassan When you put all of this together & place yourselves in Huras al-Din's [*conspiratorial*] shoes, then the evidence would appear strikingly clear that #HTS was conspiring with foreign powers (i.e. #Turkey) to defeat #AlQaeda's project in #Syria.

That aligns w. #ISIS's experience.

@hxhassan Though we may never get evidence of this, I'd be confident in predicting some form of limited, localized contact may now begin/resume between #ISIS remnants & especially hardline #AlQaeda elements in NW #Syria.

Contact ≠ cooperation, but who knows; experiences are converging.