What @snlester should have added in this piece for @BrexitCentral, I think, is that a “no trade remedies” deal will require cast iron U.K. commitments on State aid (including I suspect continued supervision by the Commission or at least the EEA institutions).
(That isn’t, I suspect, a message @BrexitCentral wanted to hear, but there we are.)
NB that even the “no trade remedies” agreement between the EEA3 and the EU applies only to products within the scope of the EEAA (not 🐟: and the EU has imposed trade remedies on 🇳🇴 smoked salmon).
NB too that the only other “no trade remedies” deal I know of (🇦🇺 / 🇳🇿) is based on strong competition policy commitments - and covers only anti-dumping duty.
So the “no trade remedies between us” provision suggested by @snlester actually depends on a lot of trust and integration. Again, not quite what @BrexitCentral might want to hear.
Final point: the trade remedies issue identified here is key to understanding why Lexit hopes of escaping State aid rules are misconceived. You either accept those rules. Or you face the EU imposing countervailing measures on your exports every time you subsidise. /ends
