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One thing the WH won with the 3-week CR is *some* ability to publicly distance themselves from the final deal. That’s a lot different than how their previous shutdown strategy worked out.
During the shutdown, McConnell skillfully maneuvered the politics into a “WH and Dems must make a deal” scenario, making himself absent from public negotiations, refusing to hold votes in the Senate, repeatedly saying this was a negotiation between Trump and Dems.
To a large degree, it worked. Republicans were never going to escape blame for the shutdown—blame always goes to those trying to leverage a shutdown against the status quo—but the bulk of the blame fell on Trump, not congressional Republicans. 
And McConnell was also able to once again use an agenda setting technique to shield his members from the wrath of the conservative base.
nytimes.com/2019/02/01/opi…
nytimes.com/2019/02/01/opi…
With the 3-week CR, however, the WH/Trump was able to arrange bargaining publicly as a deal b/t Dems and congressional GOP. Regardless of the nature of the private negotiations, the public face was this: the deal was going to be negotiated in *Congress* between the parties.
What does that win Trump? Honestly, not a whole lot. It’s still going to be a weak, face-saving deal that’s mostly embarrassing to him, given he could have gotten something better a year ago.
But it does give him flexibility in reacting to the deal.
But it does give him flexibility in reacting to the deal.
Instead of having to go out and sell a weak deal that he himself crafted, he now has the option of begrudgingly accepting someone else’s deal thrust upon him. Just like he did with the omnibus in FY2018. Shift the blame.
Again, that’s not a great look. But...
Again, that’s not a great look. But...
...it sure beats having to *own* an embarrassing face-saver deal.
Now, maybe I’m wrong—maybe Trump will go out and try to sell this deal as a remarkable win, one he’ll try to take big credit for.
Now, maybe I’m wrong—maybe Trump will go out and try to sell this deal as a remarkable win, one he’ll try to take big credit for.
But my guess is that once the WH knew they were never getting anything but a bad face-saver, they wanted to maneuver the public negotiations to minimize the president’s role in cutting the final deal, leaving him the option of signing it but not having to love it.
And the White House gets to take positions like this:
And, ultimately, if the WH judges the politics of the deal are really sour for POTUS, that could blow things up and veto it.
I think that’s unlikely, but it’s only possible in the context of Trump judging someone else’s negotiated deal.
I think that’s unlikely, but it’s only possible in the context of Trump judging someone else’s negotiated deal.
Again, none of this is great for Trump. He looks super weak, totally out of the loop, and nothing like a great deal maker.
But he could very well look weaker and less like a deal maker if he was viewed as having negotiated and constructed a weak deal himself.
But he could very well look weaker and less like a deal maker if he was viewed as having negotiated and constructed a weak deal himself.
