Thread by @boyd_vandijk

Burra asks a really great question, but I think some of his answers require more critical and deeper thought. THREAD #GC70 @ejiltalk ejiltalk.org/was-there-the-…

I agree with Burra's critique that we shouldn't focus our attention on the absence of Third World states alone. Indeed, it's critical that we take the role, ideas, and contributions of non-European delegates more seriously if we want to better understand the law's making.

At the same time, we shouldn't ignore a long history of excluding non-European voices (see chapter). This marginalization did not end in 1949, since the Vietnamese and Indonesians failed to receive an invitation - despite signifi dipl recognition. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf…

So who actually played a role at this 1949 conference? Burra is entirely silent about this, which is surprising, since the first non-white president ever chairing a commission at a major diplomatic conference discussing the laws of war was, in fact, Indian (Dhiren Mitra).

Going back to the original question, my intention is not to minimize, let alone deny, the existence of relations of solidarity among Global South delegates, as Burra emphasizes in his piece. I just think that this interesting claim needs stronger empirical evidence.

For example, most drafters (whose archives I've looked at) saw a different landscape of alliances than he implies: they certainly didn't talk about an 'anti-colonial coalition,' as he does. Instead, they saw L-Ame, 'Muslim', East Asian, Soviet, and other types of power blocs.

This doesn't mean, of course, that 3rd world solidarity did not exist at all - to the contrary. I just wouldn't go so far as to suggest a 'critical' role, as he does; I think we can learn more by asking different sorts of questions.

What did delegates say about the 'colonial question'? What sort of imperial legacies did they put in place? And are those still with us today, or were they destroyed in the 1970s with the Global South delegates' explicit anti-colonialism?

I believe Burra's argument has most purchasing power for the 1949 Red Cross emblem debate, mainly because it triggered fierce Global South (i.e. Arab) opposition against a suggested Zionist emblem. I am much less convinced by his analysis of CA3, however.

In this key debate, there existed much more division within the 'Third World bloc' than Burra admits. L-Americans generally supported CA3, whereas Asian states with insurgencies at home were extremely resistant. This vital point is missing, unfortunately.

Part of the problem is Burra's Indian-/Asian-centric analysis. It's surprising that he doesn't give any proper definition for the 'Third World' either (now a phantom entity). I feel he could have said much more about the bloc's internal divisions, paradoxes, and contradictions.

To give one example: Burra could have mentioned the role of Pakistan whose delegation worked closely together with its former colonizer (see this 1949 British report). This raises questions about the Third World bloc's so-called 'unity' in its anti-colonial legal struggle.

Most strikingly, Arab and Asian states failed to send their best experts to Geneva. In fact, they placed little emphasis on its work despite their own substantial voting power. L-American delegates often voted with the US.

In a forthcoming article, I argue that if we want to recover the Global South's contributions (I support Burra's deeper wish entirely!), we shouldn't point our attention to Geneva 1949, but to the Global South itself in the years prior.

In this period before 1949, Asian, Arab & other non-European in the Global South played a surprisingly significant role in laying the foundations for the future Geneva Conventions - a story that needs to be told in a year of celebrating their 70th birthday. #GC70