من يطلع على تجارب الصين الاستثمارية في جنوب شرق آسيا وافريقيا وتحديدًا مع الدول النامية حيث امكانية التخلّف عن سداد الديون عالية (تمامًا كلبنان) يرى ان شعار "التوجّه شرقًا" الذي رفعه امين عام حزب الله ما هو الا تعويذة لبيع البلاد للصّين وربما ايران، بحجّة عدم التباعية الى الغرب
السيّد نفسه وحزبه وانصاره باليسار الممانع الذين غالبًا ما خوّنوا رفيق الحريري ووقفوا ضد سياساته التي رمت بنهاية المطاف الى خصخصة جزء من الدولة، ينظرون الى العلاقة مع الصين ولا يمانعون امبريالية صينية ربما لانها بثقافتها المعادية للحريات وحقوق الانسان اقرب الى مخيّلاتهم الوضيعة.
لذلك نسأل السيّد نصرالله وحلفاؤه ومناصريه، بماذا يختلفون عن الاشخاص الذين طالما حاربوهم باسم السيادة وعدم الاستتباع؟ بماذا يختلف حزب الله اليوم عن سياسات بيت الحريري الاقتصادية؟ الجواب هو لا شيء.
ولكن العتب ليس بهذه النقطة تحديدًا، انما بفكرة ان حزب الله مستعد ان يذهب الى الصين لبيع ممتلكات الدولة (التي هي ملك الشعب) وهو غير مستعد ان يشير بالاصبع الى حلفاءه ويقول لهم انتم فاسدون. حزب الله الذي يرفع شعار محاربة الفساد ويجاهر نائبه حسن فضل الله بالمستندات ليل نهار،
مستعد ان يبيع البلاد بشرط الا يمس بالنظام اللبناني والا يقوم باي اصلاحات تذكر.
حزب الله ليس فقط واحدًا منهم، حزب الله بات لبنان بفساده ومفسديه، بعد ان ابتلع الجميع.
#Iraq's fiscal break-even oil price will be above $90/bl in 2024. Here's why per the @IMFNews who concluded last weekend its 2024 Article IV consultation with #Iraq authorities:
-Economic growth is projected to continue amid fiscal expansion... #oott
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-but medium-term vulnerabilities to oil price volatility have increased significantly
-significant fiscal adjustment required, through controlling public wage bill, to ensure fiscal sustainability & reduction of oil dependence
-Int'l reserves increased to $112bn.
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-while expansionary budget was under-executed in 2023, fiscal balance declined from surplus of 10.8pc of GDP in 2022 to a deficit of 1.3pc in 2023, due to lower oil revenues and an increase in expenditure (mostly a result of salaries and pensions).
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Fun fact about #Lebanon's newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs:
A battle over the Lebanese embassy in DC took place in 1989, when Abdallah BouHabib was the ambassador. The Taif Agreement had gone into effect and Elias Hraoui was elected President in December of that year.
Hraoui, immediately fired Michel Aoun from all his self-proclaimed posts, removed #Lebanon’s veteran ambassador to Washington, Bouhabib himself, and handed control of the embassy to the No. 2 diplomat at the time, Sleiman Rassi.
Yet Aoun - who was holding out with 20,000 troops at the presidential palace in Baabda refusing to recognize the Hraoui gov't - sent Bouhabib a telegram ordering him to stay put.
BouHabib, a staunch Aoun supporter, continued to occupy the ambassador’s office and residence.
Many fallacies are often perpetuated in media [esp. Arab] about alliances & geopolitics in the MENA region, mainly for propaganda purposes. For instance, since penning the normalization deal with #Israel, state-sponsored media in the #UAE insists that #Iran & #Turkey inch closer.
However, here’s a microcosm of how intricate the relation of the two is:
🇹🇷 & 🇮🇷 are at the opposing ends in: 🇮🇶, 🇸🇾 & now Azerbaijan/#Armenia; they overlap in #Libya & on Palestine. One could argue that if Ankara was to invest more in #Lebanon, it’ll be at odds with Tehran.
#Iran has remained largely silent on the dispute between Turkey & others in the East Med.
With Syria in mind, developments in Armenia [which I predict will be contained] could lead to another front of Russian-Iranian alignment in face of Turkey.
Mustafa Adib is not the hero some people are portraying him to be. But Adib, banking on French support & the suffocating situation on the ground, had a stronger hand in negotiating his government formation process - unlike his predecessors. The PM-designate though that:
•parties will cave-in following the Aug 4 explosion & Int’l pressure, resulting in them facilitating the formation of a gov’t that can enact certain reforms and tap into some $$s.
However, reality hit hard. #Lebanon, as usual, is just another piece of the regional chessboard.
Hence why, regional patrons of the sectarian ruling mafia decided to “freeze” the situation until November 3rd. When the Iranians [Hezbollah] and the Saudis [economic support: CEDRE/IMF] figure out who will occupy the Oval Office next, concessions & compromise become possible.