Charles Lister Profile picture
Jun 30, 2020 14 tweets 16 min read Read on X
This thread by @hxhassan is worth a read -- #HTS's violent response to #AlQaeda affiliate Huras Al-Din's overreach will have significant consequences.

A few additional notes of my own, to follow:

- This is all entirely consistent with #HTS/#JFS/#Nusra policy since ~2014.
@hxhassan My understanding of events leading up to the all-out fight differs somewhat -- #HTS's arrest of Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki
& Abu Malik al-Talli were *very* inflammatory to HaD. Both were crucial sources of finance & external networks. Plus, they came amid several escalatory accusations:
@hxhassan 1. After Abu Saloh's arrest, rumor swirled that #Turkey's MIT had transferred messages from #Moscow to #HTS, requesting his extradition via #Ankara in exchange for political & economic rewards.

Abu Saloh is accused of coordinating multiple attacks in #Russia in recent yrs.
@hxhassan 2. In the days following the US drone strike that targeted (& killed) Huras al-Din leader Khalid al-Aruri, #AlQaeda loyalists also accused #HTS elements of leaking Aruri's location (to #Turkey/#MIT) for targeting.

Why? Because Aruri had been working on recruiting #HTS defectors.
@hxhassan 3. Amidst (1) and (2), the paranoia that #HTS might become, or be part of sparking a "Sahwa"-type campaign against #AlQaeda loyalists gained ground.

Thus, HaD took the step to establish checkpoints west of #Idlib city on the roads leading to HaD's strongholds in N & W #Idlib.
@hxhassan The creation of new HaD checkpoints violated a years-old #HTS-HaD agreement.

That those new checkpoints were put together hurriedly, amid intensifying tensions & in close proximity to #Idlib Central Prison all sparked a night-time #HTS response.

And then HaD took the prison.
@hxhassan The #HTS-HaD fighting that followed was more intense than many expected -- and HaD did more damage & held on longer than predicted.

That brings us to what HaD represents, after all this. Has it been weakened? Absolutely. But it's more complicated than that. Here's why:
@hxhassan Unlike #HTS, which seeks to govern and command authority over swathes of territory, HaD wears a different face -- it seeks to be a tight-knit, elite, vanguard-like unit of special forces, who engage in shock attacks, operate behind enemy lines & sustain a guerrilla resistance.
@hxhassan Huras al-Din's loss of towns in close proximity to #Idlib city, like Arab Said, or long-term holdouts like Jisr al-Shughour remove urban basing -- BUT that's not necessarily a bad thing for HaD. In fact, it exacerbates a structural evolution we in the West should worry about.
@hxhassan In all likelihood, we'll now see Huras al-Din & its #AlQaeda-linked allies consolidate on border areas & in the mountainous NE #Latakia region.

Recent events may also engender an internal desire to launch a covert insurgency against #HTS, or even #Turkey's troops inside #Idlib.
@hxhassan A possible Huras al-Din anti-#HTS or anti-#Turkey insurgency in #Idlib raises another rumor that's been doing the rounds for weeks now -- that HaD elements have been behind a string of [very] small-scale attacks on #TSK, #HTS & #NLF positions around the strategic M4 highway.
@hxhassan Since March, #Turkey has slowly forced through joint patrols (w. #Russia) along the M4 -- now creeping increasingly close to the elevated approach to Jisr al-Shughour.

As that progress advanced in recent weeks, #HTS came under heavy pressure from #Ankara to prepare the ground.
@hxhassan When you put all of this together & place yourselves in Huras al-Din's [*conspiratorial*] shoes, then the evidence would appear strikingly clear that #HTS was conspiring with foreign powers (i.e. #Turkey) to defeat #AlQaeda's project in #Syria.

That aligns w. #ISIS's experience.
@hxhassan Though we may never get evidence of this, I'd be confident in predicting some form of limited, localized contact may now begin/resume between #ISIS remnants & especially hardline #AlQaeda elements in NW #Syria.

Contact ≠ cooperation, but who knows; experiences are converging.

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More from @Charles_Lister

Jun 24
Last night, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing that killed 25 people at the St Elias Church outside #Damascus on Sunday.

This is a group with a murky history -- a 🧵 Image
Ansar al-Sunna first emerged in the public on Feb 1, 2025 -- claiming responsibility for massacring ~12 Alawites in #Hama several days earlier.

But the group was formed in June 2024 (~6months pre-#Assad's fall) in #Idlib by #HTS defectors & operatives aligned with Huras al-Din.
At least 3 Ansar al-Sunna operatives were detained by #HTS's General Security Service in October 2024 -- they were deemed to be an #ISIS sleeper cell.

GSS interrogations revealed communication with militants in Deir ez Zour.
Read 8 tweets
May 2
What's happening in #Syria's #Druze-majority governorate of #Suwayda?

A 🧵:
Last night, almost all of #Suwayda's #Druze religious, civil & military leaders agreed a deal w. #Damascus to begin a gradual integration of #Syria's Interior Ministry, by folding #Druze militias into the "Public Security" force -- & later, more into the Defense Ministry.
This morning, that deal began moving -- with ~700 #Druze militiamen fast-tracked into a #Suwayda-specific Public Security force responsible for security in the (a) capital & (b) border areas. ~1,300 more men are in process to join too.
Read 9 tweets
Apr 30
Amid hostilities in #Sahnaya, let's get one thing straight -- this is *not* a "gov't vs. Druze" conflict. By any means.

#Syria's Druze are extremely divided -- especially the clerics.

And more than any other actor, #Israel is preying on that division.
While some #Druze clerics (like Hijri) appear determined to hold hard against #Damascus, others (like Hinawi & Jarbou) seem determined to find a middle ground compromise.

Then there's Druze in #Israel (working with the IDF) & in #Lebanon (backing #Damascus). Image
Image
Image
Image
The most powerful #Druze militias (Rijal al-Karama, Ahrar al-Jabal etc) -- HQ'd in #Suwayda -- have signed a framework security agreement with #Damascus & work jointly with the Interior Ministry. They worked together to end fighting in #Jaramana & same overnight in Sahnaya. Image
Read 9 tweets
Apr 15
When it comes to reports of a US military withdrawal from #Syria, there are many moving parts in play, but it's clearly coming.

The US military's decisive shift in posture & priorities post-#Assad offered the clearest evidence. A 🧵: Image
Since #Assad fell in Dec 2024, the US military has established relations with #Damascus & proactively facilitated & pushed talks between the #SDF & #Syria's new gov't.

For CENTCOM: the #SDF *must* integrate into the new #Syria.

foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/20/syr…
The March 10 framework agreement signed by #Syria President Ahmed al-Sharaa & #SDF leader Mazloum Abdi was a direct result of US mediation -- and from March 6, of *intense* pressure on the #SDF (by @CENTCOM's Gen Kurilla & @CJTFOIR's MG Leahy). Image
Read 8 tweets
Apr 1
For years, #Syria's crisis was a complex geopolitical battleground, involving #Russia, #Iran, #USA, #Turkey, #Israel & more.

With #Assad out, a dangerous geopolitical face-off is intensifying -- between #Turkey & #Israel. A 🧵:
Since #Assad fell 4 months ago, #Israel has launched ~750 airstrikes & 100+ ground incursions into #Syria, seeking to cripple #Syria militarily -- while demanding a complete demilitarization of the south.

See my latest on this: foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/27/isr…
With the #HTS-led military victory in #Syria, #Turkey -- in theory -- has the most to gain, and to a large extent, it's moved methodically to establish its influence.

But for now, the transitional gov't in #Damascus wants to balance its regional relations.
Read 9 tweets
Mar 9
The information space around #Syria has collapsed into a toxic pot of vitriol, wild misinformation and... some facts.

Large numbers of people are tragically dead, but the circumstances & context are far more complex than is being widely conveyed. A 🧵:
In the lead-up to Thursday night, pro-#Assad gunmen had launched 46 attacks on interim gov't forces in 6/14 of #Syria's governorates -- but what happened Thursday night was a whole other level.

3 days later, more than 400 gov't forces are confirmed as dead.
Almost all of those 400 gov't forces were locally-deployed -- many killed by summary execution, burned to death & buried alive.

In the 1st night of fighting, pro-#Assad gunmen also launched attacks on rival villages -- some Sunni, others Alawite.
Read 9 tweets

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