@hxhassan My understanding of events leading up to the all-out fight differs somewhat -- #HTS's arrest of Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki
& Abu Malik al-Talli were *very* inflammatory to HaD. Both were crucial sources of finance & external networks. Plus, they came amid several escalatory accusations:
@hxhassan 1. After Abu Saloh's arrest, rumor swirled that #Turkey's MIT had transferred messages from #Moscow to #HTS, requesting his extradition via #Ankara in exchange for political & economic rewards.
Abu Saloh is accused of coordinating multiple attacks in #Russia in recent yrs.
@hxhassan 2. In the days following the US drone strike that targeted (& killed) Huras al-Din leader Khalid al-Aruri, #AlQaeda loyalists also accused #HTS elements of leaking Aruri's location (to #Turkey/#MIT) for targeting.
Why? Because Aruri had been working on recruiting #HTS defectors.
@hxhassan 3. Amidst (1) and (2), the paranoia that #HTS might become, or be part of sparking a "Sahwa"-type campaign against #AlQaeda loyalists gained ground.
Thus, HaD took the step to establish checkpoints west of #Idlib city on the roads leading to HaD's strongholds in N & W #Idlib.
@hxhassan The creation of new HaD checkpoints violated a years-old #HTS-HaD agreement.
That those new checkpoints were put together hurriedly, amid intensifying tensions & in close proximity to #Idlib Central Prison all sparked a night-time #HTS response.
And then HaD took the prison.
@hxhassan The #HTS-HaD fighting that followed was more intense than many expected -- and HaD did more damage & held on longer than predicted.
That brings us to what HaD represents, after all this. Has it been weakened? Absolutely. But it's more complicated than that. Here's why:
@hxhassan Unlike #HTS, which seeks to govern and command authority over swathes of territory, HaD wears a different face -- it seeks to be a tight-knit, elite, vanguard-like unit of special forces, who engage in shock attacks, operate behind enemy lines & sustain a guerrilla resistance.
@hxhassan Huras al-Din's loss of towns in close proximity to #Idlib city, like Arab Said, or long-term holdouts like Jisr al-Shughour remove urban basing -- BUT that's not necessarily a bad thing for HaD. In fact, it exacerbates a structural evolution we in the West should worry about.
@hxhassan In all likelihood, we'll now see Huras al-Din & its #AlQaeda-linked allies consolidate on border areas & in the mountainous NE #Latakia region.
Recent events may also engender an internal desire to launch a covert insurgency against #HTS, or even #Turkey's troops inside #Idlib.
@hxhassan A possible Huras al-Din anti-#HTS or anti-#Turkey insurgency in #Idlib raises another rumor that's been doing the rounds for weeks now -- that HaD elements have been behind a string of [very] small-scale attacks on #TSK, #HTS & #NLF positions around the strategic M4 highway.
@hxhassan Since March, #Turkey has slowly forced through joint patrols (w. #Russia) along the M4 -- now creeping increasingly close to the elevated approach to Jisr al-Shughour.
As that progress advanced in recent weeks, #HTS came under heavy pressure from #Ankara to prepare the ground.
@hxhassan When you put all of this together & place yourselves in Huras al-Din's [*conspiratorial*] shoes, then the evidence would appear strikingly clear that #HTS was conspiring with foreign powers (i.e. #Turkey) to defeat #AlQaeda's project in #Syria.
@hxhassan Though we may never get evidence of this, I'd be confident in predicting some form of limited, localized contact may now begin/resume between #ISIS remnants & especially hardline #AlQaeda elements in NW #Syria.
Contact ≠ cooperation, but who knows; experiences are converging.
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According to local reporting, ~25,000 Syrians have fled #Lebanon & sought refugee in opposition-held NW #Syria, via the Aoun al-Dadat crossing in #Jarablus.
Getting to Aoun al-Dadat from #Lebanon's border with #Syria costs ~$500 per person in "fees." 🧵
That $500 of "fees" goes to a network of #Assad regime militias & the 4th Division -- to (1) enter #Syria & (2) pass through a web of checkpoints into #SDF-held territory northeast of #Aleppo.
For 25,000 people? That's $12.5 million of extortion revenue.
Once at Aoun al-Dadat crossing, refugees were initially preyed upon by a criminal gang demanding $20-$50 per person for expedited entry into opposition-held northern #Aleppo.
That criminality has since been squashed; the formal crossing fee is ~$15.
An #Israel ground incursion -- while predictable & understandable -- is the first time that #Hezbollah will perceive a potential opportunity to level the playing field.
While the group can't defend against precision strikes, it can fight on the ground.
#Hezbollah will hope to respond asymmetrically -- relying on tunnels & other covert infrastructure to target #IDF troops with ATGMs, snipers & potentially attempts to 'snatch & grab' hostages.
#Israel's intel will need to be solid.
By launching at night, #Israel has the advantage -- but #Hezbollah brought effective night-vision use into the #Syria theater as early as 2013. It's not incapable of operating at night, and the territory is its backyard.
Interesting -- #Russia says U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones have been flying over [#Assad-held] al-Sukhna in #Homs in recent days & on July 27, they nearly collided with Russian jets.
Treat the latter with skepticism, but ISR over Sukhna is significant -- a 🧵.
#Syria's airspace is delineated by deconfliction lines (i.e. defined areas of responsibility), agreed upon by #Russia & U.S.
CENTCOM has been increasingly concerned about #ISIS's recovery in the #Assad-held central desert & al-Sukhna has been key to that.
It's an open secret that subtle US ISR & occasional unacknowledged night-time SOF actions take place in the #Assad-held badiya -- but for #Russia to highlight MQ-9s being an issue is illustrative of (a) an increase amid (b) a failed regime "clearance operation."
Gathering from media reports, statements & leaks, #Israel's response to #Hezbollah's deadly attack on #MajdalShams is coming & it'll be bigger than anything we've seen in #Lebanon since October 2023.
It's a matter of time; a brief 🧵:
#Israel has already gone after key #Hezbollah operational 'HVTs' -- but not *the* leadership. #Beirut remains untouched (as does airport) & #Hezbollah's network of military bases, facilities & missile depots further north. Such strategic targets seem likely.
The key will be hitting #Hezbollah where it hurts, without triggering an existential response & a cycle of uncontrollable escalation -- a hard balance to strike.
Neither side wants all-out war, yes -- but domestically, #Israel has to & will escalate next.
#Israel's strike in #Damascus today is a huge development & a major escalation.
3 #IRGC-QF Generals:
- Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi (Commander, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Gen. Hossein Aminullah (Chief of General Staff, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Maj. Gen. Haj Rahimi (Commander, Palestine)
Since the Feb 7 U.S. strike in #Baghdad, we've had zero confirmed #Iran proxy attacks on U.S. bases in #Iraq & #Syria.
It's quite likely that freeze could now end. The #IRGC has often used U.S. "soft targets" in #Iraq & #Syria as one form of retaliation for #Israel's actions.
For months, Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles & suicide drones have targeted Israeli & U.S. targets in #Iraq, #Syria, the Gulf & #Israel itself -- but all launched from outside #Iran's territory.
There's not nearly enough appreciation of how #ISIS's branches have increased & enhanced their interconnectivity over the past ~18 months.
From #Africa, through the #MiddleEast & into South & SE Asia, lines of logistics, recruitment, financing & plotting overlap more than ever.
Multiple #ISIS wilayat in #Africa have recruitment & logistics lines running into #Europe & #ISIS finance bodies in #Africa have been supporting operatives as far as #Afghanistan.
Recent #ISIS plots in #Europe have been tied back to #Africa, the #MiddleEast & #Afghanistan.
In 2023, multiple #ISIS-related attack plots were foiled in northern #Europe -- most unreported, almost all linked to #ISKP.
BUT, those #ISKP plots were 1st detected *outside* #Afghanistan, underlining the group's transnational reach -- as I wrote here: