@hxhassan My understanding of events leading up to the all-out fight differs somewhat -- #HTS's arrest of Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki
& Abu Malik al-Talli were *very* inflammatory to HaD. Both were crucial sources of finance & external networks. Plus, they came amid several escalatory accusations:
@hxhassan 1. After Abu Saloh's arrest, rumor swirled that #Turkey's MIT had transferred messages from #Moscow to #HTS, requesting his extradition via #Ankara in exchange for political & economic rewards.
Abu Saloh is accused of coordinating multiple attacks in #Russia in recent yrs.
@hxhassan 2. In the days following the US drone strike that targeted (& killed) Huras al-Din leader Khalid al-Aruri, #AlQaeda loyalists also accused #HTS elements of leaking Aruri's location (to #Turkey/#MIT) for targeting.
Why? Because Aruri had been working on recruiting #HTS defectors.
@hxhassan 3. Amidst (1) and (2), the paranoia that #HTS might become, or be part of sparking a "Sahwa"-type campaign against #AlQaeda loyalists gained ground.
Thus, HaD took the step to establish checkpoints west of #Idlib city on the roads leading to HaD's strongholds in N & W #Idlib.
@hxhassan The creation of new HaD checkpoints violated a years-old #HTS-HaD agreement.
That those new checkpoints were put together hurriedly, amid intensifying tensions & in close proximity to #Idlib Central Prison all sparked a night-time #HTS response.
And then HaD took the prison.
@hxhassan The #HTS-HaD fighting that followed was more intense than many expected -- and HaD did more damage & held on longer than predicted.
That brings us to what HaD represents, after all this. Has it been weakened? Absolutely. But it's more complicated than that. Here's why:
@hxhassan Unlike #HTS, which seeks to govern and command authority over swathes of territory, HaD wears a different face -- it seeks to be a tight-knit, elite, vanguard-like unit of special forces, who engage in shock attacks, operate behind enemy lines & sustain a guerrilla resistance.
@hxhassan Huras al-Din's loss of towns in close proximity to #Idlib city, like Arab Said, or long-term holdouts like Jisr al-Shughour remove urban basing -- BUT that's not necessarily a bad thing for HaD. In fact, it exacerbates a structural evolution we in the West should worry about.
@hxhassan In all likelihood, we'll now see Huras al-Din & its #AlQaeda-linked allies consolidate on border areas & in the mountainous NE #Latakia region.
Recent events may also engender an internal desire to launch a covert insurgency against #HTS, or even #Turkey's troops inside #Idlib.
@hxhassan A possible Huras al-Din anti-#HTS or anti-#Turkey insurgency in #Idlib raises another rumor that's been doing the rounds for weeks now -- that HaD elements have been behind a string of [very] small-scale attacks on #TSK, #HTS & #NLF positions around the strategic M4 highway.
@hxhassan Since March, #Turkey has slowly forced through joint patrols (w. #Russia) along the M4 -- now creeping increasingly close to the elevated approach to Jisr al-Shughour.
As that progress advanced in recent weeks, #HTS came under heavy pressure from #Ankara to prepare the ground.
@hxhassan When you put all of this together & place yourselves in Huras al-Din's [*conspiratorial*] shoes, then the evidence would appear strikingly clear that #HTS was conspiring with foreign powers (i.e. #Turkey) to defeat #AlQaeda's project in #Syria.
@hxhassan Though we may never get evidence of this, I'd be confident in predicting some form of limited, localized contact may now begin/resume between #ISIS remnants & especially hardline #AlQaeda elements in NW #Syria.
Contact ≠ cooperation, but who knows; experiences are converging.
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Amid hostilities in #Sahnaya, let's get one thing straight -- this is *not* a "gov't vs. Druze" conflict. By any means.
#Syria's Druze are extremely divided -- especially the clerics.
And more than any other actor, #Israel is preying on that division.
While some #Druze clerics (like Hijri) appear determined to hold hard against #Damascus, others (like Hinawi & Jarbou) seem determined to find a middle ground compromise.
Then there's Druze in #Israel (working with the IDF) & in #Lebanon (backing #Damascus).
The most powerful #Druze militias (Rijal al-Karama, Ahrar al-Jabal etc) -- HQ'd in #Suwayda -- have signed a framework security agreement with #Damascus & work jointly with the Interior Ministry. They worked together to end fighting in #Jaramana & same overnight in Sahnaya.
When it comes to reports of a US military withdrawal from #Syria, there are many moving parts in play, but it's clearly coming.
The US military's decisive shift in posture & priorities post-#Assad offered the clearest evidence. A 🧵:
Since #Assad fell in Dec 2024, the US military has established relations with #Damascus & proactively facilitated & pushed talks between the #SDF & #Syria's new gov't.
For CENTCOM: the #SDF *must* integrate into the new #Syria.
The March 10 framework agreement signed by #Syria President Ahmed al-Sharaa & #SDF leader Mazloum Abdi was a direct result of US mediation -- and from March 6, of *intense* pressure on the #SDF (by @CENTCOM's Gen Kurilla & @CJTFOIR's MG Leahy).
For years, #Syria's crisis was a complex geopolitical battleground, involving #Russia, #Iran, #USA, #Turkey, #Israel & more.
With #Assad out, a dangerous geopolitical face-off is intensifying -- between #Turkey & #Israel. A 🧵:
Since #Assad fell 4 months ago, #Israel has launched ~750 airstrikes & 100+ ground incursions into #Syria, seeking to cripple #Syria militarily -- while demanding a complete demilitarization of the south.
With the #HTS-led military victory in #Syria, #Turkey -- in theory -- has the most to gain, and to a large extent, it's moved methodically to establish its influence.
But for now, the transitional gov't in #Damascus wants to balance its regional relations.
The information space around #Syria has collapsed into a toxic pot of vitriol, wild misinformation and... some facts.
Large numbers of people are tragically dead, but the circumstances & context are far more complex than is being widely conveyed. A 🧵:
In the lead-up to Thursday night, pro-#Assad gunmen had launched 46 attacks on interim gov't forces in 6/14 of #Syria's governorates -- but what happened Thursday night was a whole other level.
3 days later, more than 400 gov't forces are confirmed as dead.
Almost all of those 400 gov't forces were locally-deployed -- many killed by summary execution, burned to death & buried alive.
In the 1st night of fighting, pro-#Assad gunmen also launched attacks on rival villages -- some Sunni, others Alawite.
Suffice to say, the chance of #Syria being granted any sanctions relief by the #Trump admin is now effectively zero.
#Assad loyalists knew exactly what they wanted -- an extension of the long-standing "#Assad or we burn the country" motto.
#Assad fell in an #HTS-led military campaign that demonstrated extraordinary & unprecedented self-restraint -- and in the aftermath, calls for 'reconciliation' & recovery kept a lid on a long-standing boiling pot of anger & grudges.
After a decade+ of pro-#Assad sectarian massacres, 82,000 barrel bombs, starvation sieges, 340+ chemical weapons attacks, industrialized torture & 130k disappeared -- the simmering fury & thirst for revenge was restrained only by the prospect of a new start.
- Launched ground incursions into x18 localities in SW #Syria, as deep as 12km;
- Conducted x3 airstrikes;
- Threatened a military intervention toward #Damascus;
- Demanded all of south #Syria be demilitarized.
#Israel says it distrusts #Syria's interim gov't & has sought to instrumentalize minorities to justify its interventions -- particularly the #Druze.
Yet the most powerful #Druze actors have publicly rejected #Israel's "interference" & "stoking division."
24hrs before #Israel began publicly linking the #Druze to its actions in #Syria, the "#Suwayda Military Council" began an online PR campaign -- which many took to be too much of a coincidence.
Their flag was also similar in style to the #SDF in NE #Syria.