@hxhassan My understanding of events leading up to the all-out fight differs somewhat -- #HTS's arrest of Abu Saloh al-Uzbeki
& Abu Malik al-Talli were *very* inflammatory to HaD. Both were crucial sources of finance & external networks. Plus, they came amid several escalatory accusations:
@hxhassan 1. After Abu Saloh's arrest, rumor swirled that #Turkey's MIT had transferred messages from #Moscow to #HTS, requesting his extradition via #Ankara in exchange for political & economic rewards.
Abu Saloh is accused of coordinating multiple attacks in #Russia in recent yrs.
@hxhassan 2. In the days following the US drone strike that targeted (& killed) Huras al-Din leader Khalid al-Aruri, #AlQaeda loyalists also accused #HTS elements of leaking Aruri's location (to #Turkey/#MIT) for targeting.
Why? Because Aruri had been working on recruiting #HTS defectors.
@hxhassan 3. Amidst (1) and (2), the paranoia that #HTS might become, or be part of sparking a "Sahwa"-type campaign against #AlQaeda loyalists gained ground.
Thus, HaD took the step to establish checkpoints west of #Idlib city on the roads leading to HaD's strongholds in N & W #Idlib.
@hxhassan The creation of new HaD checkpoints violated a years-old #HTS-HaD agreement.
That those new checkpoints were put together hurriedly, amid intensifying tensions & in close proximity to #Idlib Central Prison all sparked a night-time #HTS response.
And then HaD took the prison.
@hxhassan The #HTS-HaD fighting that followed was more intense than many expected -- and HaD did more damage & held on longer than predicted.
That brings us to what HaD represents, after all this. Has it been weakened? Absolutely. But it's more complicated than that. Here's why:
@hxhassan Unlike #HTS, which seeks to govern and command authority over swathes of territory, HaD wears a different face -- it seeks to be a tight-knit, elite, vanguard-like unit of special forces, who engage in shock attacks, operate behind enemy lines & sustain a guerrilla resistance.
@hxhassan Huras al-Din's loss of towns in close proximity to #Idlib city, like Arab Said, or long-term holdouts like Jisr al-Shughour remove urban basing -- BUT that's not necessarily a bad thing for HaD. In fact, it exacerbates a structural evolution we in the West should worry about.
@hxhassan In all likelihood, we'll now see Huras al-Din & its #AlQaeda-linked allies consolidate on border areas & in the mountainous NE #Latakia region.
Recent events may also engender an internal desire to launch a covert insurgency against #HTS, or even #Turkey's troops inside #Idlib.
@hxhassan A possible Huras al-Din anti-#HTS or anti-#Turkey insurgency in #Idlib raises another rumor that's been doing the rounds for weeks now -- that HaD elements have been behind a string of [very] small-scale attacks on #TSK, #HTS & #NLF positions around the strategic M4 highway.
@hxhassan Since March, #Turkey has slowly forced through joint patrols (w. #Russia) along the M4 -- now creeping increasingly close to the elevated approach to Jisr al-Shughour.
As that progress advanced in recent weeks, #HTS came under heavy pressure from #Ankara to prepare the ground.
@hxhassan When you put all of this together & place yourselves in Huras al-Din's [*conspiratorial*] shoes, then the evidence would appear strikingly clear that #HTS was conspiring with foreign powers (i.e. #Turkey) to defeat #AlQaeda's project in #Syria.
@hxhassan Though we may never get evidence of this, I'd be confident in predicting some form of limited, localized contact may now begin/resume between #ISIS remnants & especially hardline #AlQaeda elements in NW #Syria.
Contact ≠ cooperation, but who knows; experiences are converging.
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NEW -- #Trump's global aid freeze has cut the salaries paid to many of the prison & camp guards responsible for securing 9,500 #ISIS militants & ~40,000 associated women/kids in northeast #Syria.
Many are no longer turning up for work.
For years, @CENTCOM has warned that #ISIS's "army in waiting" & its potential "next generation" lie in prisons & camps in NE #Syria.
The threat posed by a mass breakout cannot be understated, as #ISIS was already resurgent in 2024: syriaweekly.com/p/in-2024-isis…
@CENTCOM Did #Trump realize that "cutting aid" would mean opening a door for 1,000s of #ISIS militants to potentially be broken out in #Syria?
Of course not -- but that's the consequence of brash, ill-thought out actions intended for headlines, not policy.
The amount of disinformation doing the rounds on #Syria these days is stunning -- some is organized & by design, but much more is the result of simple ignorance.
To make matters worse, *very* few appear capable of distinguishing fact from fiction. A 🧵:
Multiple videos have went near-viral in recent days purporting to show #HTS abuses directed against #Syria's minorities -- but they've been a combination of old footage &/or incidents by #Assad's regime, often in entirely different locations than labeled too.
Social media is full of accounts that specialize in viral content -- and they've flooded the online space with misleading & often wholly inaccurate content on #Syria.
Many on the right in #Europe & the US have jumped on this, sowing yet more misinformation.
2 weeks before #Assad fell, I wrote that the US mustn't leave #Syria, as the D-#ISIS mission is far from over & the practical cost of staying is wholly affordable.
It's still *vital* we stay, but conditions have changed -- a 🧵:
In 2024, #ISIS has *tripled* its operational tempo in #Syria compared to 2023, while expanding its geographic reach, increasing recruitment & attack scale & sophistication.
The fall of #Assad has made the U.S operating environment *much* more complicated -- with our #SDF partners facing a potentially existential challenge from #Turkey, the #SNA & the surge in revolutionary sentiment across #Syria.
Seeing #Assad's former cabinet meeting with #HTS's Salvation Government in #Damascus is truly a staggering thing.
For many years, Syrians aligned with the state risked being disappeared merely for exchanging messages with opposition-aligned people. A 🧵:
In years past, I was involved in a large-scale effort to bring Syrians together from across the crisis spectrum -- for days-long meetings abroad, in neutral venues. Getting people from #Assad-held areas was an enormous logistical & security challenge (for them).
To extend an invite would normally mean first meeting in a neighboring country -- exchanging phone messages or emails whilst in #Syria was a potentially life-threatening thing. Travel would need a cover: a vacation, business meeting, or a family visit.
Over the past week, almost all attention on #Syria has been directed at the #HTS/opposition vs. #Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in #Damascus.
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
As the anti-#Assad advance gained steam in western #Syria, the Arab tribal component of the #SDF sought to take the fight to #Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.
The #SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in #Hasakeh & #Raqqa abandoned by #Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the #Turkey-backed #SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then #Manbij.