A thread here with some thoughts on the explosions in #Iran in the past week or so, keeping in mind that reporting from within Iran is not terribly reliable. I elaborate in this podcast. 1/15 israelpolicyforum.org/2020/07/08/isr…
It could be a complete coincidence that there’s a surge of explosions and fires over a short period. But given so many have occurred at military & nuclear sites there will be a perception that at least some are connected. 2/15
Continued US-Iran tensions and recent #Israel-Iran tit-for-tat in cyber realm are relevant context. These incidents are not happening in a vacuum as the Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ moves out into the open. 3/15 foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/05/isr…
US-Iran escalation also still brewing even if neither wants conflict during pandemic/before U.S. elections. Militia forces in #Iraq continue attacks despite #Soleimani killing. Iran continues violating JCPOA commitments 4/15 fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R…
The Trump administration continues to double down on its maximum pressure campaign with its latest gambit threatening snapback sanctions if the UN arms embargo isn’t extended in Oct. 5/15 nytimes.com/2020/06/30/wor…
Over the last year Israel has also expanded its strikes against Iran in #Syria to Iraq and has been getting more transparent about its involvement, moving away from earlier stance of ambiguity. 6/15 nytimes.com/2019/08/28/wor…
“Octopus” doctrine is widely accepted across Israeli security establishment - seeking to attack head not just tentacles throughout region. This has led to direct attacks on Iranian personnel in Syria and Iraq, not just strikes against proxy groups. 7/15
Now reports quote a “Middle Eastern intelligence official” claiming Israel is responsible for attack on Natanz nuclear facility in Iran. Israeli opposition leaders are suggesting Mossad head Yossi Cohen is the source. 8/15 timesofisrael.com/liberman-appea…
Israel would have motive to set back dvpt of advanced centrifuges which would shorten Iran’s breakout time. Stuxnet revealed a decade ago that Israel can do this, though moving beyond cyber is crossing a new line. 9/15
But as #Stuxnet showed, even successful attack to set back nuclear program won’t stop it. Iran believed to be just weeks away from breakout capability when JCPOA negotiations started. Covert action buys time but tactical gains are not strategic ones. 10/15
The JCPOA did what covert action couldn’t—bought 10 years of restrictions on Iran’s centrifuge development and 15 years on its enrichment levels/stockpiles. With US withdrawal from JCPOA in May 2018, we’ve now lost that time and are going backwards. 11/15
This is not a good place to be. There will be growing pressure within Iran to retaliate. Escalation is not easy to control in such a volatile environment and with a US policy that’s unlikely to discourage Israeli action against Iran. 12/15
Some in Israel might see this as a unique opportunity to strike Iran while it’s vulnerable from Covid, sanctions and protests and with the full support of the US. Some even believe that escalation can draw the US in and prevent renewed diplomacy. 13/15
And unlike in the past, there is little pushback or debate in Israel challenging PM Netanyahu’s Iran policies. @shiraefron and I have a forthcoming piece in @Survival explaining Israel’s evolving Iran policies. 14/15
In my view this is an extremely dangerous moment for the region. 15/15
