So we look at Cromwell through firepower and protection, and note popularity with Armoured Reconnaissance Regts.
OFC Cromwell mostly served in Armd Recce Regts so... it's a bit like saying, "I like cheese in a cheese sandwich."
Not particularly insightful. /2
Of course it's notable that developments in munitions also left the latest German weapons vulnerable to the latest Allied weapons.
By this stage of the war technology has leaped ahead, and even this line still plays to subtle fetishism of German kit of being superior.
Was it?/3
I mean when looking at items in isolation we need to consider doctrine, employment, user experience, after action reports, and our own framework for assessment.
Many of these areas have been very, very poorly studied for several generations.
A bigger picture is needed. /4
Most cross country AFV combat occurred at very low speeds, Cromwell being one exception - but again, lots of these studies haven't been done or aren't yet read for market. /5
Through solely focusing on firepower/agility/protection and vulnerability to 'latest German weapons' we lose sight of so, so much in the process.
This attitude bedevils much thinking in how kit is used, as highlighted by the Azerbaijan/Armenia scrap. /6
Technological fetishism in regards to WW2 kit is complex as people will often wax lyrical about it - for HOURS - but can't explain how the kit was used in reality.
This is a real problem, and often underpinned by modern experience/referents.
Ultimately reducing discourse to../7
Historians are guilty relying on deeply flawed feedback loops & greatly impeded study.
This needs to be challenged, as again, many assumptions underpin poor policy - as highlighted by some trash historical references by CGS to justify derp theory of late. /thread
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it would be nice if the iwm had another type of innovation hub where experts could go to explore the most pressing conflicts through the lense of history
the iwms commercial decisions have been beyond damaging for public discourse and actively encouraged a wealth of unhelpful actors in spreading disinformation and misinformation through structurally violent image access and film fees killing engagement and production of content
A brief glance at how a British infantry division actually reached Normandy and why anyone quietly thinking Sealion that would still work is a right plonker. /1
Efficiently moving divisions by sea so they are effective at the moment of landing is a tricky affair, as each individual component needs to be capable of near-enough immediate action.
I mean let's face it, armies are not really meant to fight on the big blue wet thing. /2
One debate was whether a formations' units should travel concentrated in a single transport or be split up into a handful, or more widely dispersed.
The former meant battalions or regiments landed completely ready with support elements ready for action. Brilliant. /3
A few years ago I did an internship at a small US think tank, related to policing/defence.
On the last day was a roundtable discussion, in which I was astonished to hear the senior directors effectively describe *all* Americans as potential threats. /1
This was meant to be a fairly light wrap up for the British interns but represented our only opportunity to proactively engage with some fairly senior thinkers on defence/policing/CT etc.
After a month stateside I'd been struck by the sheer amount... /2
of casual racism and tribalism, with one of our group violently assaulted in a bar for... being British.
During the discussion the directors' tone deteriorated to the point where they listed potential threats, all the way to, "... and Obama's supporters are getting angry." /3
60 (RWF) Anti-Tank Regiment was detached from 53rd Welsh Division on 13 October 1939 & sent to Aldershot to reform into 101 LAA & AT Regt (there's a mouthful), an experimental regiment within 1st Armoured Division.
In theory 60 AT Regt had four batteries... /2
each of three troops armed with four 2 Pounder anti-tank guns.
As was the case for the majority of TA units, new kit was slow to arrive and there were only a couple of examples on hand for training.