I’ve been asked several times over the past couple of days (given the Pentagon shake-ups) whether it would be logistically feasible to get all US troops out of #Afghanistan by Christmas as Trump supposedly wants. So, here goes a THREAD. 1/n
The answer depends on what you consider “withdrawal” of all the troops. Currently, the US has somewhere around 5000 troops in #Afghanistan & @NATO has about as many (& possibly slightly more). They are located on a small number (10 or so?) of bases across the country. 2/n
Those forces are supported by another 10-15k (maybe more?) contractors. If all Trump wanted was to get the uniformed personnel out, it’d likely be possible to do that in 2-3 weeks (a C-17 can carry ~200 people), so 10k troops = 50 C-17 sorties. 3/n
Contractors would demand to go at same time (if not b4) troops & other USG agencies would also draw down their personnel. Most of those people would go out via commercial flights from KAIA, which would surely turn the airport into chaos. Nonetheless, could be done in weeks. 4/n
But what about the *STUFF*? That’s where it gets hard. #DOD has helos, heavy trucks, sensitive gear, bombs, weapons, etc., that it would want back. Highly unlikely the WH could get away w/an order to just abandon it all (Congress would surely balk, much less DOD). 5/n
Even a highly triaged approach (eg focus on helos, lethal gear, sensitive equip) would still likely take weeks to pack up. Some of this would need to be flown out, which competes for cargo plane sorties with personnel retrograde. But much could go out by truck and/or rail. 6/n
And even that would require abandoning or destroying *a lot* of stuff in #Afghanistan. A responsible withdrawal (I know, but bear with me here) that works through #DOD’s established processes for retrograde & FOB closure/handover would take *months* to complete. 7/n
So, could we go to zero troops by Christmas? Sure, but only if you abandon all the stuff. Is that likely? I personally don’t think so. More likely is that the US sticks to the plan announced by NSA O’Brien that goes to ~2500 troops in early 2021. 8/n
Doing so would allow Trump to claim that he left office w/fewer troops in #Afghanistan than he inherited (a net drawdown) & he left Biden w/a US-#Taliban agreement & infra-Afghan peace talks as a path to zero. 9/n
If Biden continues on that path, history will credit Trump for having gotten US troops out of #Afghanistan as he wanted—though he would own the consequences. If Biden chooses something else (eg slowing the withdrawal), Trump still gets credit but is absolved of consequences. 10/n
But what about these Pentagon moves? I don’t see them as designed to get to zero by Christmas. At best, they’re to get to 2500 as planned—recall GEN Milley’s pushback on O’Brien’s announcement as “speculation?” No more pushback from #DOD on going to 2500 now. FIN. 11/11

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More from @JJSchroden

24 Sep
Watching the @USIP event with @US4AfghanPeace now. Some points that resonate with me in this thread. 1/n
His opening remarks were prepared and nothing really new there--hit all the talking points he's made in recent appearances. 2/n
First Q from Stephen Hadley: What makes you hopeful that talks will succeed? A: Both sides understand that violence cannot be the answer forever. Afghan leaders recognize they made a mistake in the wake of Soviet withdrawal by fighting each other--want to rectify that now. 3/n
Read 31 tweets
16 Sep
"The current Afghan system is totally corrupt and incapable," began one of the senior members of the #Taliban's negotiating team, suggesting that forming a coalition with the "sinking ship" of President @ashrafghani’s government would "drown the Taliban as well." 3/n
"The int’l community shouldn't be nervous," the deputy leader of the #Taliban's negotiating team insisted. Stanikzai said that, in return for being treated as a legitimate political entity in #Afghanistan, "we will be nice this time, more responsible in respect to int’l law." 4/n
“The senior #Taliban negotiator, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the previous TB regime—forced from power by the 2001 US-led invasion of #Afghanistan—was "inexperienced" and dismissed by the rest of the world, leaving it to "slide away from the int’l community." 5/n
Read 8 tweets
12 Sep
The #Taliban political spokesman (@IeaOffice) live tweeted Mullah Baradar’s speech at the opening session of the #Afghanistan peace talks—THREAD.

“Speech by Mullah Baradar Akhund, Political Deputy of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Head of the Political Office” 1/n
Read 15 tweets
21 Aug
Very good thread by @and_huh_what. Seems to me the current govt wishes its BATNA would be Biden doubling-down on it, US-TB agreement be damned. More likely is its WATNA: US grows tired of its feet-dragging and heads for the exit before a deal is done. 1/n
The govt’s perceived position of weakness for peace talks isn’t b/c of the US-TB deal. It’s because the govt is highly corrupt & divided, has been militarily losing for the past 5 years, & global trends have made it far less important to its primary backers over time. 2/n
Contrary to popular belief, the war is not stalemated. The #Taliban have been steadily gaining ground tactically & operationally for years. The US-TB deal was borne of those trends + US recognition that the ROI on its interests in #Afghanistan is bad & getting worse. 3/n
Read 6 tweets
2 Aug
Interesting proposal by ⁦@DavidMaxwell161⁩ for a Dept of Special Ops. Though if #SOF were to be their own service, it’d make more sense to consolidate the Service components under the new Dept as well (Dave proposes leaving them as is). 1/n militarytimes.com/opinion/commen…
If the underlying problem to be solved is lack of effective oversight, creation of a whole new Dept/Service for #SOF doesn’t solve that if a bifurcated chain of command remains. 2/n
Plus, if #SOF are to be their own service, they can’t have their cake & eat it too—they’d likely have to forego the vast majority of the “Service common” support they currently get from the Services (MFP-2) & pay for that stuff themselves (MFP-11). 3/n
Read 8 tweets
2 Jul
The timeline of ⁦@nytimes⁩ reports on this don’t make sense to me. This says the US concluded in 2019(!) that the Russians were paying bounties but only launched raids to catch the money guy 6 months ago. 1/n nytimes.com/2020/07/01/wor…
Previous @nytimes reports indicated that the discovery of the $500k on a raid target led to questions being asked of detainees which then led to suspicion of Russian bounties. But that raid was earlier this year, not in 2019. 2/n
So I’m confused: Did US forces raid the guy because they suspected he was the money man for Russian bounties? If so, when did we first suspect bounties were in play (& why)? Where did that trail really begin? 3/n
Read 5 tweets

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