It's one of those gold standard Normandy tales with an impressive amount of evidence backing it up, and I'm quietly sure even more lurks in archives.
Also it's a pretty consistent tale with multiple eye witnesses and a plethora of evidence. /3
Goodwood was subject to repeated forensic study by Ian Daglish through the early 2000s, an astonishingly insightful and driven historian who utterly obliterated decades of myth & in the process exposed von Luck's bullshit for what it was.
His books remain gold standard. /4
There's been a trend for people to tweet/post about how Gorman 'destroyed' a King Tiger through ramming for a long time, it's one of those blue tick factoids or chunks of a book or vid that refuse to go away.
A trope, but one which has improved by calling it out. /5
Earlier this year I was told of this YT vid, by MHV.
The problematic chunk starts at 13:58.
It has over 250k views.
250k views. /6
Now bare in mind that there is *so much* published material on Goodwood... it's bizarre this is apparently flat out ignored by MHV, bar what ends up in a couple of books.
This is particularly concering omission when trying to get a grasp on such an engagement.
I just can't.../7
Quoted source material, note it's not from the original - which should really be checked when doing such analysis as historians can and do frequently mistranslate and misquote to push their argument.
It's close to Gorman's memoir but is it an interview done by von Rosen? /8
Gorman and von Rosen knew each other from battlefield studies, along with von Luck - as Gorman explores in his memoir.
Also notable he says "17-pounder Sherman" not Firefly, but again, this could be an editors decision.
Frustrating. /9
So then we get the German account.
For me it contains multiple red flags, which are evident in other German sources and tied to warrior culture.
Also it's about a high octane mega-event ramming.
That'll seriously shake you up. /10
Bare in mind this account is by Thaysen, who has just allegedly had his SEAT RIPPED OUT FROM UNDERNEATH HIM BY A PENETRATING AP ROUND STARTING A FIRE!!! JUST AFTER THE KING TIGER IS HIT BY 33 TONS OF AMERICAN STEEL.
THERE ARE NO SEATBELTS
I mean seriously. /11
I mean these calculations are memesy as hell but trying to highlight the enormous forces involved.
This also ignores any suggestion of the King Tiger somehow reverse ramming the Sherman, which appears completely derp - but would be even more force. /12
Thaysen's account also contains chunks of situational awareness that are remarkably good for a gunner contained in a metal box in general.
I mean really good situational awareness.
The gist feels accurate but some parts, no. /13
There's also the notion that his downfall comes purely at the expense of others than his own ability.
This is a trope of warrior culture, happenstance and other's incompetence is the result of your downfall - not your own shortcomings. Esp important at vet meetings postwar. /14
21st AG SigInt repeatedly highlighted German forces withdrawing under overwhelming pressure or heavy bombardment preventing resistance when this wasn't involved in the described action. It was a convenient excuse for disengagement in a culture of recrimination. /15
The shellfire fits this trope.
MHV also interprets Gorman's account clearly unaware of the comms collapse/wireless difficulties besetting the British, nor Johns misinterpretation of Dipper's frantic waving to *probably* stop.
John admits being very keen in his first action. /16
"Generally the British account seems rather polished yet we have photo evidence that clearly denies some of the British claims."
If that is the basis to discount Gorman's narrative. It is very, very weak.
Esp considering memory etc.
And tons of source material. /17
Gorman may have the angle off, but I'm sure he was absolutely shitting it as the Tiger's gun began to traverse - or believing it to be doing so.
This is a *highly* stressful event.
This conclusions highlight a worrying lack of wider research. /18
He heavily relies on Schneider's interpretation of Thaysen and Gorman to the exclusion of... it appears much else.
This analysis also seems off given questions as to whether there was any anti-tank gun in the area by Daglish and others who studied photo recce/units in detail./19
It feels very doubtful there was any anti-tank gun or additional penetration of the King Tiger, as otherwise there should have been some smoke or such indicating internal catastrophe to Gorman and creating a radically different narrative.
This chunk particularly grates... /20
"I know nothing about the German gunner, but the British commander later on had a rather distinguished and successful civilian career and ultimately also became a politician according to a site by British armour officers which give his autobiography as a source."
... /21
Had MHV read Daglish he'd find even find a nugget that von Rosen said to Daglish.
Of course things change over time but Gorman's MC action has a wealth of material, not least Baron's own MM citation etc!
I mean a wealth. /22
It also sits poorly to strongly infer that Gorman was a self-serving liar just because he became a politician in much later life.
This feels into unhelpful modern cultural notions of how we view politicians, esp when many accounts can be traced much earlier. /23
We can also accept that accounts will be similar and differ from memory, proximity, perspective etc.
This is acceptable, not least as you can often build up a general gist of events.
Here the forensic dive appears almost too deep and highlights confused comprehension. /24
So you may wonder why I'm highlighting this.
At over 250k views this vid creates & self-perpetuates a damaging new mthology.
Such pervasive viewing by generally trusting viewers is ultimately damaging for the subject at large. /thread
The thread is probably of interest to @MilHiVisualized for sake of transparency in critique.
In many ways it still highlights the prevalent national micro-spheres of research which continue to hinder wider discourse.
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On 18 July, Operation Goodwood was launched as Second Army slung three armoured divisions in an audacious attempt to destroy Panzergruppe West as part of a mega-showdown that began back on 15 July.*
*Yup, Goodwood is one part of a MUCH larger offensive. /2
After an opening blitz by about 2,000 bombers (I shit you not) the tanks were loosed east of Caen towards the Germans.
Any op like this took massive amounts of infrastructure and was insanely complex to mount. Huge traffic jams/delays impeded progress. /3
So what Regiment is such a mouthful that you have to seriously take a breath to say it, that was also Welsh (that everyone forgets) and involved in the Battle for France 1940?
101st Light Anti-Aircraft & Anti-Tank Regiment
By 4 June 1940 pretty much all of the Welsh units in the BEF, (including) 1 RWF, 245 Field Company and 246 Field Company had been evacuated back to Britain.
Only one unit remained in action, and St Valery still stood.
*All images in this thread are sadly general* /2
On the morning of 10 June on the periphery of 51st Highland Division's perimeter a small shot up column of vehicles towing 2 Pounders, bearing 1st Armoured Division's Rhino & complimented by red and blue markings with a white 12 imposed on top, arrived: a curious combo. /3
In April 1944, the British Army banned use of 'Shell Shock' in favour of 'Battle Exhaustion', implying a more temporary form of affliction & attempt to remove stigma, altho' the old colloquial diagnosis persisted.
Over the course of the July the rate per 1,000 of those suffering with Battle Exhaustion markedly increased from 2.5 to 5.63 by 22 July, ultimately representing 21.7 percent of all non-fatal casualties, with most victims blaming persistent mortaring. /2
Improved treatment of psychiatric casualties followed with specialist Rest Centres established in theatre, as did increased allocation of LOB etc to those struggling.
MOs, officers and NCOs were advised to maintain a watchful eye on those most likely to succumb. /3
You're an front line infantryman in a two man covered slit trench. Maybe 100m from the enemy
From dawn to dusk you're hunched underground, making the best of things in a covered trench 6' long, 3' deep and 2 1/2' wide or so.
With your mate crammed in there with you. /2
You know you're under constant observation by enemy observers and marksmen, who scan the ground looking to punish any foolish or unlucky opportunity target.
They may not get you, but their rounds may well kill or maim your friends. /3
Throughout the campaign this question vexed the Allies, not least as Intelligence Officers repeatedly felt the enemy was on the cusp of collapse.
Such problems coincided with confusion as to why Army Group B didn't just withdraw to the Seine.
Many didn't understand the enemy./2
About the time of Operation Epsom, German propaganda kicked up a gear as officers enthused about devastating new Vergeltungswaffen (vengeance weapons) devastating London night after night.
With such potent firepower on hand, the British capital was in ruins and victory loomed./3