As dawn sweeps westwards across Russia and protesters and OMON get to do their thing, the q arises of just what constitutes ‘success’ for both #Navalny and the Kremlin. An early morning thread 1/
Obviously, one day of action will neither get Navalny free nor break his movement. Rather, it is about defining what kind of struggle this will be 2/
For Team Navalny, it is about the numbers coming out, the spread of places they come out, and at least as important, what kind of people come out. Can they use it to demonstrate a broadening of their support base? 3/
They don’t need to reach Bolotnaya numbers to claim success, certainly not for a 1st day of protests: tens of thousands in Moscow is enough, esp if – as seems the case – they can also point to protests all across the country 4/
As big a challenge as getting people on the streets today is managing expectations and having a strategy tomorrow onwards. A big march and some chants are fine, but what then? It has to be 100% clear this is just part of the start of something long-term 5/
If Navalny’s extraordinary brave act of returning is to mean something, it has to be used to further building a national movement + making ‘smart voting’ part of national conversation 6/
It’s also a chance to challenge but also build bridges to ‘systemic opposition’ and get them – or at least individual members, local orgs, etc – to decide if they are more ‘systemic’ or ‘opposition’ 7/
For the Kremlin, it depends how it has decided to play the day, which in turn will tell us much about how far we are witnessing an ‘authoritarian turn’ overall following the poisoning, which def went beyond past practice 8/
They can focus on managing the day: still enough arrests to signal the risks in participation, but essentially hope to ride out the protest moment. This is what they have largely done in the past. Or… 9/
They try seriously to suppress it, especially in Moscow: lots of arrests, violent takedowns, long sentences, OTT displays of force. A high-impact. high-risk approach. It will galvanise more dissent at home, more protest/sanctions abroad 10/
I am not convinced Kremlin has deftness of touch and control to calibrate that kind of violence accurately without risking a kind of Bloody Sunday - + I suspect PrezAdmin feels the same. Violence will mean hawks like Zolotov listened to more than Vaino etc 11/
This would much wider consequences for everything from state/region relationships to whether the Duma elex will have to be totally rigged. I suspect this risk-averse Kremlin will hold back or maybe allow itself one day of rage then retreat 12/
On international dimension, lots of talk of sanctions, both based on #Navalny’s own list, as released by @vashurkov, and of others, but that in itself is not enough. 13/
I’d *also* like to see diplomats accompanying marchers in hope moderates state behaviour and esp media crews covering protests. If the state’s response is esp violent, then there absolutely have to be additional consequences targeted on the people concerned, top to bottom 14/
Here, ironically, response to #Belarus may give us some pointers. Punish law enforcement + security hierarchy; identify worst offenders on ground; track chain of command (who gave what orders?); provide concrete assistance to those arrested. 15/
After all, what happens today and as a result of today doesn't just set the tone and strategy for Team Navalny and for the Kremlin, but also for the West. A weak reaction to heavy-handedness today also undermines efforts to shield Navalny and empowers hawks. 16/
A desire to make progress on big issues such as arms control + fear of Kremlin’s standard policy of angry tit-for-tat cannot be allowed to hold Western response hostage. Or things like Navalny poisoning + wider repression will happen again and again… /end

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mark Galeotti

Mark Galeotti Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @MarkGaleotti

29 Mar 20
1/ OK, time to make myself unpopular. Yes, in broad terms, #Russia considers itself at #politicalwar with the West, but so much of the overheated current coverage of a supposed use of #COVID19 in infowar is questionable + dangerous. A thread.
2/ Stop conflating Moscow + Beijing. #China is absolutely staging a coordinated disinformation campaign to minimise its responsibility for the pandemic. But the “China + Russia” formulation implying they are the same or coordinating just doesn’t work
3/ Yes, all kinds of toxic conspiracy theory in some of (state-ctrlld) Russian media. But that doesn’t mean it is Kremlin-mandated. These talking heads are paid controversialists who come up with all kinds of nonsense all the time on all subjects w/o any guidance
Read 8 tweets
9 Mar 20
A Presidential Decree has outlined the duties of the new role of deputy chair of #Russia’s Security Council, #Medvedev’s job. What can we learn from it? THREAD 1/?

publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/…
There’s clearly an effort being made to make this look like a real job. He’ll be a part of the “development and implementation of foreign policy”, prepare an annual report on the state of national security, and monitor the implementation of presidential instructions. 2/?
He’ll also hold workshops + strategic planning meetings with other members of SovBez, liaise + generally be a presence. So far so good, + a genuine step up from what otherwise would be the main function, which would be simply to attend + sometimes chair SovBez formal meeting 3/?
Read 18 tweets
3 Dec 19
THREAD: I’m really quite uncomfortable with the tenor of today’s reporting about the supposed similarity between the leaked trade talk documents Labour revealed and Russian online intelligence tactics 1/
(Based on this report from Graphika: graphika.com/uploads/Graphi…) /2
1st, the Secondary Infektion case with which parallels have been drawn involved FALSE or MODIFIED materials being peddled online after a hack. I’ve seen no suggestions these documents were either (If they were, I’m sure by now the govt would be all over this) /3
Read 10 tweets
17 Nov 19
On the claims of #Russia's “unquantifiable” interference with the #Brexit referendum – a short thread following today's @thetimes report 1/
thetimes.co.uk/article/reveal…
First of all, this is headline-making but inane: OF COURSE #Russia would have done what it could to push Brexit. For a country regarding itself at #politicalwar with the West (rusi.org/event/russian-…) then this is a no-brainer… 2/
It divides the UK and EU, it distracts from other issues (not least tying UK govt in knots for years), it spreads demoralisation. It’s a gift that keeps giving. 3/
Read 9 tweets
12 Sep 19
Assuming Oleg Smolyakov was indeed the much-touted CIA spy in Russia's Presidential Administration, a thread about some possible implications... /1
He would have had significant but limited access to classified materials: the Russians practice need-to-know, and only certain documents would cross his desk, but he was nonetheless in an environment where sensitive issues would be discussed /2
That said, I’d have my doubts as to whether he could offer hard certainties about serious, high-level intel activities such as election interference. I suspect the best he could offer is inference and hearsay - potentially v revealing but also subjective /3
Read 8 tweets
8 Aug 19
THREAD: The Kremlin's new crackdown on @Navalny_En‘s FBK anti-#corruption foundation is reprehensible but predictable: as the focus shifted from cosmopolitan Muscovites to the region’s + impoverished public servants, that's when Navalny risked being a threat... /1
...After all, protests in Moscow were awkward + embarrassing, but so long as the security forces remained loyal + effective, that’s all they were. Even at the height of Bolotnaya, this never looked to be a Russian Maidan... /2
...as Navalny targets public servants (including, NB, police) + seeks to build up network in the regions, this could *potentially* be something v different. Kremlin knows #corruption is its Achilles heel, something that can mobilise oppo across class, region, ethnic divides /3
Read 6 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal Become our Patreon

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!