Thread by @MarkGaleotti

A Presidential Decree has outlined the duties of the new role of deputy chair of #Russia’s Security Council, #Medvedev’s job. What can we learn from it? THREAD 1/?

publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/…

There’s clearly an effort being made to make this look like a real job. He’ll be a part of the “development and implementation of foreign policy”, prepare an annual report on the state of national security, and monitor the implementation of presidential instructions. 2/?

He’ll also hold workshops + strategic planning meetings with other members of SovBez, liaise + generally be a presence. So far so good, + a genuine step up from what otherwise would be the main function, which would be simply to attend + sometimes chair SovBez formal meeting 3/?

After all, these sessions are largely symbolic, there to brief the security elite on policy already decided and present materials already circulated. The formal SovBez meetings reflect and do not shape policy. 4/?

The real engine room is the SovBez secretariat, presided over by hawkish and forceful Nikolai Patrushev. If Medvedev is to have any real significance, this relationship will be crucial. 5/?

The decree does grant the deputy chair the right to hire & fire various officials including 1st Deputy Secretary of the SecCo, head of the secretariat of the Dep. Chair + Dep Secretary, as well as various assistants. This is significant. 6/?

Previously, these were formally appointed by the chair – Putin – but in practice Patrushev’s hires. This wasn’t an issue because Putin wasn’t threatened by Patrushev. The Patrushev-Medvedev relationship, is more complex on political, personal + ideological grounds. 7/?

Patrushev appears not to have that much time for Medvedev. He is also on the extreme hawkish end of the scale (more so than Putin), while Medvedev is no dove but more pragmatic. More to the point, Medvedev needs to show he is still a real player, to maintain any credibility. 8/?

So he will need to demonstrate that, + Putin appears to have given him a significant chance and vote of confidence. Of course, it *could* all be dramaturgia, but I doubt it: politics is about perception + simply making Medvedev look like Patrushev’s demi-boss gives him power. 9/?

So, what are my (admittedly unformed + early morning) take-aways? 10/?

1. Coupled with Putin’s recent suggestion that he WOULDN’T take the job of State Council chair (maybe, but a lot can change in 4 years), this suggests the SovBez is still being considered as a possible landing spot for him. 11/?

This also fits @Ben_H_Noble ‘s point relating to the wider constitutional changes, that he needs to retain ambiguity about his future to avoid becoming a dead duck president. (He’s not dead, only resting) 12/?

2. Putin is demonstrating that he looks after loyal foot-soldiers. It’s important both for his personal legitimacy and also for someone who, in due course, may be looking to transition out of the top job… 13/?

3. Putin is also keeping Medvedev in the series cast. By bulking up the job, he shows this isn’t just a face-saving exit for him but keeps him around as a potential interim president or whatever. I’d have thought DAM was too DAMaged goods given his ratings, but who knows? 14/?

4. The Medvedev-Patrushev relationship will be crucial and s/t to watch (will we see DAM trying to build own team?). Putin may have told Patrushev to play nice, but if we see friction it will prove Medvedev is still a player in his own right. 15/?

5. That said, emphasis of the dep’s role is on foreign policy, maybe because DAM remains more popular + viable abroad). We’ll have to see if he gets any real look in on all-important domestic issues 16/?

Especially as SovBez starts preparing new Public Security Concept (which will cover everything from timely issues such as pandemics to public order...) 17/?
pnp.ru/politics/sovbe…

6. Russian politics remain predictably unpredictable, and really rather interesting… 18/? THREAD ENDS