@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: It's no secret that #HTS has been pushing hard behind-the-scenes for opportunities to improve its image abroad -- first in outreach to researchers/institutes & more recently giving top access to highly-regarded media outlets.
And fwiw, PBS is one of several.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: That #HTS is pushing this shouldn't come as a surprise -- the ingredients were put in place as far back as 2015, when a prolonged internal debate regarding the right path for Jabhat al-Nusra began. Clerical "lobby groups" got involved & then #JFS was created; then #HTS.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: #HTS hasn't moderated its foundational ideology, but it has pivoted entirely to a localized agenda in which governance measures at least as important as efforts in the military sphere.
The break with #AlQaeda is/was real, but the impetus was largely for self-preservation.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: The vast majority of Syrians in the NW continue to distrust #HTS & he definitely doesn't represent their revolution -- but the success of #Jolani's governance project in #Idlib is almost certainly the only hope left for preventing a full regime conquest -- a grim irony.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: 3yrs ago, I was told #Jolani had begun using "Liberated Northern #Syria" to describe the NW & was also proposing this zone elect a "Prime Minister" -- anathema to jihadists.
Today, #HTS runs a semi-technocratic "Salvation Government" & conducts CT ops vs. #AlQaeda & #ISIS.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: 2yrs ago, I learned of unofficial outreach efforts from #HTS to a number of Western governments & began to be asked by some whether it was "time" to engage in "exploratory dialogues." (I said no)
I now understand some engagement has occurred. This also should be a surprise.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: When U.S. diplomats have spent months on end negotiating over a shared table with the #Taliban, #HTS gambled that it too could achieve a similar level of legitimacy.
The #Taliban model has been talked about in #Syria before -- years back by another group: Ahrar al-Sham.
My point was to warn of the challenge this'd present - it'd undermine moderates, risk justifying a major assault & force us into an impossible dilemma.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: I wrote and said repeatedly that thus evolving #Nusra represented the primary threat to #Syria's opposition for a reason -- because once it gains traction & achieves some level of local dominance, it'll prove immensely difficult to uproot.
That's definitely proven true.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: Worse still, when jihadists "go local" & succeed in consolidating a dominant position, they create a dynamic in which any external CT campaign against them is almost certain to enhance their local credibility -- that's also proven true.
Hence today's effort to reform image.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: Zoom out for a minute: with minimal hostilities, #Idlib is a dire humanitarian disaster. An outbreak of major fighting is hard to fathom.
If the international community wants to keep #Idlib stable, it's essentially impossible to envision how to do so w/o #HTS's cooperation.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: And yet at the same time, #HTS remains a designated terrorist organization, albeit one that allows foreign (including U.S.) aid to be distributed throughout its territory; supports a modest COVID-19 response; & confronts both #AlQaeda & #ISIS.
It's an impossible quandary.
@frontlinepbs@Martin28Smith#pt: One last pt - it's hard to understate the enormous symbolic significance of this image in the jihadist world.
Until now, #HTS was condemned by #AlQaeda & #ISIS alike for its "nationalist" rhetoric & distancing from "true" jihad -- this picture makes that look insignificant.
NEW -- #Trump's global aid freeze has cut the salaries paid to many of the prison & camp guards responsible for securing 9,500 #ISIS militants & ~40,000 associated women/kids in northeast #Syria.
Many are no longer turning up for work.
For years, @CENTCOM has warned that #ISIS's "army in waiting" & its potential "next generation" lie in prisons & camps in NE #Syria.
The threat posed by a mass breakout cannot be understated, as #ISIS was already resurgent in 2024: syriaweekly.com/p/in-2024-isis…
@CENTCOM Did #Trump realize that "cutting aid" would mean opening a door for 1,000s of #ISIS militants to potentially be broken out in #Syria?
Of course not -- but that's the consequence of brash, ill-thought out actions intended for headlines, not policy.
The amount of disinformation doing the rounds on #Syria these days is stunning -- some is organized & by design, but much more is the result of simple ignorance.
To make matters worse, *very* few appear capable of distinguishing fact from fiction. A 🧵:
Multiple videos have went near-viral in recent days purporting to show #HTS abuses directed against #Syria's minorities -- but they've been a combination of old footage &/or incidents by #Assad's regime, often in entirely different locations than labeled too.
Social media is full of accounts that specialize in viral content -- and they've flooded the online space with misleading & often wholly inaccurate content on #Syria.
Many on the right in #Europe & the US have jumped on this, sowing yet more misinformation.
2 weeks before #Assad fell, I wrote that the US mustn't leave #Syria, as the D-#ISIS mission is far from over & the practical cost of staying is wholly affordable.
It's still *vital* we stay, but conditions have changed -- a 🧵:
In 2024, #ISIS has *tripled* its operational tempo in #Syria compared to 2023, while expanding its geographic reach, increasing recruitment & attack scale & sophistication.
The fall of #Assad has made the U.S operating environment *much* more complicated -- with our #SDF partners facing a potentially existential challenge from #Turkey, the #SNA & the surge in revolutionary sentiment across #Syria.
Seeing #Assad's former cabinet meeting with #HTS's Salvation Government in #Damascus is truly a staggering thing.
For many years, Syrians aligned with the state risked being disappeared merely for exchanging messages with opposition-aligned people. A 🧵:
In years past, I was involved in a large-scale effort to bring Syrians together from across the crisis spectrum -- for days-long meetings abroad, in neutral venues. Getting people from #Assad-held areas was an enormous logistical & security challenge (for them).
To extend an invite would normally mean first meeting in a neighboring country -- exchanging phone messages or emails whilst in #Syria was a potentially life-threatening thing. Travel would need a cover: a vacation, business meeting, or a family visit.
Over the past week, almost all attention on #Syria has been directed at the #HTS/opposition vs. #Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in #Damascus.
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
As the anti-#Assad advance gained steam in western #Syria, the Arab tribal component of the #SDF sought to take the fight to #Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.
The #SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in #Hasakeh & #Raqqa abandoned by #Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the #Turkey-backed #SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then #Manbij.