Thread by @AliVaez

New from @CrisisGroup: our annual (maybe final) #IranDeal status report. The JCPOA is hanging by a thread: US has abrogated it, Iran has violated it, & Europe has put it on notice. A US-Iran tactical detente needed for breaking escalatory cycle. [Thread]
crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

2| We look at the two sides of the JCPOA's implementation record over the past year - nuclear commitments by Iran, and sanctions relief commitments for Iran. These are the two key elements that make up the deal, and they're dying by a thousand cuts.

3| In May 2019, Iran announced it would start curbing its nuclear compliance if the economic normalization expected from the deal doesn’t materialize. It has since carried out 5 steps rolling back its compliance, most recently on 5 Jan. nytimes.com/2020/01/05/wor…

4| These steps - breaching 300kg LEU cap, enriching above 3.67%, lifting R&D limits, restarting Fordow & breaking centrifuge #s are increasingly worrisome but not yet immediate non-proliferation risks. Still no moves to, for example, enrichment to pre-deal 20% or boot the IAEA.

5| In terms of sanctions relief, main story is steady broadening and deepening of US sanctions, which the other parties to the deal failed to mitigate. You can check out a breakdown of the Trump admin's designations in our interactive infographic:
bit.ly/2TqMVmP

6| Cumulative impact of US sanx has been substantial, especially since end of oil waivers. IMF projected 9.5% contraction for 2019 & 2020-21 budget looks a tall order. Economic stagflation feeds into political stagnation, contributing to Nov-Jan protests. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

7| Europe has tried to offset sanctions impact by settling up INSTEX. But the mechanism has been - to put it charitably - underwhelming in its success. Meanwhile Iran dragging its feet on FATF reforms, which could end up an own goal if unresolved in coming weeks.

8| Against this backdrop regional tensions began to rise b/w Iran,US & their allies: From tanker attacks in May to US drone downing in June to Sept Aramco strike & through to late Dec/Jan tit-for-tat in Iraq, tinder for conflict accumulates as predicted: bit.ly/30pWHXN

9| Recall here what @SecPompeo has outlined in @USATODAY as goals of "max pressure" strategy. Iran is now more aggressive in the region & more repressive at home, and rejects negotiations under US terms, which means the strategy has produced exact opposite of intended effect.

10| Growing sense of crisis prompted burst of diplomatic efforts to de-escalate. We spoke to US, Iranian, French and Japanese officials and lay out in the report details of the mediation efforts by @AbeShinzo and @EmmanuelMacron to break the deadlock.

11| A senior French official told us: "you can work w/ senior officials to circumvent the [US] president... it's much harder to work w/ the president against his senior officials, as we need to do on Iran. That's bc the president's vague wishes don't get translated into action".

12| This all leaves us with three unstable status quos:
* Internal discontent within Iran, whose econ and pol drivers likely to grow
* Regional tensions, whose fault lines could deepen
* A hemorrhaging nuclear deal, whose survival is increasingly uncertain.

13| So, where do we go from here? We lay out series of recommendations, key to which is the need for Washington & Tehran to fashion a ceasefire. A grand bargain might not be on the cards, but a tactical de-escalation could be to buy time until Iran/US go through their elections.

14| The Europeans have just played a significant card by launching the JCPOA's dispute resolution mechanism. But what they do from here determines if that card was a diplomatic ace or joker.
bit.ly/2RoQ9o4

15| The US and Europe should also ensure - can't stress this enough - that humanitarian trade is not impacted by sanctions. INSTEX and the channel Switzerland has been discussing with Washington should get up and running as soon as possible.
reuters.com/article/us-swi…

16| On the regional front, we lay out a series of suggestions all sides can take to lower risk of further tensions, including deepened engagement b/w Tehran & Gulf rivals, a military deconfliction channel, & ways US/Iran can avoid leaving Iraq as collateral damage in standoff.

17| December prisoner exchange, which seems an eternity ago now, was rare moment of diplomatic success. Further discussions on humanitarian grounds should go on. @RealDonaldTrump could appoint a special presidential envoy as a point person empowered to lay groundwork.

18| Finally, Iran's economic and political problems underscore need for major reforms. Tehran believes iron first response to protests has worked but sticking to business as usual guarantees further and possibly more profound turmoil ahead.

19| This month's 10 days from hell underscore perils of Iran-US max pressure policies. That war was narrowly avoided doesn't mean de-escalation is underway. But that's what's needed to avert the nuclear crisis & regional conflict all sides want to avoid. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…

20|20 and now that we're at it, here is one more piece on the similarities between 2020 and 2005. Yes, we've seen this movie before and know how it ends: foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/eur…