I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n

warontherocks.com/2021/02/how-to…
First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n
Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n
Some issues though:
1. Why 6 months? Why not 8? or 12? If the point is to allow more time for regional engagement & peace talks, is 6 months enough?
2. Will the #Taliban agree to a recalibration of the timeline simply based on US promises to meet already-stated commitments? 4/n
3. Could the #Taliban sell a 6-month extension w/no additional concessions to its rank & file?
4. If an extension is achieved, what else could/should the US do with it? 5/n
My own view is:
- While some progress might be made by Nov (May + 6 months) on regional diplomacy & peace talks, the latter won't conclude by then.
- The #Taliban will demand add'l concessions from the US for a renegotiation IOT sell the results to its forces. 6/n
So again, I support @BRRubin's proposal, b/c it seems like it can't hurt to at least try. But I suspect a renegotiation will be significantly more difficult & require the US to give more than he suggests. 7/n
I'd therefore recommend the following:
1. The US prepare a "negotiation in depth" strategy in which it identifies what it's willing to concede & what price of extended timeline it would demand for those concessions. 8/n
2. The US should also try to renegotiate the language of the #Taliban's commitments to make those pertaining to #alQaeda more objectively verifiable. This may require getting less back on the timeline extension, but would be worth it in the long run. 9/n

3. If the US is successful in getting an extension (if even for 6 months), it should do a regional diplomatic push as @BRRubin suggests, but it should also conduct a concerted effort to truly, no kidding prepare the #ANDSF to be on their own. 10/n
Such an effort is needed to address the conclusion of my paper in @CTCWP's Sentinel: that the #Taliban will have a military advantage over the #ANDSF when the US withdraws. 11/n
ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…
This push should include: (1) forming & deploying a task force whose purpose is to make cuts/changes to the #ANDSF to maximally improve sustainability before US withdrawal; (2) establishing a remote advising capability & transitioning the @ResoluteSupport mission to it. 12/n
and (3) exploring other counterterrorism platform options as I discussed in this @lawfareblog article. 13/n

lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi…
To conclude: Negotiating an extension will be hard, possibly costly & may not work. Even if it does, we'll likely not be vastly better off by the end of it then now. But it still seems worth a try & if it works, there are some things we could do to get the most from it. 14/n
Among the panoply of undesirable options from which @JoeBiden will have to choose on #Afghanistan, this one seems to me as currently the least bad. 15/15

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More from @JJSchroden

12 Feb
I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
Read 5 tweets
11 Feb
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n
Read 4 tweets
10 Feb
I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US-#Taliban Agreement is a bad deal b/c it gave too many concessions to the TB while getting too few in return for the US. In this THREAD, I'll state why I think it's a bad deal from an assessment point of view. 1/n
To do that, let's walk through each of the things the US & #Taliban committed to in the agreement & answer the Q: "Is this objectively & publicly verifiable?"

Why is that Q important? B/c a good deal is one where both sides can reliably & transparently determine compliance. 2/n
Let's start w/the US:
1. Within 135 days...The US "will reduce the number of US forces in #Afghanistan to 8,600 & proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces."

A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 3/n
Read 28 tweets
8 Feb
I’m going to post some thoughts on @USIP’s #AfghanistanStudyGroup report in this THREAD. 1/n

usip.org/sites/default/…
I’ve been debating since the report came out whether to provide a proper critique. As a senior advisor to the #AfghanistanStudyGroup I feel some decorum toward the effort is warranted. But I also don’t fully agree with where the plenary group ended up. 2/n
So, rather than provide a full critique of the entire report as I might normally do, here I’ll focus on two main points that have been bugging me. #AfghanistanStudyGroup 3/n
Read 16 tweets
22 Dec 20
ICYMI I wrote this article for ⁦@lawfareblog⁩ w/some ideas on what the Biden admin should do about #Afghanistan. TL:DR summary in this THREAD. 1/n lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi…
As was the case for Trump & Obama before him, Biden will inherit a war in #Afghanistan that’s trending in the wrong direction, in terms of violence, casualties, #Taliban control. Dèjá vu of this article I wrote four years ago. 2/n

warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…
But Biden will also inherit a peace process that didn’t exist previously. He will also inherit the US-#Taliban agreement. Both of these are new dynamics from when Biden was last in the White House. 3/n
state.gov/wp-content/upl…
Read 10 tweets
16 Dec 20
So, I did a little more analysis on the lists of agenda items reportedly put forth by the government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban (listed in this @TOLOnews article from yesterday). Some observations in this THREAD. 1/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…
In the table below, I tried to combine some of the like themes on each side & then compare them to each other--to identify areas of overlap & gaps. Areas of strong overlap include drugs, corruption, care for war disabled/wounded, & ceasefire. 2/n
Areas of moderate/limited overlap (which includes areas where one side was very broad but the other more specific) include type of future govt, future foreign policy, future of the #ANDSF, territorial integrity, education, and human rights. 3/n
Read 7 tweets

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