Thread by @JJSchroden

I'm seeing lots of discussion on @BRRubin's argument in @WarOnTheRocks today for a 6-month extension to the US-#Taliban agreement & have gotten some Q's about it. Will tell you what I think in this THREAD. 1/n

warontherocks.com/2021/02/how-to…

First, I support @BRRubin's idea of trying to renegotiate the timeline of the US-#Taliban agreement. At a minimum, it's logically a middle path between leaving by 1 May (even when the TB haven't met their commitments) & unilaterally going past it (& risking the peace process) 2/n

Second, I agree w/@BRRubin that int'l legitimacy matters to the #Taliban & they care about sanctions relief, delisting, etc. So, there is leverage there as he suggests. The future of US aid to #Afghanistan is another TB concern & point of leverage (though extent is unknown). 3/n

Some issues though:
1. Why 6 months? Why not 8? or 12? If the point is to allow more time for regional engagement & peace talks, is 6 months enough?
2. Will the #Taliban agree to a recalibration of the timeline simply based on US promises to meet already-stated commitments? 4/n

3. Could the #Taliban sell a 6-month extension w/no additional concessions to its rank & file?
4. If an extension is achieved, what else could/should the US do with it? 5/n

My own view is:
- While some progress might be made by Nov (May + 6 months) on regional diplomacy & peace talks, the latter won't conclude by then.
- The #Taliban will demand add'l concessions from the US for a renegotiation IOT sell the results to its forces. 6/n

So again, I support @BRRubin's proposal, b/c it seems like it can't hurt to at least try. But I suspect a renegotiation will be significantly more difficult & require the US to give more than he suggests. 7/n

I'd therefore recommend the following:
1. The US prepare a "negotiation in depth" strategy in which it identifies what it's willing to concede & what price of extended timeline it would demand for those concessions. 8/n

2. The US should also try to renegotiate the language of the #Taliban's commitments to make those pertaining to #alQaeda more objectively verifiable. This may require getting less back on the timeline extension, but would be worth it in the long run. 9/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1359588240123179015?s=20

3. If the US is successful in getting an extension (if even for 6 months), it should do a regional diplomatic push as @BRRubin suggests, but it should also conduct a concerted effort to truly, no kidding prepare the #ANDSF to be on their own. 10/n

Such an effort is needed to address the conclusion of my paper in @CTCWP's Sentinel: that the #Taliban will have a military advantage over the #ANDSF when the US withdraws. 11/n
ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

This push should include: (1) forming & deploying a task force whose purpose is to make cuts/changes to the #ANDSF to maximally improve sustainability before US withdrawal; (2) establishing a remote advising capability & transitioning the @ResoluteSupport mission to it. 12/n

and (3) exploring other counterterrorism platform options as I discussed in this @lawfareblog article. 13/n

lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi…

To conclude: Negotiating an extension will be hard, possibly costly & may not work. Even if it does, we'll likely not be vastly better off by the end of it then now. But it still seems worth a try & if it works, there are some things we could do to get the most from it. 14/n

Among the panoply of undesirable options from which @JoeBiden will have to choose on #Afghanistan, this one seems to me as currently the least bad. 15/15