ICYMI I wrote this article for ⁦@lawfareblog⁩ w/some ideas on what the Biden admin should do about #Afghanistan. TL:DR summary in this THREAD. 1/n lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi…
As was the case for Trump & Obama before him, Biden will inherit a war in #Afghanistan that’s trending in the wrong direction, in terms of violence, casualties, #Taliban control. Dèjá vu of this article I wrote four years ago. 2/n

warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…
But Biden will also inherit a peace process that didn’t exist previously. He will also inherit the US-#Taliban agreement. Both of these are new dynamics from when Biden was last in the White House. 3/n
state.gov/wp-content/upl…
Unfortunately, that peace process has moved very slowly while the timeline for US troop withdrawals per the US-#Taliban agreement looms. Thus, Biden inherits a war that is eroding militarily & crawling diplomatically—with critical decisions required immediately. 4/n
What should he do? I offer 4 ideas: 1) Play for time. The US-#Taliban deal’s deadline for troop w/drawals is contingent on the TB meeting their commitments. Statements by @US4AfghanPeace @Commander_RS & GEN Milley make clear the US thinks they’re not. 5/n
aljazeera.com/amp/news/2020/…
Biden should further build this case publicly & privately—make clear that until the #Taliban uphold their end, no more troops will come out. Significant moves against #alQaeda members in #Afghanistan should be a key element of this. 6/n
2) Make clear to the #Taliban that the admin’s patience for their compliance w/the deal is limited. TB have consistently pushed the limits of the deal during Trump’s time (eg violence in/near cities, hosting AQ) & found no pushback. Biden needs to change that dynamic. 7/n
3) Biden should engage in proactive planning for CT options that don’t require a troop presence in #Afghanistan. None of the options for this are great—but there are options & the admin should pursue them IOT increase its freedom to action on AFG policy. 8/n
4) The admin should press #Afghanistan for additional reforms to the #ANDSF to make them less expensive, less complicated & more sustainable for the Afghan govt (esp the Air Force & Army). This would help strengthen the govt’s hand in negotiations w/the #Taliban. 9/n
*None* of these things will be easy & they’ll all require significant immediate attention when the admin will want to be focused on a host of other issues. I’ll be very curious to see who the admin chooses to lead these complicated but critical efforts. 10/10

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More from @JJSchroden

16 Dec
So, I did a little more analysis on the lists of agenda items reportedly put forth by the government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban (listed in this @TOLOnews article from yesterday). Some observations in this THREAD. 1/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…
In the table below, I tried to combine some of the like themes on each side & then compare them to each other--to identify areas of overlap & gaps. Areas of strong overlap include drugs, corruption, care for war disabled/wounded, & ceasefire. 2/n
Areas of moderate/limited overlap (which includes areas where one side was very broad but the other more specific) include type of future govt, future foreign policy, future of the #ANDSF, territorial integrity, education, and human rights. 3/n
Read 7 tweets
16 Dec
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #Afghanistan. 1/n
SEC. 1212. EXTENSION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM.

Extends the program through through 2022 (and appears to expand the number allowed by 120 slots). 2/n
SEC. 1213. EXTENSION & MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES LED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.

Extends #DOD ability to provide funding to cover certain costs of participants in peace talks (which includes #Taliban) through 2021 & adds some restrictions. 3/n
Read 14 tweets
16 Dec
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #SOF. 1/n

govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BI…
SEC. 163. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ARMED OVERWATCH PROGRAM.

No armed overwatch aircraft for @USSOCOM in FY21 or @usairforce FY21-23. Seriously disappointing for @AFSpecOpsCmd, which has been pushing hard for this. 2/n
SEC. 165. AIRBORNE INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, & RECONNAISSANCE ACQUISITION ROADMAP FOR THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.

Requires @USSOCOM & ASD-SOLIC to submit an acquisition roadmap to meet the manned & unmanned airborne ISR req'ts of #SOF by Dec 1, 2021. 3/n
Read 19 tweets
26 Nov
Op-Ed here by the leads of ⁦@USIP⁩’s #Afghanistan Study Group: “An abrupt withdrawal of US troops, as is now being contemplated by the Trump administration, would undermine the fragile but potentially transformational peace process.” 1/n washingtonpost.com/opinions/afgha…
“It would embolden the #Taliban, destabilize the Kabul government and allow terrorist groups to reconsolidate. A civil war could result, provoking a wider regional conflict and an inevitable humanitarian and migration crisis.”

They make 4 recommendations. 2/n
1. “We should make clear to all parties involved what the desired end state will be. In particular, a post-peace #Afghanistan must be able to either sufficiently control its territory to prevent the harboring of terrorists or accept international assistance to do so.” 3/n
Read 8 tweets
17 Nov
I’m seeing lots of stratospheric-level discussion on US drawdown to 2500 troops in #Afghanistan & what it might mean, but let’s get operational for a moment in this THREAD. 1/n
The US is conducting 2 missions in #Afghanistan: counterterrorism (CT) & train/advise/assist (TAA) of the #ANDSF. It does so from a half-dozen major bases around the country. The TAA mission it does w/@NATO ally forces. CT it does unilaterally & partnered w/Afghan #SOF. 2/n
For the past few years, TAA has been at the level of the MOD & MOI (in Kabul) & the Afghan Army Corps HQs & Afghan Air Force at regional bases. That posture—which was sustainable even at 4500 troops—is heavily enabled by contractors. 3/n
Read 9 tweets
16 Nov
I was thinking again this morning about the argument to rapidly withdraw from #Afghanistan (& #Syria, #Somalia...) emanating from the Trump White House & was reminded of a conference I spoke at last year, on the 30th anniversary of #alQaeda. 1/n
One of the audience Qs was "what events or developments might you predict would give #alQaeda the biggest boost in the future?" The other panelists--which included some of the US' best terrorism experts--gave great answers that covered a variety of possible contingencies. 2/n
Being by far the least impressive terrorist analyst of the group (& someone focused more on countering terrorism), I chose to focus on ourselves. My answer: "Another strategic blunder of historic proportions by the United States." 3/n
Read 6 tweets

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