I've seen some #Afghanistan commentators argue recently that the US-#Taliban Agreement is a bad deal b/c it gave too many concessions to the TB while getting too few in return for the US. In this THREAD, I'll state why I think it's a bad deal from an assessment point of view. 1/n
To do that, let's walk through each of the things the US & #Taliban committed to in the agreement & answer the Q: "Is this objectively & publicly verifiable?"
Why is that Q important? B/c a good deal is one where both sides can reliably & transparently determine compliance. 2/n
Let's start w/the US: 1. Within 135 days...The US "will reduce the number of US forces in #Afghanistan to 8,600 & proportionally bring reduction in the number of its allies and Coalition forces."
A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 3/n
2. Within 135 days..."the United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from 5 military bases."
A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 4/n
3. "With the commitment & action on the obligations of the #Taliban...the United States, its allies, & the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from #Afghanistan within the remaining 9.5 months."
A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 5/n
4. "The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases."
A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 6/n
5. "The US [will] work with all relevant sides...to expeditiously release [up to 5,000] combat & political prisoners as a confidence building measure w/the coordination and approval of all relevant sides."
A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 7/n
6. "The US will initiate an admin review of current US sanctions & the rewards list against members of the #Taliban w/the goal of removing these sanctions by August 27, 2020."
A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete). 8/n
7. "w/the start of intra-Afghan negotiations, the US will start diplomatic engagement w/the UNSC & #Afghanistan to remove members of the #Taliban from the sanctions list w/the aim of achieving this objective by May 29, 2020."
A: This is O & P verifiable (but incomplete) 9/n
8. "The US & its allies will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of #Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs."
A: The 1st part (use of force) is O & P verifiable; the 2nd part isn't (subjective). 10/n
9. "The US will request the recognition & endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for this agreement."
A: This is O & P verifiable (& complete). 11/n
10. "The US will seek econ coop for reconstruction w/the new post-settlement Afghan Islamic gov't as determined by the intra-Afghan...negotiations & will not intervene in its internal affairs."
A: The 1st part (aid) is O & P verifiable; the 2nd part isn't (subjective). 12/n
So, of the 10 express commitments the US makes in the US-#Taliban agreement, all 10 are either wholly or in part objectively and publicly verifiable. 13/n
Now, let's do the #Taliban: 1. "#Taliban commits that its released prisoners will be committed to the responsibilities mentioned in this agreement so that they will not pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies"
A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective). 14/n
2. "#Taliban will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including #alQaida, to use the soil of #Afghanistan to threaten the security of the US & its allies."
A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective in multiple ways). 15/n
3. "#Taliban will send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies have no place in #Afghanistan."
A: This is publicly verifiable but not objectively (what constitutes a "clear message"?) 16/n
4. #Taliban "will instruct [their] members...not to cooperate w/groups or individuals threatening the security of the US & its allies."
A: This is O & P verifiable (& I think complete?) 17/n
5. "#Taliban will prevent any group or individual in #Afghanistan from threatening the security of the US & its allies & will prevent them from recruiting, training & fundraising & will not host them"
A: This is not O & P verifiable (subjective in multiple ways). 18/n
6. "#Taliban is committed to deal w/those seeking asylum or residence in #Afghanistan according to int'l migration law & the commitments of this agreement, so that such persons do not pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies."
A: This is not O & P verifiable. 19/n
7. "#Taliban will not provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to those who pose a threat to the security of the US & its allies to enter #Afghanistan."
A: This is not O & P verifiable. (It also treats the TB like they're already a govt!) 20/n
So, of the 7 express commitments made by the #Taliban, only 1 is objectively & publicly verifiable.
To compare: the United States' commitments are almost entirely objectively & publicly verifiable, whereas the #Taliban's are almost entirely not.
Which means I can easily assess US compliance w/the terms of the agreement & it's almost impossible to assess TB compliance. 22/n
This is, from an assessment standpoint, literally the definition of a bad deal, as it puts *all* of the burden of proof on the US.
This is why, despite the consensus view that the Biden admin needs to formulate an #Afghanistan policy soon, it will be so difficult to do so. 23/n
The Biden admin effectively has three choices: 1. Withdraw by May 1. The #AfghanistanStudyGroup report concluded if it does so, #Afghanistan likely devolves into civil war. 24/n
2. Unilaterally stay past May 1. This is effectively the recommendation of the @USIP#AfghanistanStudyGroup. But as I argued previously, doing so would likely result in the collapse of the #Afghanistan peace process. 25/n
Unless the US can convincingly show that the #Taliban haven't upheld their commitments under the US-TB Agreement. I suspect this is part of what the Biden admin is looking to do via the review announced by @jakejsullivan. But as this thread shows, that will be VERY difficult 26/n
3. Negotiate an extension to the troop withdrawal timeline in the US-#Taliban agreement. This has been recommended publicly by at least @BRRubin & @LaurelMillerICG. But it would likely require the US to either convincingly argue TB non-compliance or make add'l concessions. 27/n
As this thread argues, convincingly arguing non-compliance will be very difficult. I don't know which way the Biden team is leaning on these issues, but I do know the US-#Taliban Agreement's structure does them no favors in assessing their options for #Afghanistan. 28/28
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I have now seen several op-eds (including this one) argue that the US could “punish” the #Taliban for, or “deter” it from, violating its obligations in the US-TB Agreement via offshore kinetic means following a full US troop withdrawal. 1/n washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/biden-…
That suggestion is usually made in an off-hand way toward a paper’s end, like it’s a given it would work. But would it? If the #Taliban are willing to host members of #alQaeda w/US troops still in #Afghanistan, why would offshore threats change that? 2/n wsj.com/amp/articles/k…
And didn’t the Clinton admin already provide empirical demonstration that lobbing missiles from the Indian Ocean against terrorist training camps in #Afghanistan doesn’t accomplish much? This was a primary reason for the innovation of arming drones, as I understand it. 3/n
I take issue w/the interpretation of things I’ve said in this article on #Afghanistan as “deferential to the #Taliban.” My view is *not* the one this article attributes to me: that the US has a one-sided obligation in the US-TB Agreement. 1/n brookings.edu/blog/order-fro…
Rather, I believe—as the author does—that the #Taliban have not met their commitments per the deal. But I also believe—as I tweeted earlier today—that the US will have difficulty showing this b/c the TB’s commitments aren’t objectively & publicly verifiable. 2/n
Which means that any attempt now to argue “conditions” with the #Taliban will be difficult & may result in the collapse of the peace process—something the US very much wants to avoid. 3/n
I’ve been debating since the report came out whether to provide a proper critique. As a senior advisor to the #AfghanistanStudyGroup I feel some decorum toward the effort is warranted. But I also don’t fully agree with where the plenary group ended up. 2/n
So, rather than provide a full critique of the entire report as I might normally do, here I’ll focus on two main points that have been bugging me. #AfghanistanStudyGroup 3/n
As was the case for Trump & Obama before him, Biden will inherit a war in #Afghanistan that’s trending in the wrong direction, in terms of violence, casualties, #Taliban control. Dèjá vu of this article I wrote four years ago. 2/n
But Biden will also inherit a peace process that didn’t exist previously. He will also inherit the US-#Taliban agreement. Both of these are new dynamics from when Biden was last in the White House. 3/n state.gov/wp-content/upl…
So, I did a little more analysis on the lists of agenda items reportedly put forth by the government of #Afghanistan and the #Taliban (listed in this @TOLOnews article from yesterday). Some observations in this THREAD. 1/n tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…
In the table below, I tried to combine some of the like themes on each side & then compare them to each other--to identify areas of overlap & gaps. Areas of strong overlap include drugs, corruption, care for war disabled/wounded, & ceasefire. 2/n
Areas of moderate/limited overlap (which includes areas where one side was very broad but the other more specific) include type of future govt, future foreign policy, future of the #ANDSF, territorial integrity, education, and human rights. 3/n
With the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act having been passed (& now sitting on President Trump's desk for signature or veto), thought I'd put together a THREAD on what it says about #Afghanistan. 1/n
SEC. 1212. EXTENSION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM.
Extends the program through through 2022 (and appears to expand the number allowed by 120 slots). 2/n
SEC. 1213. EXTENSION & MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT FOR RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES LED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN.
Extends #DOD ability to provide funding to cover certain costs of participants in peace talks (which includes #Taliban) through 2021 & adds some restrictions. 3/n