Thread by @JJSchroden

I’m going to post some thoughts on @USIP’s #AfghanistanStudyGroup report in this THREAD. 1/n

usip.org/sites/default/…

I’ve been debating since the report came out whether to provide a proper critique. As a senior advisor to the #AfghanistanStudyGroup I feel some decorum toward the effort is warranted. But I also don’t fully agree with where the plenary group ended up. 2/n

So, rather than provide a full critique of the entire report as I might normally do, here I’ll focus on two main points that have been bugging me. #AfghanistanStudyGroup 3/n

The first point has been raised by many others already: the #AfghanistanStudyGroup’s assumption that the US unilaterally blowing past the US-#Taliban Agreement’s 1 May deadline for full withdrawal of US troops w/o doing so won’t result in the collapse of the peace process. 4/n

The #Taliban have been pretty clear all along that they would view such a move as the US abrogating the US-TB agreement and they have reiterated that stance in response to the #AfghanistanStudyGroup’s report. 5/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan-16…

The people I know who speak to the #Taliban have heard the same directly from the group. These people believe that, at best, a one-time extension of 6-8 months might be feasible if the US agreed to additional concessions in new, direct negotiations w/the TB. 6/n

This means that the likely outcome of the #AfghanistanStudyGroup’s recommendations is actually the report’s *Policy Pathway 2*: collapse of peace talks & the US recommitting to #Afghanistan’s govt. 7/n

Which brings me to the second point. The #AfghanistanStudyGroup report paints a fair picture of US interests in #Afghanistan & makes clear that the US cannot secure these interests unilaterally. IMHO, this might be the report’s strongest contribution. 8/n

However, it whiffs on the patron-client dynamics that result from this fact. Most notably, while the #AfghanistanStudyGroup report acknowledges corruption in #Afghanistan’s government, it seriously understates how massive & pervasive that corruption is... 9/n

...as well as how much the #Taliban-led insurgency is enabled & prolonged by it. The #AfghanistanStudyGroup report therefore makes significantly erroneous assumptions as to how much the US can do about corruption in #Afghanistan. 10/n

Let’s be real: We barely put a dent in #Afghanistan govt corruption during the surge; attempts at conditionality of aid haven’t worked; we had to threaten a $1B cut to the #ANDSF just to get a govt negotiation team formed—& *now* we’re going to do better w/only 2500 troops? 11/n

NO. WE’RE NOT. #Afghanistan’s govt is *corrupt* & 👏will 👏remain 👏so. The client is chronically ill & the patron has no effective medicine for it. This is where the #AfghanistanStudyGroup’s Red Team comes in. 12/n

The #AfghanistanStudyGroup’s Red Team section recognizes this issue & its implications: a structural inability of #Afghanistan’s government to secure US interests & the resultant ascendancy of the #Taliban. 13/n

From there, it argues for a more middle-of-the-road stance: recognizing that we lack *any* client in #Afghanistan that can fully secure US interests, why not take a position between the govt & #Taliban that favors neither exclusively? 14/n

There are certainly counter arguments to be made against the Red Team’s policy formulation, but the point is that its proposition starts from a more realistic interpretation of the current situation in #Afghanistan & a debate on its merits would be a fruitful exercise. 15/n

So what does all this mean IRT the #AfghanistanStudyGroup report? IMHO it means you (& the Biden admin) should pay the most attention to Policy Pathway 2 & the Red Team section, since the former is where the ASG recs lead & the latter is the most realistic discussion. 16/16