On the ‘borderization’ of #Armenia: this week a number of territorial encroachments by Azerbaijani forces were reported on Armenia proper, along the international border between Armenia and those parts of #Azerbaijan that were under Armenian occupation.
On 13/5 Nikol Pashinyan confirmed that some 250 AZE troops had advanced 3.5 kilometres around a remote lake in ARM’s southernmost Syunik region, Sev Lich, that Soviet-era maps indicate is divided by the de jure border. Other movements reported in Gegharkunik.
AZE says it is demarcating the border per maps in its possession. France and the US have called on AZE to withdraw. ARM has referred the matter to to the CSTO. As of today, latest reports are that Russian troops from the Gyumri base are on way to Syunik.
🇦🇲 / 🇦🇿 borders were internal Soviet borders + never demarcated since independence. Incident in Tavush/Tovuz in July 2020 showed that even where 🇦🇲and 🇦🇿 sovereign spaces have been contiguous over the last 25 years, where the border ‘really’ lies is unclear (compare 🇰🇬🇹🇯)
And we know from 🇦🇿🇬🇪 border issues, delimiting borders can be challenging even between friendly states. Rather than a comprehensive normalisation process, the 🇦🇲 / 🇦🇿international border is now being ‘delimited’ coercively through troop movements.
This is ‘borderization’, the process of turning a line of actual control into an international border, as seen in Ukraine, South Ossetia, etc. Rather than a conflict zone, now it is Armenia that is being borderized, another aspect to the ongoing 🇦🇲🇦🇿 rivalry.
For 🇦🇿 this seems to be about maintaining maximum pressure on 🇦🇲, to extract concessions on other issues (e.g. minefield maps, Syunik corridor)? Never-demarcated borders allow conversion of dated or ambiguous cartographies into better positions. More such incidents likely.
In the context of the election campaign exposure of Armenia's inability to defend borders can only strengthen the hand of Robert Kocharian and weaken that of Pashinyan. Maybe Baku believes that Armenia is so weakened now that it no longer matters who is in charge?
Borderization also pressures 🇷🇺 in 3 ways: (1) showing that Russian security guarantees to 🇦🇲are tractable relative to other issues; (2) testing CSTO collective security guarantees; (3) testing Russia’s capacity to broker.
But it seems to be a fundamentally tactical manoeuvre: securitizing Syunik surely advances prospects of this region’s and Armenia’s ever deeper strategic embedding within a Russian security regime. This is regional fracture at work.
Manufactured border crises benefit ‘strongman politics’ on all sides, make regional connectivity plans look ever more implausible.

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More from @LaurenceBroers

7 Nov 20
Six weeks in, 2nd #Karabakh War is at a crucial moment as fighting rages for NK’s historical capital, Shusha (spelled Shushi in Armenian sources). Significance of this town cannot be under-estimated for either side (see thread by @Tom_deWaal)
Shusha is a natural fortress, protected by cliffs on its south side, and overlooks NK capital Stepanakert to the north - a local saying has it that "Whoever controls Shusha, controls Karabakh".
It was the principal Azerbaijani-majority town in NK prior to 1990s war (c. 85% in 1979), falling to Armenian forces in May 1992. For a narrative of those events see the joint documentary film Parts of a Circle: History of the Karabakh Conflict, at 37.08: vimeo.com/407942633
Read 14 tweets
31 Oct 20
ARM + AZ FMs met in Geneva with OSCE's Minsk Group today, but no new ceasefire agreed. Instead, sides agree to observe international humanitarian law by not targeting civilian populations or non-military objects. Crucial that sides are held to this. 1/7
Sides agreed also to implement exchange of bodies and submit lists of POWs within 1 week; and submit comments + questions relating to wider conditions (beyond humanitarian) for a ceasefire - item 2 of the 10/10 Moscow ceasefire document. 2/7
Geneva talks also attended by ICRC President and UN High Commissioner for Refugees – signal that the brutality of this war for civilians is registering? 3/7
Read 7 tweets
28 Oct 20
ARM + AZ foreign ministers meet in Geneva tomorrow, in the aftermath of a deadly cycle of civilian suffering: at least 25 Azerbaijani civilians killed yesterday + today, dozens injured, in Armenian strikes on the town of Barda; dead include an @AzRedCrescent volunteer. 1/6
AZ claims use of cluster munitions against its civilians - must be investigated by @amnesty and @hrw. AZ strikes on towns in NK killed one in Shusha, more injured; a hospital building in Stepanakert hit – must also be investigated – more strikes reported tonight. 2/6
Fighting continues on southern front (localised engagements) + northern front (artillery), incl. in Lachin district, close to ARM-NK corridor. Armenian media are discussing grim worst-case scenarios with implications of much wider escalation. 3/6
Read 6 tweets
25 Oct 20
Third ceasefire agreed, this time brokered by US (after previous, failed Russian- and French-led efforts), to begin from 0800 local time tomorrow. Follows meetings of ARM + AZ foreign ministers with US officials.
Many reasons to doubt it will hold. Three tests of ceasefire viability are: 1) have military goals been achieved? 2) has the cost of carrying on become prohibitive? 3) do 3rd parties have leverage to enforce?
None of these conditions appears to hold.
AZ goals seem aimed at full reincorporation of NK, or perhaps advantageous enough position to achieve this within months if winter forces a timeout.
Read 8 tweets
21 Oct 20
Armenian-Azerbaijani war at a critical conjuncture. AZ forces have extended advance along southern flank to recapture yesterday Zangilan. Now reportedly advancing northwards through Qubatly towards Lachin, the corridor connecting ARM + NK. 1/9
This corridor is one of the Basic Principles, but these and diplomacy in general not mentioned (unlike in interviews to intl media) in Ilham Aliyev’s address to the nation yesterday. Already supportive of military action, AZ public is being prepared for total victory. 2/9
ARM leadership today rejected a diplomatic solution, frames an existential struggle: “Without Artsakh, there is no Armenia”, says diplomatic solutions not possible if AZ insists on complete capitulation of NK. 3/9
Read 9 tweets
19 Oct 20
Second ceasefire of 17/10 also failed; sides blame each other and without ceasefire monitoring mechanism impossible to be sure but common sense suggests AZ has military advantage and therefore more to gain from continuation. 1/9
Intense fighting continued in north and southern areas of front, and Ilham Aliyev announced today recapture of another 13 villages in Jebrayil; also yesterday historically symbolic Khudaferin Bridges, constructed 11-13th centuries across River Aras. 2/9
Seems clear that AZ advance has reached halfway point between former Line of Contact and ARM border; mobilisation of all men of military age reported in Meghri, Kajaran, in southern ARM region of Syunik. 3/9
Read 9 tweets

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