On one hand, people let out thoughts or aggressions online that they would be less prone to do in person. It helps get a feel for what people "really" think.
On the other hand, people are social animals with instincts and bonds. Online diminishes those, leaving the rough side.
Folks develop "internet enemies" that if they were to meet in person and get to know each other a bit, might be more respectful even if they naturally disagree.
Internet enemies have all the natural disagreements, without the million years of empathy instincts as social animals.
In person tho, folks might be too nice because all of those evolutionary social instincts kick in along with cultural norms, so they hide their true thoughts.
When one has a thought they wish to hide, it requires extra introspection. Is society weird, or is the individual weird?
For example, an aggressive individual with views that can harm others would get natural pushback from society. That's like an immune function.
However, if society itself gets rather corrupted, individual pushbacks towards reason are important for societal self-correction.
Ultimately, the ideal case is to combine them. To speak rather freely in public and in private, online and offline, while having enough social awareness to separate the person from their viewpoint, and to consider details of their personal experience and how they developed it.
Obviously it's different for folks in regimes that don't have freedom of speech, which is why it's worth promoting that value wherever possible, online and offline.
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Broad money growth generally occurs in one of two ways: either banks lend and create deposits (and thus increase the money multiplier, M2/MB) or when bank lending seizes up, governments run large deficits and go around the bank lending channel.
A thread.
Looking at 140 years of data, we see periods where loan growth fueled broad money growth (late 1800s, 1920s, 1950s, etc), periods where fiscal deficits fueled broad money growth (1940s), and periods like the 1970s/1980s where both lending and deficits fueled broad money growth.
The 1940s are interesting because they are most analogous to the 2020s. After a large private debt bubble partial deleveraging (1930s and 2010s), a period of economic stagnation and external catalyst eventually resulted in a massive fiscal response (1940s and 2020s).
Over the past couple decades, US labor share of GDP has decreased to being well below trend (left chart), while US corporate profits as a percentage of GDP have increased to being above-trend (right chart).
A thread.
In addition to being partly due to technology/automation, another part of this is due to structural US trade deficits.
The US exported large portions of our supply chains overseas, and foreigners took those dollars and reinvested them back into US equities.
Since the top 1% own 53% of US equities, and the bottom 50% own less than 1% of US equities (and many of them had jobs/wages impacted by offshoring/automation), this trend of declining labor and increasing profits/valuations has favored wealth concentration.
In April and May, there will be various easy comps from low base effects that will make some year-over-year numbers look quite high.
Official CPI for example is likely to hit over 3% year over year:
The producer price index for March is already over 4% year-over-year, and could very well hit over 7% in April or May thanks to low base effects and fiscal-driven reflation:
These unusual base effects already occurred for March 2020 vs March 2021 for asset prices, since asset prices bottomed before economic indicators.
For example, the Wilshire 5000 had its best year-over-year increase ever:
The next few years are going to test how much deflationary capacity there is in the US and global economy from technology, debt, and demographics to absorb the inflationary increase in broad money.
A thread.
In terms of overall fiscal and monetary policy, including the wartime-like fiscal response that we’ve seen over the past year, the 2020s so far have structural similarities to the 1940s.
Here’s the long-term debt cycle, for example:
During the 1930s, monetary policy hit the limit of what it can do against the prospect of a private debt bubble, and so it was then a massive fiscal response in the 1940s, forced by external factors (the war), that pumped inflation:
Like with a company, it takes a ton of work to make a good software product (equipment, staff, time, etc).
But then, it takes minimal work to send that software to 1,000,000,000 users compared to 10,000 users.
High base cost for it to exist + tiny cost per marginal user.
Bitcoin's overall energy usages does go up with adoption as a store of value as its market cap grows, but in a nonlinear way as it matures. It needs to be secure to function, but from there, its marginal cost per user is efficient. swanbitcoin.com/bitcoin-fee-ba…