🧵1/ Good morning! I gathered more data over night on the hashtag 'Qatar Revolts', which is exaggerating the scale of protests in Qatar. Approx 1040 of 10500 accounts in the sample are probably fake. There is also at least one other hacked verified account #disinformation
2/ The network graph shows a fairly independent community in the top right quadrant. If you zoom in you'll see a lot of the accounts boosting the hashtag are retweets of the account @JesseCsincsak .... #cybersecurity#disinformation
3/ Now at first glance @JesseCsincsak is a company called JCK - even the name seems to kind of match the handle. Clever. But that's a ruse, the account actually promotes almalka_store. The account is hacked, and belongs to Jesse Csinscak a pro snowboarder &ABC Bachorlette winner!
4/ As you can see JCK/Jesse is spamming numerous hashtags with content, and being retweeted by hundreds of accounts. Most of these retweeting accounts are fake. #disinformation
5/ Other accounts in the community seem quite spammy , retweeting adverts for various companies among other things. Now all those retweeting in this community amount to around 1000, although of course some will be real, but many are just fluffer accounts, au RT'ing
6/ Again, these manipulated and hacked accounts are statistically some of the most influential on t he hashtag. The most influential in this case is @TurkeyAffairs - a dodgy anti Erdogan account that also spends a lot of time writing about Qatar. I say dodgy because its
7/ links to its blogspot and Facebook account are broken (taken down?). Hardly the measure of a sophisticated or well maintained news outlet, despite some of the polish of the videos...Anyone smell a PR company? #disinformation
8/ So that's it for now. Will keep looking at the data. But it's interesting to see the extent of manipulation on these hashtags targeting Qatar. Particularly interesting to see the mysterious @TurkeyAffairs account playing such a large role in it too 🤔 #disinformation
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
[Thread] 1/ Here is another #manipulation thread (I'll try make it shorter, but it's got some juicy nuggets). This is an analysis of the hashtag "Qatar Revolts". We've seen such hashtags on Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia etc. It's a common hashtag during *widespread* demonstrations.
2/ For context again There were/are some protests in Qatar, mostly by some members of the Al Marra tribe who have been excluded from the upcoming Shura Elections. For more background on statelessness in Qatar, see this AI report for example: refworld.org/docid/483e27ab…
3/ As this graph shows, the two circled communities are worth further examination. Both represent accounts being retweeted heavily by accounts using an identical application (in this case, Twitter Web App). Who are they retweeting? See next > #disinformation#Qatar
[Thread] 1/ This thread is on Qatar's long-awaited upcoming Shura elections, and manipulation on the hashtag 'elections for the Shura council'. I analyzed around 18000 interactions involving around 8600 unique accounts. #disinformation#deception
2/ The sample is from the last two days, and generally encompasses the majority of activity on the hashtag. (Of course the presence of manipulation doesn't discount any of the important issues being raised about electoral fairness and inclusion, but I am focusing on manipulation)
3/ Firstly. There is clear, unequivocal manipulation going on. If you look at the network graph below, it shows a large hub of accounts (green block), along with a separate pinkish constellation. The pinkish constellation shows an account being retweeted hundreds of times. Now..
[Thread]1/ As mentioned before, but delayed slightly due to food poisoning 🤢, what follows is an analysis of the hashtag "Strong Turkiye" which began trending as a response to the hashtag 'help turkey' on 2nd August. As expected, it shows signs of manipulation and co-ordinated
2/ activity. For some context, the hashtag help Turkey, which I analysed previously, sprung up as a response to wildfires in Turkey. The hashtag prompted an angry response from the Turkish authorities, & the hashtags "we don't need help" & "strong Turkey" emerged. #disinformation
3/ This sample includes around 20,000 interactions involving 9100 unique accounts extracted on 2nd August. First up, signs of deliberate signal boosting of a hashtag by generating high volumes of retweet and mentions. If you look below, you will see three clusters/communities
🧵 [Thread] 1/ This thread is about some attempts to manipulate the Arabic hashtag "boycott elections". The trend refers to upcoming Shura council elections in Qatar. It's currently the number one trend in Qatar. There is clear manipulation + outside influence. Read on>
2/ First, while the topic of Shura elections has generated much debate, it is clearly going to be an issue of international scrutiny. So at these times looking at social media commentary and manipulation will be key, especially with democratic backsliding in the region #Qatar
3/ It's not a big hashtag. Only around 300 interactions from around 250 unique accounts. However, the most retweeted account is a digital marketing account that literally offers trend promoting services. > noof30304. 100 RTs and 40 likes cost 10 Riyals! This account
[Thread] 1/ Good evening, afternoon, or morning all! Tonight's thread is on #Turkey, and it will be a big one. Many have commented on the massive hashtag "Help Turkey" that rapidly reached 2.5 million tweets today. Read on for an in depth Twitter analysis > #Disinformation
2/ 1st, some brief context. The hashtag "help turkey" involved people calling for international help to combat Turkey's wildfires. Images like the one below were common. The tweet storm prompted reactionary nationalistic hashtags including "Strong Turkey" & "We Dont Need Help"
3/ Some felt the message being generated on the hashtag was designed to make Turkey look weak, incompetent and desperate. This, coupled with the scale of the campaign, suggested a possible influence operation. To be clear though. The hashtag had many real users. See below.
An interesting aspect of the Shura Elections is that candidates must be from a family that resided in Qatar prior to 1930. Article 80 of the #Qatar constitution as far as I can tell does not provide this requirement, simply that they be Qatari nationals. 1930 is mentioned in
the nationality law of 2005. 1930 is a date mentioned in the nationality law as the key date for which those residents and descendants of those residents have nationality. There are many other roads to obtaining Qatari nationality however, but the almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?o…
law on candidates for the Shura council does make a distinction between those with pre-1930 nationality and post 1930 nationality. As far as I know there is no formal distinction between citizen and national. Also I am not sure if there are numbers out there defining the