Arkady Dubnov, one of the leading Russian regional experts on how Russia sees #Taliban and what comes next in #Afghanistan. 8 key points. 1. Ruling regime was too corrupt and too far from ordinary afghans; relied only on $$$ support and foreign military;
2. Taliban survived because of Pakistani help and endorsement. It's most crucial military units were based in Pakistan. Taliban will now be returning favors to Islamabad.
3. Taliban has to be euphoric now: they made US understand that this war is pointless. This euphoria might be clouding their judgement at the moment.
However, their goal is legitimacy. They will now try to convince the world they are not barbaric murderers.
4. Taliban will form a transit government, its likely head - Haji Ahmad Shah, a Pashtun businessmen currently living in UAE, educated in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, speaks Russian.
Taliban will likely remove only top level of regional authorities, trying to convince the rest to stay
5. New constitution is due, it will lack any of "western" influences but might offer some mention of women rights, although hardly it would be followed. On human rights, it is most certainly going straight back to pre-2001.
6. Taliban will likely try to force Pushtun-lead dominance and unity which would be contested by ethnic Tajiks of Panjshir Province. And Tajikistan will support them. Dushanbe is currently refusing to even acknowledge Taliban.
7. Taliban seems to seek consolidation rather than global jihad, so it is unclear what to do with ISIS and others who would want to join in. Central Asia is clearly in the danger zone.
8. Russia seeks guarantees that Taliban will not operate up north, Taliban wants recognition and a support of a UNSC member is what Taliban definitely desires. Russia will not be providing any financial assistance for sure. republic.ru/posts/101321?u…
Interesting Timofeev analysis on why all Russian FP experts are realists (!) (of the ones that want to make it a career). Liberals, neo-marxists do exists but they are marginalized. He gives 4 reasons for the popularity of realism in Russia:
Realism is "real". No one doubts destructive nature of the human being. Only the strong survive, the weak must join the strong. IR is pure anarchy and only balancing with enough power helps.
Realism is simple. Survival, security, domination triumphs all. Economy is secondary for as long as it provides at least "good enough". Ideology is a feature of "information warfare". What the state does is irrelevant as long as it secures national interests.
Russian Constitutional Court (CC) is turning 30 this year. What was it like? Any chance it could play a construction role? Thread.
Out of 13 judges elected in 1991, 3 - Gadis Gadzhiev, Yuri Rudkin and Valery Zorkin are still in the office today.
Over the years it heard over 400k appeals, issued dozens of thousands of rulings as well as 719 decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws and legal acts. CC played a crucial role in 2020 constitutional amendments
As a result CC was granted powers that other higher courts do not enjoy: it can now examine allegations of non-enforcement of Russia’s various international treaties and decisions of international courts
Alexei Chesnakov, a political technologist often associated with Vladislav Surkov gives his rundown on how the Kremlin destroyed Navalny movement. He lists six major narratives against Navalny and his movement
1. Foreign influence
Navalny and his team work in the interests of foreign powers, including foreign intelligences; are linked to "toxic" personalities like @Billbrowder and @McFaul (as defined by the Kremlin); call for sanctions against Russia; are foreign funded
2. Ethics
Have no right to call for protests while remaining outside of the country ("they are cynical"); use donations for personal enrichment;
1. Before Taliban took over in 1996, Russia was actively supplying anti-Taliban coalition since 1995. In 2021 Russia did no such thing, Taliban takeover was accepted as given. 2. The views towards Afghanistan have not drastically changed - its civil war is a source of instability
3. Difference is that in late 1990s Central Asia was a mess: civil war in Tajikistan, Ferghana valley "time bomb", general economic despair. 4. Central Asian states are viewed as adequate states now instead of poorly governed territories in the aftermath of USSR collapse
Had a fun talk (link below) with Vladislav Inozemtsev and Vasily Zharkov about #sanctions, Russia - West relations and the role sanctions play in Russian domestic opposition discourse. #Belarus & #sanctions theme was also mentioned. Few key points and arguments:
Inozemtsev: sanctions or not West can't change Russian regime; no sanctions whatsoever can kick Putin out of Kremlin; Russia is simply too strong to be coerced by sanctions (It's not Yugoslavia);
Sanctions need to be fast - in order to work, they can't be anticipated
Western sanctions policy towards Russia is careful, moderate and cautious. $$$ matters.
Sanctions are a feature of solidarity with UA and affirmation of Euro-Atlantic unity. NS2 sanctions was a weird story from day one;
As long as Putin does not escalate (considerably) no new
Some argue this is a "New Cold War", some argue it is a different thing altogether. Sergei Karaganov says it is Cold War 2.0. and Russia is already winning with the help of it's "semi-ally" China. His points are: Russia is stronger than late Soviet Union, West is much weaker
than 30 years ago; Putin is much more clever than Soviet leaders in terms of military spending and power projection; Let China take most of heavy lifting, if things go well for them, Russia can distance itself from Beijing - if China starts loosing, Russia should invest
in defeating the West more resources, we're looking at 10-15 horizon. Karaganov has yet another big narrative idea. So, it is "Greater America" (US + Western, Northern Europe) vs. Big Eurasia (Russia, China + some CEU and Southern Europe nations). Says key battle is Germany.