2. Volatility is a financial product, complete with ever-growing chain of derivatives and structured products. Each stage magnifies leverage and exposure. There are also indirect connections that amplify these movements (dealer hedging, risk parity funds, etc.)
3. Volatility is subject to short squeezes given its unlimited downside. Structured products and derivatives can amplify these moves. The first volatility squeeze occurred on "Volamageddon". Short Vol products were wiped in a day.
4. After declining for 16 months after the "COVID crash", Volatility has been rising since in early July, and realized volatility has increased.
5. VOLATILITY IS NEGATIVELY CORRELATED WITH PRICE. When volatility spikes - equity prices decline. Therefore, owning equities is effectively taking short-volatility exposure. Below is $UVXY - a levered long-volatility ETF compared to the S&P500 (in blue - inverted scale)
6. When volatility is squeezed, markets rapidly decline. This is the likely cause of every selloff since 2018, including the "COVID" crash. Below, you see that increasing volumes in a levered long-volatility product $UVXY preceded the three major drawdowns since 2018:
7. Here is the same chart updated through today.
8. Looking at volume over a long period is somewhat misleading since the price of the product has gone down so the same dollars traded result in higher volumes - but this highlights a key point. As the price of volatility declines, the same dollars can buy more long-vol exposure.
9. Unless Volatility is crushed below its July lows, a serious Volatility Squeeze is likely in the near term. This would result in a significant and rapid drawdown in the market. The drawdown may be attributed to macro events of which there are plenty to choose from.
10. As in investor - you must recognize that equities are at high risk given their correlation with Volatility. *not investment advice* but to prepare yourself for this squeeze, either be on the sidelines or the right side of the squeeze.
2. #Evergrande made headlines in the US two weeks ago when markets dropped 2%. But the slide was more likely due to gamma "unclenching" after a massive 9/17 options expiration. Since Evergrande has now been deemed "contained", attention has moved elsewhere.
3. The story was never #Evergrande. The story is a decade of unsustainable, unproductive debt fueled growth that is key to Chinese economic growth, holds the countries wealth, and is at risk of imploding as Beijing breaks the implicit debt backstop.
THEORY: Banks play a crucial role in a country's economy. They take money that is not currently being used and lend it to others. Through extending credit, they are allocating resources, but importantly they are also responsible for assessing the value of capital they have lent.
3. Example: a bank lends $100, and that money is used by the borrower to generate value, that ensures the bank is repaid $100 with interest. But that doesn't always happen. Its up to the bank to constantly reassess the value of that loan and the likelihood they will be repaid.
If contagion in the property sector spreads, and the sector continues its rapid contraction, a Chinese banking crisis is *IMO* is a significant risk if not a probability.
2. The belief that banks are not at risk ignores both huge direct and indirect property exposure as well as the direct warnings of Chinese regulators. Its rooted in the belief of power and desires of central intervention; the same faith that incorrectly assumed an EG bailout.
3. Setting the backdrop, on 12/31/20 Chinese regulators directed domestic banks to limit their property exposure to 40% of their total loan book in order to head off systemic risk, and provided them four years to comply. spglobal.com/marketintellig…
🚨🚨 China Credit - Writing on the Wall - and How to Trade It. (9/15/21)👇👇
2. In June, I described contagion in the Chinese credit as a tail risk - not necessarily a probability, a significant risk that was being underpriced. But now the fuse has been lit and no one is stamping it out. The collapse of the property sector is now a probability.
3. (If you're newer to the saga, I'd encourage you to read this master thread below thread in sequence as it provides necessary pretext. If you're up to date, then jump right in.)
This relates to EG's wealth management product ("WMP") of which 99% of employees are invested in (they are protesting). Some top brass left and were paid out before payments halted. WMPs are a huge funding source for developers. Citizens (who buy apts) are creditors. Disaster.
2. WMPs, which are funded by citizen's savings, totaled $1 TRILLION dollars according to BBG, and regulators are cracking down. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
3. Reported: Staff of Shenzhen Financial Bureau: “We are not sure if Evergrande Wealth belongs to the Financial Bureau, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, or the People’s Bank of China. It is currently not on our P2P list.”
2. Evergrande is the Gorilla, but it is not unique nor is it the first. Below is the debt and equity trading of large stressed developers, in chronological order from when their debt began to fall. (these are USD bonds - onshore debt would be better but data is less accessible)
3. The First Domino: China Fortune Land Development ($61bn of liabilities): Defaulted in January - the first major default of this tightening cycle. Ping An - largest insurer in China - reported a $5.5bn loss relating to China Fortune in its 1H21 results.