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5 Oct, 7 tweets, 7 min read
[Thread] 1/ @OPCW Exec. Council-98, U.S. & 44 other countries requested clarification from #Russia regarding its compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention #CWC, under article IV, para 2, more than a year after Moscow's attack on @navalny. state.gov/u-s-leads-effo…
2/ This is not the suspension ultimatum @NatSecAnthony & I recommended, but may be part of a medium-to-long-term effort to build a case on Russia's #CWC non-compliance & muster political will for eventual suspension, if compliance is not forthcoming. thehill.com/opinion/intern…
3/ After Russia's attack in the UK in 2018, which resulted in several injured & one dead British mother of three, and the brazen attack against Navalny in Aug. 2020, the international community is showing Moscow it cannot escape accountability. independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/…
4/ Russia clearly maintains a #Novichok program to assassinate & poison enemies of the state, in violation of the #CWC and its declaration that it fully dismantled chemical weapons stocks under @OPCW verification in 2017.
opcw.org/media-centre/n…

bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-eu…
5/ Recall it took @OPCW member states more than seven years to muster will to suspend #Syria from its voting rights & privileges, after it used chemical weapons >300 times since the start of the conflict. States gave Syria plenty of time to comply. npr.org/2019/02/17/695…
6/ States fear suspending #Russia would cause withdrawal from #CWC and Moscow would have no accountability. At the same time, Russia has been causing procedural delays & attempting to obstruct @OPCW work & Syria investigation since 2017. fdd.org/analysis/2021/…
@OPCW 7/ If @OPCW member states truly support a world with zero chemical weapons, even a "world power" like #Russia must not escape accountability. States should not wait seven+ years to act if any state is in non-compliance. CC: @StateAVC @usunvie @UK_OPCW

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More from @StrickerNonpro

Andrea Stricker Profile picture
13 Apr
Only thing that didn’t “work” about max pressure was it wasn’t correctly framed as a long-term effort to contain the regime in Iran’s aggression, push for changes in behavior, and give the Iranian people tools to demand better. Sanctions pressure clearly worked on the economy.
Claiming the main objective was to get a stronger nuclear deal provided ammunition for critics to call the policy “discredited” and a “total failure” after just two years and change, with oil sanctions in place for only part of that period.
Meanwhile, the economic facts show tremendous leverage for U.S. and allies — yes, leverage — to obtain concessions across many fronts if the regime wanted to remain in power. Either way, Tehran would be more contained and weakened over time to carry out its malign policies.
Read 5 tweets
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
12 Apr
The @OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) has issued a new report determining that Syria used a toxic chlorine gas against its own people in February 2018. Damascus did not cooperate or provide relevant access to the IIT. opcw.org/sites/default/… 1/
The IIT provided to member states the names of responsible Syrian officials. It is now up to UN member states (facing a Russian veto) -- and more likely to individual states -- to sanction the Syrian officials who were responsible for the attack. 2/
As @NatSecAnthony & I wrote for @ForeignPolicy, it is time for OPCW member states to vote to suspend Syria's rights and privileges at the OPCW, which includes its voting rights. They can do so at the April 20-22 Conference of States Parties (CSP): foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/08/opc… 3/
Read 4 tweets
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
25 Feb
Analysis of the IAEA's Iran monitoring and verification report with @TheGoodISIS. Thread on key findings: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d…
1) Iran's breakout time to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU) for one nuclear weapon, if it chose to do so, has a range of 2.7 to 3.5 months, where the average is 3.1 months. Iran could produce a second amount of WGU, and have enough for two nuclear weapons, within five months.
2) Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) stock now exceeds by fourteen-fold the limit set by the JCPOA. As of Feb. 16, Iran had a stockpile of about 4390.2 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), almost all enriched below 5 percent, or 2967.8 kg (uranium mass).
Read 14 tweets
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
13 Jan
As @laurnorman reports & Iranian officials attest, Iran has notified the IAEA of its intention to start an assembly line at Esfahan to produce uranium metal as part of advanced fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). 1/

wsj.com/articles/iran-…
It’s worth exploring Iran’s experience with u-metal, a key material that can also be used to produce nuclear weapon cores. We know that Tehran has quite a bit of experience thanks to the Nuclear Archive documents, seized by Israel in 2018. 2/
The Nuclear Archive contained info about Iran’s plans to build a pilot uranium metal production facility, called Shahid Mahallati. There, Iran would become adept at u-metal and nuke weapon component fabrication: isis-online.org/isis-reports/d… 3/
Read 13 tweets
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
16 Oct 20
Regarding Iran nuclear site claims this morning from NCRI: what we know about the described sites and/or their activities.

Newly revealed facility in Sorkheh-Hessar region - an administrative-appearing building allegedly used by an SPND Geophysics Group, the "Chamran Group" 1/
Allegedly the team carries out research related to underground nuclear tests, geophysics, and seeks an underground tunnel. Allegedly it has illicitly procured ground penetrating radar and seismometers from abroad. 2/
The site is located south of the Iran Aerospace Organization, and north of the Khojir missile site; this is an area controlled by IRGC. Images show construction began in May 2012, allegedly the Chamran group began using the building in 2017. 3/
Read 17 tweets
Andrea Stricker Profile picture
6 Sep 20
Key findings from ⁦@TheGoodISIS⁩ IAEA Iran safeguards report:

1. Iran’s estimated breakout time as of late Sept 2020 is as short as 3.5 months. Iran may have enough LEU to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a second nuclear weapon. isis-online.org/isis-reports/m…
2. The second nuclear weapon could be produced more quickly than the first, requiring in total as little as 5.5 months.
3. Iran’s LEU stock now exceeds by ten-fold the limit set in the JCPOA. As of Aug 25, 2020, Iran has a stockpile of about 3114.5 kilograms (kg) of LEU (hexafluoride mass), all enriched below 5 percent, or the equivalent of 2105.4 kg (uranium mass).
Read 22 tweets

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