#PolicybazaarIPO Long thread: There is monetary printing by RBI, there is lending by banks & finally there is the Indian IPO. “Foreign owned” company with ~1 Bn investment is selling “Indian” unicorn to “savvy” Indians for $ 6.2 Bn. Want to know how this printing works? Let’s go-
The basics: Rs 6017 Cr being raised by new shares (Rs 3750) & re-selling (Rs 2267). Face value Rs 2 offered at Rs ~1000 per share is one of a kind. Who decides the price? Examine the valuation ladder below.
With ~$ 150 Mn invested till 2017, we see $ 525 Mn rushes in after 2018
So, a company valued $1 Bn in 2018 & $ 1.5 Bn in 2019 by key investors like Tencent, suddenly “needs money” in March 2021. Falcon Edge “invests” all of $ 75 Mn in March at valuation of $ 2.65 Bn.
Enter IPO bankers a couple of months later & they value the company at $ 6.2 Bn
Why does PolicyBazaar need $ 75 Mn just 6 months before IPO & give away 2.5 times in returns? And it doesn’t even use that money as the B/S reflects appx Rs 1000 Cr in cash lying around.
What kind of a favor is that? Why do they need US investment bank for this just before IPO?
Notice 50% rise in shareholding of promotors here & a 1: 500 bonus share issue. After all, how do you print money & still keep share price at “reasonable” Rs 1000?
Without bonus issue in June 2021, each share would have costed Rs 50,000. Heard of circular valuation?
Well, let’s move on to the business model & future potential here. The whole story is tied to the “enormous potential” of insurance in India & how under-penetrated it is.
The DRHP devotes significant weight to mark & Sullivan report on Indian insurance. See the snapshot below:
DHRP quotes “Indian life insurance premiums will grow at 18% CAGR from 2021 till 2030". The 2020 (pre covid) premiums were Rs 5.7 lac Cr.
It adds reasons – under-penetrated market, demographic dividend, need for life insurance, blah blah. So what’s wrong with this?
Well, for one, try searching any other report from Frost & Sullivan for last 10 yrs on Indian insurance. You find nothing. So let me quote no less than the #BCG report for Indian insurance in 2011.
Life insurance was to grow 8 times from 2011 to 2020 to a premium of Rs 20 lac Cr
Except that it didn’t. Not only did #BCG missed the mark, it missed it by 70%. Life insurance could muster a measly Rs 5.7 lac Cr in 2020. A projected CAGR of 25% came to barely 4% for a decade. But it is BCG, so in 2021, it says “Indian has disappointed". Disappointed whom? BCG?
The fun doesn’t end here. The same consultants publish with yet another report in 2021 & this time take a CAGR of 15% till 2025. The same as Frost & Sullivan report that PolicyBazaar quotes.
Most within industry know that it not feasible. But it does help bullish IPO, never mind
Move to another lever of growth: The power of digitization & why PolicyBazaar can do what insurers couldn’t. Drive online business at low cost.
Let’s examine this myth in view of life insurance that is almost ~60% of revenue for PB. Life ins is a people intensive push business.
There comes complexity of scale. Look at below P&L & examine the employee expense. These range from 80% in 2019 to 62% in 2021, despite positioning for IPO. It's standard for life insurance biz.
How can #policybazaar scale digitally when 65% costs are employee expenses?
And it talks of opening branches for better conversions (Read - selling insurance like bank RMs do). Aside of term plans, life insurance is pushed by salesforce.
Revenue = Salesmen x policies sold x avg premiums. Can't beat this equation. Have you ever bought a ULIP on your own?
Talking of push, let’s compare the revenue growth for PB with some banks. Firstly #SEBI, pls ask 5 yr financials for loss making cos seeking to list. Post Covid, 3 yr P&L doesn’t tell us much. Of course, PB also hasn’t disclosed anything more.
If you’re impressed that losses in 2021 have reduced, just notice "advt & sales promotion" expenses. If we keep the same proportions as last 2 yrs, the loss % would be exactly the same.
But magically, the promotional exp reduce in IPO year. How? Ask Zomato & Paytm. Same trick.
For a ~ Rs 1000 Cr sales, the valuation of #policybazaaripo is 46 times SALES. You heard it, “times sales, not profits”.
Assume a 15% profit margin in distant future, the PE works out at ~ 306. So how about banks that earn similar revenues from brokerage?
IndusInd bank earned Rs 4500 Cr from fee income & its valuation is $ 12 BN. Axis Bank with Rs 14,000 fee income is valued at $ 30 Bn. And these are BANKS where fee is just a side income.
PolicyBazaar with just Rs 1000 Cr (fee income) revenue is asking $ 6 Bn !
Last resort – “Well PB is not only insurance but PaisaBazaar also. It is expanding into lending & can make money there”. Well, not really.
First, PB is 70% insurance biz. Second, the PB revenues have been growing on “outsourcing services” & “Online consulting”. What's that story
#PaisaBazaar revenues have fallen adversely due to lack of loan disbursals in covid (Paisa Bazaar loan disbursal fell by 50% in FY 21). But there is always Frost & Sullivan with their rosy projections (no track record), under-penetrated loan market, & blah blah.
Again, not happening. Loan growth in India has been falling consistently since 2019 as the below chart indicates (Sajjid Chinoy of Morgan Stanly).
If banks can’t have loan growth, brokers like #paisabazar can’t grow more on their backs.
Finally, look at contribution margins for #policybazaaripo . The margins look fine in 9 – 13%, but bloat to 39% in the IPO year.
Suddenly, revenue seems to go up with a fall in employee costs & promotion expenses. This one-year fall raises more questions than it tries to answer
Let not all pessimism cloud us. Yashish Dahiya, Alok Bansal & team have built a unique company that tries to make buying insurance easy, less messy with digital touch & good service. Hats-off to their resilience as entrepreneurs.Very few can do this in a tough & regulated market
Conclusion: To buy or not to buy?
We have a business that grows 4 times in valuation in 3 yrs & 2.5 times in just 6 months, operates in an industry that has grown by just 4% CAGR in last decade. The business is people intensive & digital scalability benefits are limited
With no 5-year financials, sharp drop in expenses in 2021 look out of line with trend. To pay 305 PE multiple for a semi-mature business, looks very pricey.
Light all fire crackers this Diwali but stay away from this financial bomb. You may burn your fingers.
A correction- #PolicybazaarIPO issued 1:499 bonus shares in June 2021. Had it not done the bonus issue, the IPO share price would have been Rs 5 lac per share ( not 50k as quoted earlier). Now you know the reason behind bonus shares.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
However, despite all this, Zomato’s valuation grows from $ 3 BN to 8.6 BN in 18 mths. Now that’s an innovation at Zomato that I’m not willing to pay for. I’m sure they’ll find many who would like to own “fools gold”. I’ll pass.
Zomato listing – Follow up:
So what does an analyst do when listing surprises everyone. Well, he digs more.
At PE of 350, #ZomatoIPO beats DoorDash of US hands down. And we thought DoorDash is overpriced at PE of 143. Is it pricey?
Hell yes, it is VERY pricey. And if possibilities are immense, why did sales stay flat for last 3 yrs? What did we miss here? Takes us to the listing dynamics & why most stocks decline post listing pop phenomenon. Let's see some details.
1)#ZomatoIPO : LONG THREAD: Once in a decade opportunity…. for some?
Is the IPO the golden opportunity for investors, as claimed by many? How much appreciation can one expect? A multi-year holding story or just a listing pop. This time it’s different, or is it? Let’s evaluate:
The authorized share capital of the Company is divided into 880 crore Equity Shares of face value Rs 1 each, paid-up share capital of the Company is Rs 666 crore.
IPO size: Rs 9,350 crore or $ 1.3 BN USD
Valuation of Zomato : Rs 66,000 crore or $ 8.8 BN USD
Ownership as below
Start with the balance sheet: We see B/S size increased almost 3 times in FY 21 vs FY 20. The equity infusion of Rs 7,643 cr in FY 21 just before IPO is not co-incidental? While this is not unusual for growth companies, this quantum change has an implications for shareholders.
Long Thread on Farmers protests & Agri reforms: What is the protest all about? Who gets impacted & how? Why are protests concentrated in Punjab & Haryana? Are these really farmers or traders losing grip on monopoly? Are farmers being misled? Let numbers do the talking. Here we go
A top-down view of Indian production is in order here. What does India’s agriculture produce in a year? I like the below chart for FY 2015. Now to understand the complexity, we’ll have to work with one crop & dig details. Let’s work with Wheat.
In 2020, India is looking at 105 million tons of Wheat produce vs 94 mn tons in 2015. What does the growth look like? See below the YoY growth of wheat in India. A 105 mn tons in 2020 will bust the chart below. Forget nay-sayers,Indian agriculture is doing great production.
SBI Cards IPO: long thread on valuation disasters in Indian markets & how these rip off the retail investors: Basic stats first:
13 crore shares offered out of total of 93 crore stocks. 14% float at Rs 750 per share is valuation of Rs 70 thousand crore to SBI Cards. #sbicards
This US $ 10 Billion market cap. They say this is the only card company getting listed so a great opportunity. We’ll see some numbers & benchmarks internationally. At FY'19 profits of Rs 862 crore & EPS =Rs 9.43, we get a Price Earning ratio of 80 !!
I know many will justify citing the growth prospects. I have a few questions to explore.Firstly, what is the highest PE of any mature financial company in India? Look at HDFC bank, Kotak, etc & we see much modest PEs of 25 to 35 for HDFC Bank & Kotak. And they are richly valued.
Why do people buy #LIC policy when returns are so bad? Long thread: As LIC goes towards divestment, let’s see what makes it policies click. It could save you a fortune, if you get the spirit behind this thread. Please keep your humor cells intact while reading. Let’s begin:
(1) Indian custom to buy LIC, passed through generations: LIC has the most entrenched network of 12 lac advisers & a legacy of 60 plus yrs. It has become customary to buy LIC. Your dad is bound to recommend the you same once you get your first salary.
However, fact is that the times when average returns from LIC were considered good (1950s-1980s) are long gone.With inflation running 9% for a decade in 2000s, LIC plans have been a big value destroyer.Unfortunately, it takes 20 yrs for you to even realize you lost money on LIC
Long thread on Indian Budget 2020-21. Let’s be cynical for a change & question the rationale of initiatives. Because I can’t understand some things the way they are. I’m sure however that we as a nation do believe in good luck. Else we seem to be cruising without compass.
If you couldn’t understand why we needed 2.5 hours speech to convey this budget, you’re not alone. To simplify, GDP = Consumption + Investment + Govt spends + (Exports – Imports).We need all cylinders to fire, for #India with highest working age population in the world.Let's see
Basics first:
On a Rs 30.4 lac cr budget, govt will earn 74% & borrow rest 26%. Of this, 23% will be spent on interest payments. On balance 77%, Defense takes 11%, police forces 4%, subsidies 7%, Railways 7%, tax administration 5%, pensions 7%.