1/ While news items about falls in the Russian stock market and exchange rate may rejoice some observers, the hard reality is that Russia has much higher macroeconomic resilience than Western nations in terms of its external balances and fiscal position.
2/ Over the 2014-2016 period, sanctions played a minor and secondary role in damaging the Russian economy. Oil price changes mattered more, falling from around 100 to around 50 dollars per barrel between July 2014 and December 2014 - and below 40 in early 2016.
3/ While the "break-even price" is a moving target - because fiscal and macro policies can be adjusted - it was the case in early 2016 that the oil price was so low as to force serious re-ordering of Russian priorities.
4/ Since mid-2021 we've seen oil prices systematically above 70 - and Russia's external macroeconomic positions are strong. Sanctions on banks and sovereign debt, and on currency operations, are good ideas, and stringent export controls are a good idea too.
5/ But the question remains: where Russia is at its weakest, meaning revenues from oil and gas exports, is there something that we can do? The answer is yes.
6/ The EU could impose an import tariff on imports of Russian oil and gas - and use the revenues, in part to cross-subsidise imports of oil and gas from other suppliers, and in part to finance necessary energy infrastructure adaptations.
7/ Such a tariff could be set to automatically increase every year, e.g. 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and so on. In the space of a few years, the entire dependence on Russia would be gone. Russia would incur enormous costs to redirect its energy export infrastructure to Asia.
8/ And in Europe, delirious projects such as Nord Stream 2 and their related pernicious effects on European security and solidarity would end. And after that, there isn't much that Russia produces that Europe would need at all. We would be decoupled.
9/ Note that this would be a painful adaptation, but deliberately not a death sentence for either side. Other markets would still be there, and no attempt should be made to prevent Russia from exporting to any other market.
10/ And while Russian industry counterparts will be busy transitioning at gigantic cost, they will remember: they had it so good, they had the perfect market, rich, friendly, pliable, corruptible even. And their reckless leaders threw it all away.
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1/ Interesting to see West. journalists and Pres Zelensky not understanding each other. Tension btw the Western mind that seeks a "single truth", e.g. mass invasion in X days (and if not, loss of interest, confusion). And Ukrainian experience of permanent war and threat of war.
2/ Zelensky is asking for money bc RU war against UA is also a permanent economic war, a war of destabilisation, internal subversion, political manipulation - plus cyber-attacks, sabotage attacks, actual combat in Donbas, provocations on LOC...
3/ Plus recurrent threats of Blitzkrieg style invasion, and note, this was also the case in 2014, and it is again now. Every time, it could be invasion. Every time, it could be a coup. And all the time, the Kremlin's goal is permanently to bully and undermine and coerce...
1/ On the "energy transition" and geoeconomics:
My experience, including e.g. lobbying for #electrification of #transport before it was cool, is that govts prefer the path of least resistance, which helps the incumbent #oil and #gas industry.
2/ So what you get is a compromise of #green policy goals (lower CO2, but not too fast, plus nuclear exit), slow-exiting of #oil and increase in #gas (good for incumbent industry), promotion of #hydrogen (helps gas industry survive), and of course #Russia.
3/ Liberal economic principles, and foreign policy idealism, are brought in just in time to prevent heavy geoeconomic measures to cut dependence on Russia. And so, Europe will do a slow energy transition with Russia guaranteed major benefits for the next few decades.
1/ Posting same video shared by @andersostlund earlier. Worth watching. The @CDU spox is very good. But even the @spdde spox sounds quite reasonable. However I fully disagree on the logic of not delivering weapons...
2/ ...the reasoning (or pretext) now given by @spdde is that GER shouldn't deliver weapons because it is a facilitator in negotiations. Well at least there's no longer a clumsy argument about history. Nonetheless the new argument is poor logic...
3/ ...delivering weapons to #Ukraine would strengthen GER credibility and put Moscow on the backfoot - if even SPD types give weapons, that means #Kremlin has gone too far. Also, @spdde argues that GER is helping UA in other ways, esp economically...
@ulrichspeck 1/ I think German "geopolitics" would be a disaster given the blind spots of many German elites - e.g. taking the EU market for granted, therefore being soft on Moscow & Beijing. That is a geopolitics of a certain kind. What makes the West tick is something else...
2/ What is more-or-less unique about America today - and the British Empire before WW2 - was that in spite of a lot of hard power politics, both at times mobilised power to impose positive change elsewhere, rather than choose the path of least resistance...
3/ Take for instance the Royal Navy's leadership in interdicting the slave trade in the 19th century - and of salient interest to all Europeans, the choices made by London and then far more importantly by Washington to confront totalitarianism...
@IlvesToomas@andersostlund 1/ In my perception war guilt per se is not the driver. Rather this, even if subconscious only: early 20th century Germany strikes, twice, at the two continental enemies, FRA and RUS. Post-war dream is reconciliation with both. Nobody may get in the way of the dream.
@IlvesToomas@andersostlund 2/ Another key is Cold War history itself: West Germany lives in fear and a large part is held by the Soviets. W. Germans learn, subconsciously again, that US is needed but can be criticised, and that USSR is dangerous and can't be criticised. Stockholm Syndrome ensues.
@IlvesToomas@andersostlund 3/ As a result of Stockholm Syndrome, Germany is grateful to Moscow for German Reunification, but not grateful to the Western powers. And because Moscow is assumed dangerous and can't be criticised, easier to blame tensions on America or Eastern Europeans rather than on Moscow.