On January 20, 2022, ISIS launched a large-scale military operation, in terms of chosen target and the size of participating fighters, to liberate its members who were detained in Al-Sina’a Prison in the Ghweran neighborhood, south of Al-Hasakah city.
This operation is considered the most intense of its kind since the collapse of the group in Syria three years ago by coalition forces and the SDF, as the operation lasted for 7 days and resulted in many causalities.
The operation proves the extent of the slackness and corruption that the SDF suffers from, and its weakness in dealing with such events without direct support from the international coalition.
The events of the Al-Sina’a Prison refuted the SDF’s claims of its ability to control the ground and deal with security threats, and this will have repercussions that are expected to be invested by active countries involved in the East Euphrates issue.
ISIS attacks against SDF during a year:
SDF forces were the first aim of the group’s operations during 2021, reaching 70% of its total operations in Syria as a target, according to what group’s reports published on its official platforms shows.
SDF forces were the first aim of the group’s operations during 2021, reaching 70% of its total operations in Syria as a target, according to what group’s reports published on its official platforms shows.
In 2021, ISIS launched 292 operations on all of Syria.
An illustrative table of the entities targeted by the group during the past year:
An illustrative table of the entities targeted by the group during the past year:
Information about SDF prisons:
About 12,000 members of the organization are held in eight prisons: Gweran and al-Sina’a in al-Hasakah, al-Bulgar camp and al-Shaddadieh in al-Shaddadi, Derek in al-Malikiyah, al-Kasra in Deir ez-Zor, Rmelan in Rmelan, and central Raqqa in Raqqa.
The prisons of al-Sina’a, al-Kasra, and Camp al-Bulgar are the most important, as they contain the majority of the organization’s leaders.
Previous ISIS attacks on prisons:
The group launched 3 major operations on prisons holding its fighters, most notably: an attack on Abu Ghraib prison and Taji prison in Iraq in 2013,
an attack on Idlib prison, which is under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in 2017, and an attack on Ghweran prison under the control of SDF in 2022.
These operations have often succeeded in releasing its leaders and fighters. perhaps this sheds light on the group's capabilities still possesses despite the losses it suffered.
The group relies on the freeing their leaders to enhance its activity, by increasing its ability to mobilize and manage operations. It also sends a special message to the members of the group that it does not leave its prisoners, thus increasing cohesion within the group’s ranks.
In conjunction with the attack on Ghweran prison, the group launched 22 attacks against SDF forces through seven days, 4 in Al-Hasakah, 5 in Raqqa, and 13 in Deir Ezzor, with the aim of confusing the SDF forces and diverting their security focus.
During the previous years, the group attacked Ghweran prison three times, during which it did not succeed in breaking into the prison, but its latest attack highlights that is the group learned from its mistakes, while indicating the corruption and slackness of the SDF forces
About the attack, technical perspective:
Crossing informations, the groups attacked the prison with 200 fighter who were brought from outside the prison.
Crossing informations, the groups attacked the prison with 200 fighter who were brought from outside the prison.
“The group began planning the operation six months ago”, according to Nuri Muhammad, one of the leaders of the SDF.
The operation began with an attack on the prison gate with two VBIED, which opened the door and facilitated the entry of a number of attacking elements.
The remaining part of the elements were distributed within the Ghweran neighborhood with the aim of preventing the aid of the SDF from reaching the vicinity and inside the prison, in addition to maintain an open road for the escape of leaders and the elements from the prison.
After entering the prison by group’s member, they began to engage close combat with the prison guard elements and administration, and some of them moved to attack weapons and food depots.
After capturing the depots by the attacking elements, and the SDF forces in the prison were neutralized, either fell as captive or killed by the attackers, the prisoners' wards were opened and prisoners grabbed arms.
The group then scattered their freed elements and then armed them to holding guarding points on the prison sides, while the attacking force engaged in a clash with SDF forces that tried to storm the prison in order to exhaust it.
Meanwhile with the clashes going inside and around the prison, other members of the group deployed in the neighborhood began to advance towards the east and capture a number of SDF checkpoints on the main road south of Al-Hasakah
. The goal was to secure an escape route for the leaders and elements who were smuggled from the prison towards the desert and the Iraqi-Syrian border.
After that, members of the organization began to leave the prison for Ghweran neighborhood through the tunnels previously dug by SDF in the prison and the neighborhood, which indicates a major security breach that SDF was subjected to by ISIS.
The attack on the prison simultaneously lanched with other attacks on the patrols and headquarters of the SDF in Al-Hasakah, Al-Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor, with the aim of creating a kind of confusion among the military and security command and control staff in the SDF.
After a day and a half of taking control of the neighborhood, ISIS fighters retreated to the prison and some cells hid inside the Ghweran neighborhood.
The group began negotiating with the SDF forces and the international coalition to pass its members to the desert in exchange for the release of SDF members detained by the group.
After that, the military operations stopped for about 20 hours, then the clashes resumed again with a noticeable progress of the SDF forces and the surrender of a number of the group’s members who were already in prison.
No pictures or names of the attacking members of the group from outside the prison appeared, suggesting the idea of their escape through tunnels or during negotiations with SDF and the coalition.
SDF leaders appeared on January 26 to announce the end of the clashes and the control of the prison and the Ghweran neighborhood.
But the next day, one of the sleeper cells of the organization in the Ghweran neighborhood attacked a joint patrol of the International Coalition and SDF, which prompted SDF to expel the journalists and declare Ghweran neighborhood a military zone.
This is a defensive tactic that is rarely used, which is backward fighting, and the tactic aims to continue the defensive process at a minimum against the attacking forces with the aim of exhausting and diverting them until complete the objectives of the operation as planned.
The previous tactic aims to achieve the following military equation: the cost of the war exceeds the cost of victory, meaning that the cost of regaining control of the prison exceeds the logical military cost. Thus, victory loses any meaning. This is what the group did in Mosul.
Finally, after the previous incident, the SDF stated that there are about 60 to 90 members of the group still hiding in tunnels and locations inside the prison and the Ghweran neighborhood, which means that the battle is not over yet.
It is likely that the leaders who were released from prison will be transferred either to the Syrian desert in the main, as a home for recruiting and training, or to Iraq in a secondary degree, albeit an expensive option.
The Iraqi border is 35 km from Hasaka, and the desert begins immediately after the Ghweran neighborhood.
It is expected that the group will take advantage of the leaders that left after securing them, to enhance its organizational and recruiting capabilities,
and this increases the burden of security threats on its opponents and competitors, and puts the SDF forces ahead of a difficult and serious stage in the face of the ISIS’s cells.
The group is still operating within the first stage of a strategy that it adopted after its collapse, which is the strategy of guerrilla warfare, as mentioned by its lords and leaders on several occasions.
This stage depends mainly on attrition or the so-called bloodsheding, based on limited offensive operations and carried out by a small group characterized by two things: speed of movement and lightly armed.
In this strategy the attacker refrains from holding the ground in order not to fall into defensive operations that lead to attrition and require continuous and significant supply of both human and arms types.
The attacker also tries to focus on two main characteristics of his attacks, namely continuity and distribution. they neither stop attacks neither limit operations to a specific area.
Ghweran aftermath:
The attack on Ghweran prison in this way is considered a significant change for the group in its guerrilla offensive operations, and a strong threatening message for the SDF and the international coalition.
The attack on Ghweran prison in this way is considered a significant change for the group in its guerrilla offensive operations, and a strong threatening message for the SDF and the international coalition.
Syria is not considered the main theater of the group's operations. Since its foundation, the group has still considered Iraq the main theater for its operations,
as the group carried out 738 attacks in Iraq in 2021 only. This reinforces the idea that Syria is a therater for recruitment, mobilization, and training.
Operation Ghweran has not ended, and we may hear about some operations that may occur in Ghweran neighborhood while the SDF and the coalition forces are clearing the neighborhood, or we may witness specific operations of the group similar to Operation Ghweran in the near future.
The operation demonstrated the extent of the security stagnation within the ranks of the SDF, which may push some countries active in the Syrian case to promote the inability of the SDF forces despite the international support
they receive to keep the group’s elements inside prisons, in addition to the failure of the strategy of the international coalition and SDF in counter terrorism.
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