It seems Lukashenka still denies Russia a permanent military base but Russia is becoming more flexible. The ‘Union Resolve 2022′ is technically not an exercise by "test of the Union State’s response force". Regular Zapad Exercise are announced well in advance - this was just 2/8
announced 3 weeks before the start. Regular exercise count from 2500-3000 Russian participants, now the estimations go as high as 30,000. More conservatives estimates give 5k-7k personnel.
3/8
Aside from obvious "Ukraine component" this exercise has a domestic "humanitarian component" as what if what happened in Kazakhstan in January happens in Belarus. Russia will respond fast and strong.
4/8
Lukashenka still denies separate base but we have joint training-and-combat center for air force and air Defence specialists at the Baranovichi airbase since autumn 2021; two similar joint centers are to be established in the Nizhny Novgorod region and near Kaliningrad 5/8
Thus, military integration within the Union State continues, regardless of Lukashenka’s resistance to the emergence of a Russian military base. 6/8
Also a symbolic move is a participation of Belarus military in Russian operation in Syria under Russian command. Russia can do the same for Belarus and thus there would be no need for a Russian base in Belarus. Russian troops might just take parts of BL bases. 7/8
With all the attention to Ukraine, a few question the fundamental military transition transpiring in Belarus.
Read the full piece here. 8/8 ridl.io/en/military-in…
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Karaganov here promotes emerging Russian discourse of "constructive destruction" of Western-centeric Russian foreign policy. In other words - practical steps towards multipolarity in the 21st century. Thread. 1/
Karaganov says Russia does not wish to war with anyone for now for as long as it is not threatened (taking Ukraine to the West is a threat). Basically, he says Russia needs to wait out until West finally gives up pretending that it is almighty and a deal would be made
Then Russia can rebuild its relations with the West to balance growing might of China.
Karaganov, unlike Kortunov for instance, claims Russia should abandon all attempts to play by the West's rule and invest in new rules of Greater Eurasia.
What will happen in Russia domestically in case Russia - US talks fail and major escalation is on its way. @Stanovaya here for @CarnegieRussia raises a number of important points. Thread 1/9
Naturally if the frontier is on fire, all the conservative forces would accelerate their efforts to secure the country from within with triple speed.
Obviously the first target would be the internet. 2/9
I can imagine a situation of a massive coordinated attack by Rozkomnadzor+ on foreign platforms with demands to ban "war propaganda" which could be anything and everything that Russia would be denying at the moment: failure to comply will lead to slowing down and blocking 3/9
1. Luzin asserts that you need to add defense spending to “National Security and Law Enforcement” budget spending to see a broader picture and it is that spending is on the rise since 2021 and will rise at least until 2024 after stabilization of 2017–2020. 2/12
Russia seems to have already entered a phase of long-term increase in spending. From the perspective of the Russian authorities, the need for such an increase is no longer closely linked to the overall growth rate of the economy. 3/12
Karaganov often speaks what Russia's most conservative foreign policy minds think (military but not only)
Few gems from his recent interview:
1/12
What can Russia do to force US to take it seriously?
Karaganov says Russia has three ways - beefing up military presence across the board, strengthening military alliance with China, cyberwar
2/12
Karaganov says if it was not for nukes, West would have already attacked Russia.
He says it is better for Russia to relive Cuban missile crisis than second June 22nd of 1941. In other words, better escalate now, on Russia's term than be attacked later. Not being attacked
3/12
What do Russians think about the war with Ukraine and Russian - NATO confrontation? Will they support overt activity?
Thread based on Levada's director Denis Volkov piece for @RiddleRussia ridl.io/en/we-are-bein…
1/9
50% of Russians think major war with Ukraine is impossible;
39% think otherwise. 1/4 believe war with NATO is possible(highest number ever); the rest think otherwise
2/9
62% of Russians, highest since collapse of the USSR feared war in the spring of 2021 - after Putin/Biden meeting in December it dropped to 56%.
3/9
Few observations about reader preferences with Russia analysis. So, we @RiddleRussia@RidlRussia posted most read articles of the year with: #Riddletop10_2021 and #Riddle_топ_2021. We have about same amount of people reading us in English and in Russian.
Out of 10 most read
articles only two made it to both lists, Vladimir Gelman on #Sputnik "success story" ridl.io/en/sputnik-v-o… and Igor Gretskiy on Russia - NATO relations in 1990s ridl.io/en/could-the-w…;
Topics of most interest to English speaking readers: simply foreign policy - Russia and
Ukraine, Afghanistan, Syria, China, Central Asia, Libya and Russian military. Among a few exceptions is @fa_burkhardt's piece on PM Mishustin's ambitions ridl.io/en/foolproofin…;
For Russian speakers it is much more diverse list: elections (Smart Voting efficiency -