My take for @RiddleRussia with a few takeaways on why February 21st will mark a new reality for Russian foreign policy for at least the next decade. Thread 1/7 ridl.io/en/putin-in-th…
The entire show: from Security Council meeting to Putin's speech to signing the documents was unprecedented. The level of humiliation of Putin's boyars and degree of his conspiracy theory driven motivation behind Russian FP stance is a new high 2/7
No longer can any Russian argue for a "smart" realpolitik justification or some other civilized version of Putin's actions: he made it clear it was about him not recognizing Ukraine and believing US wants to destroy Russia. 3/7
For now we have Russian troops already in Ukraine, so far in what is recognized by Russia as DNR and LNR independent republics; key question - where the border is. It is yet unclear. Many contradictive messages going around. 4/7
Recognition of DNR/LNR solves nothing for Putin or Russia. It is in fact a set back on its own.
It addresses none of the concerns Putin voiced last night and has been voicing for the past years.
So nothing is ending with this recognition 5/7
Unfortunately, a very bloody scenario is becoming more likely with attempts to change power in Kyiv/split Ukraine even more.
What is crucial - Putin still wants to talk to Washington . Only Biden can regulated de-facto where Putin stops in Ukraine 6/7
This is a culmination of Putin's growing desire to re-do European security and post-cold war regulation. Many areas are in question. There is no way of getting the
genie back in the bottle 7/7
For more detail read ridl.io/en/putin-in-th…
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It seems Lukashenka still denies Russia a permanent military base but Russia is becoming more flexible. The ‘Union Resolve 2022′ is technically not an exercise by "test of the Union State’s response force". Regular Zapad Exercise are announced well in advance - this was just 2/8
announced 3 weeks before the start. Regular exercise count from 2500-3000 Russian participants, now the estimations go as high as 30,000. More conservatives estimates give 5k-7k personnel.
3/8
Karaganov here promotes emerging Russian discourse of "constructive destruction" of Western-centeric Russian foreign policy. In other words - practical steps towards multipolarity in the 21st century. Thread. 1/
Karaganov says Russia does not wish to war with anyone for now for as long as it is not threatened (taking Ukraine to the West is a threat). Basically, he says Russia needs to wait out until West finally gives up pretending that it is almighty and a deal would be made
Then Russia can rebuild its relations with the West to balance growing might of China.
Karaganov, unlike Kortunov for instance, claims Russia should abandon all attempts to play by the West's rule and invest in new rules of Greater Eurasia.
What will happen in Russia domestically in case Russia - US talks fail and major escalation is on its way. @Stanovaya here for @CarnegieRussia raises a number of important points. Thread 1/9
Naturally if the frontier is on fire, all the conservative forces would accelerate their efforts to secure the country from within with triple speed.
Obviously the first target would be the internet. 2/9
I can imagine a situation of a massive coordinated attack by Rozkomnadzor+ on foreign platforms with demands to ban "war propaganda" which could be anything and everything that Russia would be denying at the moment: failure to comply will lead to slowing down and blocking 3/9
1. Luzin asserts that you need to add defense spending to “National Security and Law Enforcement” budget spending to see a broader picture and it is that spending is on the rise since 2021 and will rise at least until 2024 after stabilization of 2017–2020. 2/12
Russia seems to have already entered a phase of long-term increase in spending. From the perspective of the Russian authorities, the need for such an increase is no longer closely linked to the overall growth rate of the economy. 3/12
Karaganov often speaks what Russia's most conservative foreign policy minds think (military but not only)
Few gems from his recent interview:
1/12
What can Russia do to force US to take it seriously?
Karaganov says Russia has three ways - beefing up military presence across the board, strengthening military alliance with China, cyberwar
2/12
Karaganov says if it was not for nukes, West would have already attacked Russia.
He says it is better for Russia to relive Cuban missile crisis than second June 22nd of 1941. In other words, better escalate now, on Russia's term than be attacked later. Not being attacked
3/12
What do Russians think about the war with Ukraine and Russian - NATO confrontation? Will they support overt activity?
Thread based on Levada's director Denis Volkov piece for @RiddleRussia ridl.io/en/we-are-bein…
1/9
50% of Russians think major war with Ukraine is impossible;
39% think otherwise. 1/4 believe war with NATO is possible(highest number ever); the rest think otherwise
2/9
62% of Russians, highest since collapse of the USSR feared war in the spring of 2021 - after Putin/Biden meeting in December it dropped to 56%.
3/9