@gho1989 sent me a DM with some great questions, and I want to relay our conversation here. He asked who might be in line after #Putin, in case of an accident or “accident” befalling the Russian leader, and the prospects of insider regime change in Russia.
This ties in with another topic of interest, @mtaibbi’s Substack column on Putin’s rise in 90s Russia and the connivance of Western interests in his political advance. Taibbi knows Russia, having started as a journalist in Moscow for an alt-weekly: taibbi.substack.com/p/putin-the-ap…
The piece is good, especially with the detail work on the corruption and blackmail that served as the main channel of political competition in Yeltsin’s “democratic” Russia, and the Western profiteering that enabled it.
This is relevant because the current Putin-centric political order was engineered in that context and his early moves as president were all intended to replace the chaos of that period with a durable, state-led order.
From the Soviet system where the party-state exerted authority at all levels and on all aspects of life, #Yeltsin’s Russia became a hellscape of state collapse, with real power in the hands of mafia fighting one another and oligarchs with incredible wealth.
Oligarch power came from privatization. All of the economy had been state owned, so it was all up for grabs - not sale, because no one had money - through different political schemes that could be gamed by insiders. Oligarchs grabbed all the oil in Siberia, or whole industries.
Similarly, the change in the system meant that Soviet law was defunct, and Russian police were unfamiliar with enforcing new property laws and preoccupied with survival - the state often couldn’t pay salaries, let alone back them up against “violent entrepreneurs.”
#VadimVolkov has an excellent book by that title detailing the emergence of post-Soviet criminal gangs. They provided muscle for oligarchs in economic disputes, and you ended up with a country ruled by criminal billionaires in which the state could only do what they allowed.
The government couldn’t even cover salaries for doctors, teachers, soldiers, and other essential workers. They went for months without their meager pay under conditions of general economic ruin: rferl.org/amp/1085616.ht…
Putin’s rise was cleared by oligarchs - notably #BorisBerezovsky and #RomanAbramovic - who expected another yes man they could control. Instead, he played divide and rule to break their power, jailing some, driving others to exile, and assassinating others.
Berezovsky is a great example - Putin used his real crimes as a justification to break him. He fled to London and died under mysterious circumstances. They weren’t replaced by a new economy but by new oligarchs, personally loyal to Putin on whom their fortunes and safety depended
Abramovic may be the only 90s oligarch to get out with his fortune intact, largely because he provided essential support and durable loyalty to Putin. He got to keep his billions and ran Chelsea FC until the war, which might cost him everything: thesun.co.uk/sport/football…
Putin also broke the power of legislative institutions and regional governors. He also stacked government with loyal professionals like #SergeyLavrov, capable but with no power base outside of Putin. tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.275…
The President/PM swap out charade via #DmitryMedvedev he also broke the constitution. Russia is not a rule of law country - even for the elite, wealth and safety depend on Putin’s favor. en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Putin-Med…
He has this level of control thanks to investment in the loyalty and effectiveness of security agencies - they were the first to be reformed in the early 2000s. Putin was sharpening his axe that he would wield against the other institutions of power and rival claimants in Russia.
This system has served to make him irreplaceable PERSONALLY. Other insiders fear him, owe him their positions, are implicated in (and execute) his policy choices and mistrust one another. Quite deliberately, Putin has created a bad environment for palace coups. Ex-KGB can scheme.
If he died tomorrow - as he will someday - I imagine a scramble like #ArmandoIanucci’s #DeathofStalin. There is no heir apparent (because that would facilitate plotting), so succession is a messy contest of insiders. Maybe Medvedev wins since he’s non-threatening to the others.
Whatever the victor, what follows is Putinism without Putin, with all the complications for peace and change that implies. Any other outcome would depend on mass protests and the defection of regular soldiers/police like what ended the USSR.
It’s hard to see how that happens - older Russians will remember Yeltsin, shudder, and say “no thanks.” No opposition groups have the broad appeal and organization to make something like this happen. Maybe if there are enough war dead grieving mothers might anoint Navalny. Maybe.
I realize that this thread is a gloom parade, but the first step in responsibly addressing events is acknowledging reality as it is. Putin’s ouster is up there with a Ukrainian victory as a great thing that won’t happen. We need to figure what will. FIN
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