The #UkraineRussiaWar has entered its second week. I find the YouTube genre of map-based animations of war progress helpful to keep track of developments across Ukraine:
There are a number of different channels doing the same: , , , . They differ primarily in their choice of music.
I like to think that their convergence is based on shared visualization conventions and reflects similar interpretations of reports from Ukraine (they seem slightly ahead of but do not contradict maps from media/academic outlets). They could also be plagiarizing each other.
There is also this outlier: It isn’t a time lapse, there’s no audio, it uses Google maps, few updates, and massively more Russian gains. The channel has more detailed maps of Ukrainian cities, but I have trouble believing the data (sources not given).
A few developments worth noting on the consensus maps: Russian forces have reached the Dniepr from Crimea (consistent with reports of disputes with nuclear plant staff at Enerhodar), they’ve linked the Crimean and Donbas fronts on the Sea of Azov…
…Kherson and Mariupol are captured/surrounded, Chernihiv has been cut off in a larger pocket (the mayor reports the city itself is surrounded, with access points mined), and Russia advances south of Kharkiv presumably to surround Ukraine’s Donbas forces.
In other words, it’s a grind but Russia is progressing, stiff Ukrainian resistance notwithstanding. But what about reports like this? nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pent…
Note the source. I struggle to figure out the most credible YouTube cartographer but this is easy: nothing optimistic from the DoD can be trusted without evidence #AfghanistanPapers. There DO seem to be problems that Russia is encountering with vehicles, resistance, etc…
…but there’s a leap from “they aren’t moving as fast as expected” to “the invasion is failing.” It still looks like Russia is winning militarily, and the recent US/NATO preoccupation with “disinformation” has placed officials under pressure to forward “correct” narratives…
…regardless of accuracy. Government spokesmen - US, Russian, Ukrainian, European - do not work for you. They are part of their government’s security apparatus and see information as just another front in the war. There’s also the question of interpretation.
Rather than remark “Russia isn’t doing as well as predicted” and assume that it’s being defeated, the better move is to ask why. One question: why hasn’t Russia made more use of air power, especially since it claimed (optimistically, it turns out) air superiority early on.
Al Jazeera asks that in the article below. The question is good, their answer (incompetence/Ukrainian resistance) not so much. Russian air forces haven’t been defeated so much as absent. So where are they?
While Ukraine is the war front, Russia and NATO are in contact elsewhere, especially the Balts/Scandinavia. If Russia doesn’t NEED its AF to move in Ukraine, it isn’t bad strategy to accept higher losses to preserve air power to deter or defend against a potential NATO move.
There may also be a ruthless, Soviet-style decision to do the same with elite land forces. Ukrainians describe the Russian units in country as “inexperienced,” “conscripts,” using “Soviet-era” vehicles/heavy weapons. During WW2, Soviet strategy was to make the weakest units…
…absorb the most losses in initial attacks, holding back shock troops for use once defenders were worn down. Some elite troops may also be held for potential use in the Baltic States in case of NATO escalation. It’s a slower, bloodier war plan, but don’t forget who won WW2.
In this context, NATO mobilization and threats against Russia can be understood not as diplomatic pressure, but as a means of preventing Russia from committing all its forces and keeping contingency reserves. You don’t need actual intervention - just the credible threat.
Meanwhile, last statesman standing #EmmanuelMacron continues talking with Putin, who forwarded three demands for peace: recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, Ukrainian neutrality, and demilitarization/denazification. The third point is trouble because only Putin…
…knows what he means, but the first two have been discussed for years as potential concessions. We’ll see what comes next, but Ukraine-Russia talks continue. A ceasefire is unlikely, but as costs mount to both sides this is not a hopeless framework for a deal.
Russian jets crossed into Swedish airspace briefly near the Baltic island of Gotland (incidentally a charming location connected to ancient Norse history). This suggests that indeed the RusAF has been held back strategically: ctvnews.ca/mobile/world/s…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
@gho1989 sent me a DM with some great questions, and I want to relay our conversation here. He asked who might be in line after #Putin, in case of an accident or “accident” befalling the Russian leader, and the prospects of insider regime change in Russia.
This ties in with another topic of interest, @mtaibbi’s Substack column on Putin’s rise in 90s Russia and the connivance of Western interests in his political advance. Taibbi knows Russia, having started as a journalist in Moscow for an alt-weekly: taibbi.substack.com/p/putin-the-ap…
The piece is good, especially with the detail work on the corruption and blackmail that served as the main channel of political competition in Yeltsin’s “democratic” Russia, and the Western profiteering that enabled it.
The situation in Ukraine is developing rapidly. Russian forces have entered #Kherson, a regional capital between #Crimea and #Odessa. Latest word is that the city capitulated after encirclement: news18.com/amp/news/world…
Encirclement is an established tactic - the Konev maneuver by the Red Army surrounded Kraków to take it from the Nazis in WW2 - and Russia has done the same with other Ukrainian cities like #Chernihiv and #Mariupol. The idea is to avoid casualties and force eventual surrender.