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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Nov 27

Thread
A year ago today, a ceasefire agreement began to be implemented on the Israeli-Lebanese border. This agreement followed a brutal and complex war, which at times resembled a Hollywood movie (the pagers and walkie-talkie explosions). Today, this agreement is back in the spotlight, amid assertions from Israeli officials that the Lebanese side has not fulfilled its commitments. This escalating rhetoric in Israel coincides with a military escalation on the ground, marked by the assassination of Hezbollah's Chief of Staff, Abu Ali Tabatabai, and once again the drumbeat of war grows louder. This analysis examines the political and military landscape on the Israeli-Lebanese border and the options available to each side.
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On this day a year ago, I published a thread discussing the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel, describing it as fragile and expressing doubts about its implementation by both sides, particularly by Hezbollah. Today, my predictions have been confirmed. The militia, which had evaded implementing UN Resolution 1701 after the July War of 2006, is once again evading the same resolution and the ceasefire agreement's provisions under various pretexts. While Hezbollah officials claim to have implemented the agreement by withdrawing from south of the Litani River, this claim does not match the reality on the ground, as the continued presence of fighters remain south of the Litani, who are targeted and killed by the IDF, demonstrates. Even a year after the agreement went into effect, the Israeli Air Force continues to destroy rocket launchers, weapons depots, and militia infrastructure south of the Litani. As for the areas north of the Litani, Hezbollah officials argue that there is no provision requiring the militia to handover its weapons to the Lebanese state. This claim is also false, as the agreement clearly states that the Lebanese state must take possession of the militia's weapons starting from the Litani River, meaning throughout all Lebanese territory. Furthermore, the agreement itself is based on Lebanon and Hezbollah's acceptance of the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which explicitly stipulates that weapons in Lebanon must be exclusively held by the state. On the other hand, Lebanese officials believe that the main reason of the current escalation is the Israeli side's refusal to fully withdraw from southern Lebanon, where it still maintains a presence on five strategic hills and three military outposts inside Lebanese territory. Many consider this to be a breach of the agreement by the Netanyahu government, which explicitly stipulates a complete Israeli withdrawal within 60 days of the ceasefire. The Israeli side justifies this decision by stating that Lebanon, which promised to withdraw Hezbollah from south of the Litani within 60 days, failed to carry out its commitments. Consequently, Israel had to maintain control over certain points that allow it to protect the security of Israeli villages in the north. In conclusion, both sides are exchanging accusations, and the result is the same: a year after the ceasefire agreement went into effect, the situation on the Israeli-Lebanese border once again tops the agenda of Israel’s security cabinet, both small and expanded. The drums of war are beating louder with each passing day as we approach the end of this year, a period many see as the last chance before a new war breaks out. So, has war truly become inevitable, or is there still a chance to avoid it through diplomacy?
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In fact, from the very first day of the ceasefire, Washington launched an intensive diplomatic effort to push the agreement forward and ensure its implementation. The first practical steps involved supporting the election of Lebanese Army Commander General Joseph Aoun as President of the Republic, followed by the selection of Judge Nawaf Salam, an independent figure, as Prime Minister. American delegations continued to arrive in Beirut, delivering messages and presenting proposals, the most important of which was a document prepared by the White House envoy to Lebanon, Thomas Barrack. However, these diplomatic efforts collided with the reality that Hezbollah was not serious about accepting the ceasefire agreement and implementing UN Resolution 1701. Despite the Lebanese government's openness to these proposals, culminating in its August 5 decision to restrict weapons to the Lebanese state and its subsequent approval of the Thomas Barrack paper on August 8, these decisions were met with the Lebanese army's reluctance to confront Hezbollah. This reluctance was further underscored by clear statements from militia officials, most notably its Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, who affirmed their readiness for war to defend their weapons. On the Israeli side, Netanyahu's government refused to include the issue of Hezbollah's disarmament in any negotiations, emphasizing that any direct or indirect negotiations between Lebanon and Israel would begin only after Lebanon fully implements UN Resolution 1701 and disarms Hezbollah. The visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to Beirut two days ago can be considered a final warning to Lebanon. Mr. Abdelatty stressed that Israeli escalation is now only a matter of time and that the only solution for Lebanon to avoid war is for the Lebanese state to immediately begin disarming Hezbollah south and north of the Litani River. Otherwise, the Israeli side will launch a military operation against Lebanon, both aerial and ground. In this escalating atmosphere, it is essential to outline the options available to each side, whether in war or diplomacy.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Nov 12

Thread
About 22 years ago, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who would later be known as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, entered Iraq through a smuggling route near the Syrian city of al-Bukamal to participate in confronting the American invasion. Today, al-Sharaa enters the White House as the president of Syria, wearing a red tie and a broad smile, and Trump greets him with praise and support. An analytical reading of Ahmad al-Sharaa's visit to Washington, the balance of Syrian-American relations, and the challenges facing Damascus internally and regionally under the watchful eye of Israel.
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While some focus on the symbolism of this visit, which undoubtedly confirms the flexibility of politics and that yesterday's enemy may be tomorrow's ally, I believe that some have gone beyond reality, claiming that Syria is now under American protection, that Washington will lay out roses before al-Sharaa’s steps, and that Syria will become the Switzerland of the Middle East. In reality, however, what unites Syria and America are two main factors: the political pragmatism of the Syrian administration and the opportunism of the American administration. Here, I will provide a simplified explanation of the development of Syrian-American relations after the fall of the Assad regime and the assumption of the presidency by Ahmad Hussein al-Sharaa in Syria.
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It can be said that this visit is the result of extremely important diplomatic work carried out by the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the Syrian-American Council, which has, in recent years, become an influential pressure group on Washington's policies toward the Syrian issue. It also came after Middle Eastern mediations in which Qatar, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia played important roles in bridging the gap between the new Syrian administration and the Trump administration. Practically speaking, it is certain that the American administration, since the first weeks after the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus, began communicating directly with the new Syrian administration on multiple issues. The first of these was the issue of American detainees in Assad's prisons. Then, the American ambassador to Türkiye, Mr. Thomas Barrack, was appointed to assume the position of the American envoy to Syria, who in turn played important roles in coordinating between the new Syrian administration and Washington's approach on internal issues in Syria and the region. Barrack also had a decisive role in the Suwayda issue, ending the Israeli military action at that time, which was under the pretext of protecting the Druze in Syria. Barrack also bridged the gap between the viewpoints of Damascus and the Lebanese government, and he is currently managing the file of the security agreement between Syria and Israel. The general outline of US-Syrian relations can be summarized as follows: each side has its own interests and objectives. From the Syrian perspective, as President Ahmed al-Sharaa emphasized from the very beginning of his term in Damascus, economic development is the priority. To achieve this development and revive the devastated Syrian economy, it was essential for Damascus to engage with Washington on multiple levels. During the rule of both Assad the father and the son, the United States imposed many economic sanctions on Syria, the first of which was in 1979 when Syria was placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism following Hafez al-Assad's intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. The harshest of these sanctions was the Caesar Act imposed by Washington in 2020. Al-Sharaa and his government, with assurances from Arab allies, reached the conclusion that for Syria to recover and begin reconstruction, the Syrian administration had to redefine its relationship with Washington and gain Trump's trust and support to lift these sanctions. As for the American side, it can be said that Washington views Syria through several strategic and vital files, the most important of which are the file of combating terrorism, the file of Syrian-Israeli relations, and the file of Syria's geostrategic position as an important ally of Moscow and Iran. These three files formed the basic rules from Washington's point of view for relations with Damascus, and in my opinion, these three files were the focus of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa's visit to the White House.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Aug 19

Thread 🧵
On August 5th, the Lebanese government approved the decision to withdraw Hezbollah's weapons, and on August 7th, the government approved the American paper, also known as the Barrack paper. After these two decisions, Lebanon enters its most dangerous and complex turning point since the end of the civil war in 1990. A detailed reading of the circumstances of the Lebanese scene and the viewpoints of the internal factions, while the Lebanese-Israeli border remains on high alert for any emergency.
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In his first speech after the Lebanese government's decisions, dedicated to developments in Lebanon, Naim Qassem, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, emphasized that the militia will not surrender its weapons to the Lebanese state and that they are ready for what he called a Karbala battle (named after the Iraqi city of Karbala) if necessary to confront the Lebanese government's decisions. Qassem also threatened that tampering with the militia's weapons threatens Lebanon's survival as a state. This escalatory speech by Hezbollah's leadership came one day after the visit of the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Ali Larijani, to Beirut and his meeting with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament. Larijani's visit was part of a tour that included Iraq and came after he assumed his new position. Larijani is now responsible for the file of Iranian regional influence in light of the inability of the commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, to manage this file properly. Larijani conveyed Khamenei's position to Hezbollah and a diplomatic message to the Lebanese state. It is clear from Naim Qassem's statements that Iran is still firmly supports Hezbollah's weapons. Meanwhile, a US delegation headed by US Special Envoy Tom Barrack and Morgan Ortagus arrived in Beirut. The delegation came to emphasize the importance of implementing the Lebanese government's decisions and translating these decisions into action, stressing that Lebanon's international future is linked to the outcomes of these decisions. Between Iran's adherence to the Hezbollah card and its attempt to restore regional deterrence, which has been shattered over the past two years due to Israeli military actions on the one hand, and America's insistence on the need for Lebanon to break free cloak and not become a source of tension in the region on the other, the Lebanese today find themselves facing complex choices whose outcomes will determine Lebanon's near and distant future. To paint a clearer picture of the current Lebanese scene, it is necessary to examine the perspectives of the internal and external actors, each separately, starting with Hezbollah.
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Hezbollah
In a speech nearly nine years ago, former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said that the militia's budget, fighters' salaries, financial support, weapons, and missiles come from the Islamic Republic of Iran. This statement summarizes the reality of the militia, which represents a part of Lebanon's Shia community, a reality based on political, military, security, financial, and religious ties to the Iranian regime. Therefore, the militia's dealings within Lebanon have always taken into account Tehran's position before Beirut's. So, will Hezbollah accept the status quo and hand over weapons to the Lebanese state? To answer this question, we must first examine Tehran's position and strategy in the region. Today, after the 12-day war it fought with Israel, Iran has become fully convinced that the Israeli government would not have adopted the decision to go to war if Hezbollah had not been experiencing its weakest moments since its formation in 1982. Therefore, Iran, which is considered, through the words of a number of its officials, the most recent being yesterday’s statement by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s assistant for military affairs, Rahim Safavi, who affirmed that Tehran is not in truce with Israel, that nothing is written in this regard, and that Iran is still in a state of war. From this standpoint, the Iranian regime believes that the next round of war with Israel is only a matter of time, and therefore Hezbollah’s survival as a militia, a pressure card, the front line, and the restoration of its military capabilities are among Iran’s top strategic priorities at this stage and may be the very top priority. Therefore, Hezbollah’s leadership must defend its Iranian weapons at all costs because it is certain, in my view, that in any future war between Iran and Israel, Hezbollah will participate in the battle.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jul 20

Thread 🧵
About nine days ago, tensions in the Druze-majority province of Suwayda in southern Syria began to escalate into street fighting, clashes, and Israeli military activity, threatening to assassinate interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and destroying the Syrian General Staff building. This dangerous escalation did not begin on July 11 but rather has precedents and consequences. A geopolitical reading of the escalation in the Syrian province of Suwayda.
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First, I must clarify that the scene is extremely complex in Syria in general and in Suwayda in particular. To understand the details of what is happening now will not be possible without examining the file from a broader perspective. The disputes did not begin with a kidnapping by Bedouins of a Druze citizen, nor did they start with the military clashes that took place months ago in the Jaramana and Sahnaya areas around the Syrian capital, Damascus. Since the fall of the Assad regime last December, one of the most prominent clerics of the Druze community in Syria, Sheikh Hekmat al-Hijri, has refused the entry of any representatives of the new Syrian administration government into Suwayda Governorate, justifying this step at first by saying that Suwayda Governorate has own special nature and therefore the locals of the governorate should have priority in managing it. Then, as the Syrian administration made concessions on this matter and demanded at least that the governor appointed by the administration be allowed to enter the governorate and receive the requests and complaints of the governorate’s residents, the governor was subjected to physical attacks and was expelled. Then Sheikh al-Hijri raised his demands to demand decentralization in Syria, and that Suwayda must manage itself. He justified this by saying that the Druze in Syria do not trust the new Syrian administration, which, in his opinion, is composed of “jihadists and takfiris.” Every time the new Syrian administration, now an interim government, tries to negotiate with representatives of the Suwayda Governorate, Sheikh al-Hijri stands in the way of any rapprochement in viewpoints, despite the fact that Druze religious leaders, most notably Sheikh al-Hanawi and Sheikh al-Jarbou’, have confirmed more than once their acceptance of the entry of the Syrian interim government and Syrian security into the governorate. However, al-Hijri, who supports a militia called the Military Council of the Suwayda Governorate, which has now become his military arm and is primarily made up of former officers and members of the Assad army who fear prosecution by the new Syrian authorities for war crimes committed over the past 14 years. Some of them had direct relations with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and Iran, and drug dealers within a wide network for the Captagon trade, previously linked to the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran, in addition to groups that were previously part of the so-called National Defense in the governorate who are loyal to him. Thus, Sheikh Al-Hijri, in addition to his religious influence in the province, has military and financial influence, supported by his close relations with Sheikh Muwaffaq Al-Tarif, the leader of the Druze in Israel, giving him regional backing to justify his intransigence in confronting the Syrian administration.
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It must be emphasized that the new Syrian authorities inherited a country torn apart in every way, and that political life was definitely dead in Syria under the rule of the Assad family and the Baath Party. It is natural that any new administration would face difficult challenges and make mistakes. However, the new Syrian authorities were more preoccupied with foreign affairs, building relations with Sunni countries in the region, opening a new page with the European Union, and culminating in their international efforts with Sharaa’s meeting with Trump in Riyadh and Washington’s lifting of economic sanctions on Syria. Domestically, Sharaa’s administration was less flexible and more chaotic. Every internal step taken was largely symbolic and lacked practical implementation on the ground. The National Conference was worthless, and the Constitutional Declaration was written hastily and without broad consultation with Syrian society in all its spectrums, while the Ministry of Defense’s announcement of ending factionalism was a symbolic step that did not exist on the ground. Then came the bloody events on the Syrian coast, which began with terrorist attacks by remnants of the Assad regime against Syrian security, to which the new Syrian authorities responded criminally and with a militia mentality, not a state mentality. Accumulated mistakes and a group of individuals monopolizing decisions internally and externally has increased divisions within Syrian society, which has just emerged from the most violent bloody conflict in the Middle East in decades. Trust has diminished and concerns have increased within this already fragmented society. Next, we have an administration in Damascus that has not done enough to prove its ability to bear its responsibilities and to guarantee the rights of Syrians in all their components. We also have a governorate with deep concerns which has previously suffered from terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS. The scene there is dominated by a cleric who has a militia and is protected by the most powerful country in the region. In this reality, it was certain that at some point it would lead to a military clash, which began a few days ago. Here, some may wonder why the Israeli military took action in Suwayda Governorate, while no movement occurred on the Syrian coast months ago, and none while Assad was destroying Syria and killing its people for 14 years? To answer this question, we must go back to the past decade.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jul 12

Thread 🧵
While the obstacles are diminishing to reach a temporary ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip between the Israeli government and Hamas, with indications that this temporary cessation could be a first step towards ending the war that has lasted for more than 640 days, the political atmosphere in Lebanon and Iran appears less positive. A geopolitical reading on three fronts: Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.
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Gaza
It seems that both parties to the war have begun to reach the conviction that ending the war now is the best solution, and that waiting will not increase the gains of either side but will only lead to further depletion. From Hamas’s side, and based on a field analysis of the war, despite their ability to inflict some human losses on the IDF recently through ambush tactics, the videos published by the militia of these ambushes show a noticeable shortage in locally manufactured anti-tank weapons, a serious indicator of the militia’s capacity to sustain the war for a longer period. Meanwhile, the decrease in the number of attacks confirms a reduction in the number of fighters despite the continuation of security incidents on an almost daily basis, which is due to the IDF forces feeling comfortable, leading to field mistakes. On the popular side, Hamas cannot deny the public discontent in the Gaza Strip over the continuation of the war, which is reflected in the popularity of the militia and the rise of voices demanding an end to the war, even if the price is the withdrawal of the militia from the Gaza Strip, and the formation of groups of Gaza residents who cooperate with the Shin Bet to carry out security operations and gather information. Regionally, Hamas leaders hoped that the conflict would expand in the region, leading to losses on the Israeli side, causing Israeli losses that would pressure Israel to end the war with a deal offering better terms to Hamas. These hopes have collided with the reality that Hamas’s allies in Iran and Lebanon have suffered severe blows that have pushed them to abandon Hamas. Within this field, military, internal and regional equation, Hamas today wants to stop the war even if it is forced to make further concessions that were categorically rejected two months ago.
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From the Israeli side, in my opinion, Netanyahu's delay in accepting a prisoner exchange and ceasefire deal in recent months was linked to two factors. The first is his government partners, who insist on rejecting any ceasefire deal with Hamas and that the war must end with military and security control over the entire Gaza Strip. Therefore, Netanyahu's move toward a temporary deal that would stop the war, while Washington might increase its pressure to prevent the resumption of fighting, would mean the collapse of the government coalition and early elections, which was not in Netanyahu's interest a month ago. The second factor is that Netanyahu had devised the plan to attack Iran to deliver a severe blow to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Therefore, he did not want to end the war in Gaza before striking Iran. Of course, the two factors are interconnected. Netanyahu has thus far been able to prove to the region and to the Israeli people that he has managed to strike the Iranian axis from head to toe, something he believed was impossible or at least would be extremely costly. Yet this important achievement was realized with minimal damage, even more than the most optimistic members of Netanyahu’s government and his security and military leadership expected. It also translates into the return of the popularity of the Likud Party under Netanyahu’s leadership, which had declined significantly after the attacks of October 7. Therefore, Netanyahu today no longer fears the fall of his government and early elections. In fact, some advisers may see that going to elections in the upcoming fall would be better for Netanyahu’s party than waiting for the natural election date in October 2026. On the other hand, the continuation of the war in the Gaza Strip no longer adds more military gains given that most of Hamas’s top leaders have been killed while international, especially American, pressure on the Israeli government is increasing. Thus, Netanyahu can today move toward a temporary ceasefire that will result in the release of half of the hostages held by Hamas, which will have positive domestic impact. During this period, he can negotiate further achievements in the normalization file with Arab and Islamic countries in exchange for a complete end to the war in Gaza, thus securing a new victory that would make calling early elections the next logical step.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 26

Thread 🧵
At dawn on Tuesday, US President Trump announced that Washington, with diplomatic mediation from Qatar, had reached a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran, ending the war that Israel had started under the name "Operation Rising Lion" about 14 days ago. The American announcement was surprising in a timing that seemed unsuitable for both the Iranian regime and the Israeli government. In an analytical reading of the 12-day war, as Trump called it, I attempt to answer some questions, the most important of which is: What comes after this round of war?
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Of course, it is still too early to estimate the extent of the military damage sustained by the Iranian regime, whether in their nuclear or missile programs, or their human losses among military leaders and scientists specializing in nuclear development. However, there is no doubt that the Iranian regime has suffered a severe military blow that will require years before it can restore its capabilities and the billions of dollars that Tehran does not have amid continued US economic sanctions. Iran, today, is exposed in the air, as its air defenses and anti-air missiles collapsed in less than 48 hours, and it is exposed in terms of security, in light of a horrific human and electronic security breach that is still ongoing. However, the most important and essential point that Israel has managed to prove is that a military operation against the Iranian regime is not impossible and will not bring catastrophe to the world or the region. Iran, which the American and European media have always presented as a frightening power in the Middle East, was by the Israeli "Rising Lion" operation to be a fragile state in terms of security and militarily and strategically weak. What contributed to this reality is the Israeli military movements that began after October 7, 2023, in the region. But of course, there was severe human and material damage on the Israeli side, given the limited capabilities of the Israeli Iron Dome to intercept some types of Iranian missiles, which put pressure on the political leadership in Jerusalem. With the start of the first hours of the ceasefire, each side began to present what had happened as a victory. Did Israel win or did Iran?
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Before answering this question, we must first answer another one: Why did Tehran agree to the ceasefire, when just 48 hours before the announcement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that diplomacy was over? And why did Israel agree to the ceasefire despite the statements of a number of its officials, led by the Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir who confirmed about 24 hours before the ceasefire that the IDF would continue their military operation until its goals were achieved?
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