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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 4

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A car bomb exploded yesterday in the city of Manbij, located in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, northern Syria. The blast killed approximately 15 civilians, most of whom were women, making it the deadliest attack in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime. While social media users pointed fingers at the SDF militia, the new Syrian administration refrained from identifying those responsible. In an official statement, they focused on pursuing the perpetrators of this terrorist attack. An analytical reading of the security and political circumstances of this explosion.
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On December 9th, the SDF withdrew from the city of Manbij towards the eastern bank of the Euphrates river. According to informed sources, this withdrawal came after an agreement between Ankara and Washington, under which the Euphrates river will serve as the dividing line between the SDF forces and the Syrian administration forces in preparation for direct negotiations between Damascus and the SDF to reach a diplomatic solution to de-escalate the conflict. Indeed, a delegation from the SDF traveled to Damascus and intensive rounds of negotiations have been ongoing to this day without any notable results. Returning to the city of Manbij, which has been the subject of a dispute between the SDF and the armed Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye since the Kurdish militias, backed by the international coalition against ISIS, crossed the Euphrates River and imposed their control over the city of Manbij after expelling ISIS fighters in 2016, has been plagued by a series of car bombings since the SDF’s withdrawal. In less than two months car bombs eight car bombings have taken place with yesterday's attack being the deadliest. So, who is behind these bombings?
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It can be said that there are three parties accused by the conflicting sides. First, the SDF claims that the Syrian groups supported by Türkiye are behind these car bombings, arguing that Ankara is looking for a pretext to launch a military action against them in the eastern Euphrates region. In practice, the car bombings and motorcycle bombings have not stopped in the areas of the northern Aleppo countryside over the past six years, despite the strenuous efforts of the Syrian opposition factions supported by Türkiye to prevent them. Dozens of fighters from these factions, along with hundreds of civilians, have been killed in these explosions. Moreover, Türkiye is well aware that there is no military solution to the eastern Syrian file unless the ongoing diplomatic process in Damascus fails or if Washington gives the green light to this move by withdrawing its forces from the east of the Euphrates. Therefore, Türkiye or the Syrian groups affiliated with it have no interest in instigating such bloody events.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Feb 1

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In a first-of-its-kind event, at approximately 11 PM last night, an Israeli force that had penetrated the vicinity of the village of Tranjah, located in the disengagement zone in southern Syria, was exposed to gunfire from the Syrian side, followed by the IDF combing the area and firing illuminating bombs. An analytical reading of the scene on the Israeli-Syrian border after the fall of the Assad regime.
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Less than an hour after this attack, a group called the Islamic Resistance in Syria claimed responsibility. In their statement, they confirmed firing towards a vehicle belonging to the Israeli Defense Forces in the village of Tranjah in the northern Quneitra countryside, which resulted in casualties on the Israeli side, and then the group withdrew. This statement is the second for this group since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. A few days ago, they issued a statement confirming that the resistance in Syria has not ended and that the coming days will bring surprises. So, who is the Islamic Resistance in Syria?
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During the first years of the Syrian revolution, with the intervention of the Iranian Quds Force and the Hezbollah militia, they started forming groups of Syrian fighters who mainly belonged to the Shiite sect. The circle of fighters later expanded to include Sunnis loyal to Assad. As Assad expanded his control over southern Syria in the governorates of Quneitra and Daraa, Hezbollah leader Ali Musa Daqduq, who was assassinated last November by Israeli warplanes, took over the so-called "Golan file". This involved working to form a network of agents affiliated with the Iranian Quds Force and Hezbollah in southern Syria. The Military Security Branch of the Assad regime coordinated the work of this network by issuing security id cards to its members. During that period, the work of this network was limited to collecting information on the locations of the IDF and on the movements of Israeli patrols on the opposite side of the disengagement zone in the Golan. However, with the fall of Assad, Tehran gave the green light to this network to work on carrying out attacks against Israeli forces in the disengagement zone, which these forces had penetrated during the past two months.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 26

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In his speech today, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Ansar Allah militia, known as the Houthis, , affirmed that they are monitoring developments in the West Bank and Gaza. He warned that the failure of the ceasefire agreement would lead to a resumption of attacks by the militia. This statement comes just days after the Trump administration's decision to re-designate the Houthis as a terrorist organization. A comprehensive analysis of the political landscape regarding the Yemeni file and its prospects.
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On November 19, 2023, the Houthi militia announced the hijacking of the ship "Galaxy Leader," declaring the beginning of what they called "supporting Gaza operations." These attacks focused on two main fronts: the first was targeting commercial and military ships, either crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, those in the Red Sea, or those they could reach in the Arabian Sea. According to the latest data, the militia has claimed 110 attacks against commercial ships and 116 attacks against warships from November 2023 to December 2024. The second front was through direct targeting of Israeli territory using drones and ballistic missiles. According to the militia, they launched around 400 missiles and drones towards Israeli territory over a year and three months. Although Israeli defenses managed to intercept most of these attacks, the Houthi threats to Israeli national security have become a concern for military and political officials, given the militia's developing capabilities and its geographical distance, which poses a challenge in dealing with and stopping them. However, it can be said that after the latest developments, the Houthis have become a top priority for Israel in the coming phase.
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In March 2015, Saudi Arabia launched a massive military operation in Yemen as part of an Arab coalition to support the Yemeni government in Aden and confront the alliance formed between the Iranian-backed Houthi militia and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This operation was followed by another Saudi operation called 'Restoring Hope', which has not been officially declared over to this day. This did not prevent the Houthis from consolidating their control over large areas of Yemeni territory, most notably the capital, Sana'a. Nor did it prevent the continued missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi territory, posing a serious threat to Saudi national security and global energy supplies amid ongoing attacks by the militia on refineries and oil wells in the Kingdom. With the military solution reaching a dead end and with the emergence of differences within the Arab coalition itself, the United Nations sponsored a ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the Yemeni government in Aden. Although this agreement was initially limited to two months, regional and international consensus contributed to its extension until today. The understanding brokered by China between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 played a crucial role in maintaining this calm, especially by halting attacks on Saudi territory. Today, with the changing balance of power in the region, changing Israeli priorities, and with Trump in the White House, questions arise about the fate of the Houthis and the ceasefire agreement.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 22

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While Syrian cities are still celebrating the fall of the Assad regime and Damascus is crowded with Arab and Western officials announcing the beginning of a new phase for Syria, the file of eastern Syria remains a thorny dilemma that could explode at any moment. A geopolitical reading of the SDF file and its presence in the east of the Euphrates River between internal disputes and regional and international interventions.
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The visits of SDF delegations to Damascus today are not their first. Even during Assad's rule, there were tough negotiations in search of a consensus that would suit the Assad regime and the SDF. The two sides were linked by military relations in Afrin, a joint alliance in Manbij, and disputes and clashes in the eastern Deir ez-Zor countryside. However, it can be said that the military operation launched by Turkey in coordination with the Syrian armed opposition in eastern Syria under the name 'Operation Peace Spring' in 2019 marked a significant shift in relations between the Assad regime and the SDF, as forces belonging to the Assad regime entered eastern Syria to fight Turkey and the Syrian armed opposition, then stationed its forces in the Manbij area. Oil cooperation between the two sides also increased. But despite this rapprochement and despite Russian mediation, all visits by delegations of this militia failed due to the intransigence of both sides’ positions. The SDF insisted on the principle of self-administration for eastern Syria, while Assad affirmed the centrality of the Syrian state.
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With the fall of the Assad regime, the new Syrian administration faced a dilemma in dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and eastern Syria. After the collapse of Assad's forces in the city of Aleppo and its countryside, the militia moved from the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to spread in Aleppo International Airport in coordination with the Assad regime. This prompted the Syrian armed opposition, backed by Turkey, to launch a military operation in the Tal Rifaat area and its surroundings. Meanwhile, forces from the SDF militia advanced from Manbij towards the thermal power station in eastern Aleppo countryside and Kweires Airport. All these military movements by the militia sent negative signals to the new Syrian administration, which now views the SDF as an integral part of the Assad regime and believes it should end, whether diplomatically or militarily.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 18

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While the eyes of the world were fixed on Gaza, the ceasefire agreement and the release of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas after about 460 days of war, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian was in Moscow signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between the two countries with his Russian counterpart three days before Trump arrives at the White House. A multi-faceted reading of the scene in the Middle East from the Iranian perspective.
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After years of negotiations between two countries bound by shared interests and common enemies, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between Moscow and Tehran has finally been signed. Despite this agreement, the smiles on the faces of both Raisi and Putin conceal a more complex reality. Yes, Tehran has increased its military cooperation with Moscow since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, the Syrian file and the two countries' partnership in protecting Assad and his regime from falling have been crucial in driving this rapprochement. However, despite these shared interests, it does not appear that this is a decisive strategic alliance. Beneath the surface, there are larger and more heated disagreements between today's allies and yesterday's enemies.
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The Iranian media do not hide the extent of the differences between conservatives and reformists over relations with Russia. A large portion of Pezeshkian's government officials reject rapprochement with Russia and prefer relations with the West, while the conservatives view the West as the enemy and believe that rapprochement with Moscow is the natural path within the geostrategic landscape most suitable for Tehran. Khamenei seems to have been the decisive figure in this matter. He has given the green light to signing the agreement with Moscow while simultaneously allowing for a return to negotiations with the West.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 13

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About three weeks ago I had confirmed that we were closer than ever to reaching a deal that would end the war in the Gaza Strip and release the Israeli hostages held by the Hamas militia. Today it seems that we are hours or days away from announcing this deal. A pragmatic analysis of this deal from the perspective of the Israeli government, Hamas, and what comes after it.
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Over the past few days, the Qatari capital, Doha, has witnessed intensive rounds of indirect negotiations between representatives of the Israeli government and Hamas, in coordination with representatives of the Biden administration, the Qatari and Egyptian governments, in addition to the very important role of President Trump's envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff. During these rounds, viewpoints were brought closer and gaps between the two sides were bridged, so that today we are facing a comprehensive deal divided into three stages that ends the war, releases the hostages, and paves the way for the beginning of the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. As for the most important details of this deal, according to what has been leaked so far, they are as follows:
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*The first stage begins with the release of 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for a temporary ceasefire for 42 days, during which several Israeli brigades withdraw from populated areas of the Strip, the release of a specific number of Palestinian prisoners (some of whom are serving life sentences), and an increase in the amount of humanitarian aid entering the Strip, including fuel. During this period, negotiations between the Israeli government and Hamas representatives will intensify to finalize the details of the second stage and release all civilian hostages.
*In the second stage, which also lasts for 42 days, all Israeli soldier hostages will be released in exchange for a specific number of Palestinian prisoners, in parallel with a complete withdrawal by the IDF from within the Strip, including the Netzarim area and the Philadelphi Corridor.
*In the third stage, the bodies and remains of the dead from both sides will be exchanged after their identities have been determined, a sustainable ceasefire will be declared, and plans for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will be implemented, which may extend for five years under the supervision of the United Nations and a number of countries and international organizations, the crossings will be opened and the movement of people and goods will be permitted.
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