At the same time, the international co-movement of house prices has strengthened; more than 60% of house price movements can now be explained by a common global factor
Small open economies (both advanced and emerging) have been at the sharp end of this development
Special Covid-related factors (demand for space, strong liquidity asset positions of households) were partly responsible
But they combined with the more timeless factors such as easy financing conditions and reaching for yield in pushing up prices
But before sounding the alarm, it's worth noting that household and bank leverage are not flashing red as they did before the GFC
More accurately, they are not flashing red everywhere; there is a great deal of diversity in country experiences
Where do we go from here?
To get some answers, the #BIS_Bulletin undertakes two analytical exercises
First is a simulation based on past data using "random forest" machine-learning methods (don't ask - just read the piece) on what we might encounter depending on interest rates
Need to step away for a second; to be continued
Short-term declines in nominal house prices usually occur when GDP growth is negative and annual credit growth is below a 5–10% threshold
Higher interest rates need not trigger immediate house price declines if there is growth and rising incomes; debt service capacity matters
In a bid to study the impact of higher interest rates, the #BIS_Bulletin also looks at how the price-to-rent ratio might depend on mortgage rates and extrapolations of capital gains
The house price trajectory depends on assumptions about the path of interest rates; with no change in interest rates, the model predicts further appreciation before reversing to levels consistent historical user cost levels
With a gradual tightening of monetary policy of 100-200 bps, house price rises would be more muted, averting a boom-bust-style adjustment
Needless to say, how house prices evolve from here could have material implications for real activity going forward
For the median economy in our sample, a 10% increase in house prices boosts consumption growth in the following year by 2.2 percentage points
The effect is quite symmetric; a 10% decline lowers consumption growth by 2.2 ppts - a big hit
But it's worth stressing how diverse the international experience has been; small open economies (both advanced and emerging) have seen the largest housing booms with the greatest increases in household debt to historical highs
No doubt, the short-term impact of rising house prices has been a tailwind for growth
But we should be attuned to the risks of a reversal; in economies with high historical valuations and household debt, demand tailwinds could turn into headwinds
The macroprudential toolkit (loan-to-value caps, debt service-to-income caps) can help;
Monetary policy cannot neglect these risks, either
I leave you with a recap of the key takeaways of the #BIS_Bulletin
The financial channel of exchange rates operates through the risk capacity of market participants and shows up in the response of financial conditions to exchange rate movements
This new BIS Working Paper shows that the channel operates for stock returns, too
Dollar-denominated returns tend to be an amplified version of the local currency-denominated returns; both the gains and losses are magnified when converted into dollar returns
Hence the "dollar return multiplier"
The dollar return multiplier comes about because stock returns tend to be positive when the local currency is appreciating against the dollar and negative when it's depreciating
This correlation turns out to be a remarkably robust feature of the data
Supply bottlenecks have grabbed all the headlines recently, but longer-term structural changes brought about by the pandemic (labour markets, especially) are important to understand where we are headed
Two further points to bear in mind are (1) counterparty sector (official or private financial, private non-financial) and (2) the distinction between location and nationality
For this, the following BIS data would shed more light
First, regarding the counterparty sector, the 2020:Q1 surge in cross-border banking flows stands out
Normally, we would expect a sharp retrenchment during stress episodes, but there was instead a surge, as discussed in this #BIS_Bulletin bis.org/publ/bisbull34…
A closer look reveals that most of the flows were the recycling of dollar funding through interoffice flows as part of a "Grand Overdraft"; this explains the surge and the subsequent unwinding
#DeFi, or decentralised finance, is the latest manifestation of this idea where the ledger is much more elaborate than simply keeping score of who pays whom
Bottlenecks started out as disruptions to supply, but they have morphed into something more
Key point to bear in mind: in aggregate at least, supply has caught up to pre-pandemic levels in key sectors like semi-conductors as well as in raw materials and shipping
So, what then is going on?
Two factors are key: (1) shift in composition of demand and (2) the endogenous changes in behaviour that's given rise to bullwhip effects
Decentralization is motivated by the governance benefits - the idea is that the checks and balances of the community as a whole is the best way to safeguard the integrity of the system and avoid capture by a few powerful entities
But there has been an argument that the price to be paid for this better governance is the lack of scalability