Thread by @emilietjacobsen

The war in #Ukraine has elevated everyone's attention to #propaganda/#disinformation with people recognising its role in war/conflicts. But this is not something that has suddenly emerged - and there are lessons to learn from past/ongoing conflicts: a🧵
meduza.io/en/feature/202…

As long as there has been media available, leaders have used strategic communication and #propaganda to mobilise support for their causes - whatever they may be. The biggest difference today is social media that accelerates the spread and amplify the impact of the messages. 2/

Regimes, not least authoritarian ones, are very much aware of how algorithms on SoMe work and use them for their own benefit. Throw state-controlled media into the mix and you have an optimal setup to dominate narratives and influence public opinions. 3/ thediplomat.com/2021/01/how-to…

SoMe have therefore become one of the key communication tools for authoritarian regimes -not least in countries where people rely heavily on eg. Facebook for news/communication. But the tech companies have been far too slow in recognising the massive consequences of this abuse 4/

The main argument for platforms have for a long time been that they are only platforms and that there will always be "bad users". But the reality is that their SoMe channels do not only provide platforms for "bad users" - they also amplify their messages 5/

Last year we observed how the #Myanmar military strategically used SoMe to influence public opinion while tightening the grip on legacy media and restricting people's access to information in the country by shutting down the internet and mobile networks 6/ crisisgroup.org/asia/south-eas…

And this was not the first time, the military had used this strategy. As has been probably the most cited example of a regime's abuse of social media, the military in 2017 used #Facebook to incite a genocide against the country's Rohingya minority 7/ nytimes.com/2018/11/06/tec…

So when the #Myanmar military last year instigated a coup d'état #Facebook along with other platforms took immediate action and banned military official channels and accounts from their platforms - similarly to what we are currently observing in #Ukraine/Europe. 8/

However, this move did not remove military propaganda from the platforms completely. Nor did it discourage the military from trying to influence public opinions, sow mistrust or spread fear by using disinformation and strategic communication tactics. 9/

Instead it moved the conversations to other platforms or into closed groups - and made it more difficult to decipher who took part willingly or unwillingly in disinformation efforts on SoMe in #Myanmar. In other words it made everything more messy and untransparent. 10/

Luckily the platforms seem to have learned that complete #censorship does not have the wanted effects and have opted for a labelling solution of state-sponsored content together with their various content moderation/fact-checking efforts in Ukraine. 11/ techpolicy.press/the-sunday-sho…

But at the same time legislators are running around frantically to find ways to combat #Russia's #propaganda machine - resulting in dubious #censorship solutions that seem haphazardly put together with no long-term thinking. 12/ washingtonpost.com/technology/202…

While they may limit people's access to Russian #Propaganda in the EU & Ukraine, they will have no effect on the situation inside #Russia - and have already been used strategically by the Russian propaganda machine and resulted in ban of Western media. 13/ nytimes.com/2022/03/04/wor…

The trench between the EU/West/Ukraine and Russia is getting deeper by the hour and possibilities of communicating is gradually disappearing. Alienation and "us-vs-them" rhetoric is once again dominating the narratives. But we are forgetting potential long-term consequences. 14/

As @rmack is arguing in this piece published by @techpolicypress, we must ensure people's access to reliable information - also in Russia. 15/ techpolicy.press/the-invasion-o…

And how about the other conflicts that do not currently attract the attention of world audiences -and therefore do not gain the same focused attention from platforms and legislators? Or the next big geopolitical conflict? What will the answer be then? New forms of censorship? 16/

We need to think carefully and strategically before we jump into action. We need to find ways to ensure that the so-called "bad users" do not get to reap the benefits of SoMe algorithms on at the expense of trustworthy and fact-checked information. 17/

We need better access to the SoMe machine room so we can analyse what is happening and identify solutions. 18/ platformer.news/p/everything-p…

We need to find ways to regulate without compromising ourselves and what we believe in - and without further isolating those who already have limited access to information and have to navigate in far more complex information environments than those we are used to. 19/ [end]