Thread by @GresselGustav

1/ A short update tweet on where we are on the 🇷🇺🇺🇦 war. A lot to do for @ecfr, and our next #twitterspace will be about different things ... so here wer are.
Last week 🇷🇺 repaired the railway connection into #Izyum and you immediately see the results.

2/ Further offensives from Izyum towards #Sloviansk are expected in the comming days. This will make 🇺🇦 positions in #Severodonestk even more vulnerable.
Renewed 🇷🇺 attacks on #Bakhmut were repelled so far, but breakthroughs may happen any day. Any of them will force ...

3/ 🇺🇦 to retreat to the #Sloviansk - #Kramatorsk line. When this happens is hard to predict, but it can happen by tomorrow. A lot of prepared positions there, so this again should hold up 🇷🇺 for weeks.

4/ Why then is 🇺🇦 fighting for Severodonestk? Urban terrain favours the defender, and also #Lysychansk would offer strong defensive positions.
Ukrainians are inferior in firepower and mobility due to the lack of heavy weapons, but have more infantry. Throwing infantry ...

5/ at an armoured enemy is a meat-grinder, unless you have the terrain to get your men close enough, and provide cover enough to make them engage the tanks. Urban terrain is the classic, so if you can force the enemy to fight there, you stand better chances.

6/ That of course only works if 🇷🇺 cannot circumvent your positions. So they need to contain the Popasna- bulge, which is much more difficult than defending Lysychansk.
I would expect 🇺🇦 to be thrown back to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk line by July. Let's see.

7/ Where does this put us in the overall war effort? Again, this is a long war of attrition, small, incremental 🇷🇺 gains are not the issue, but rather who erodes the other faster?
Russians employ concentrated artillery to substitute (lacking) infantry & airpower.

8/ While I don't see much effect on materiel losses (caveat: it takes more time to count them), effect on morale and losses in 🇺🇦 menpower become visible. This is a worrying trend.
Second, after #Mariupol 🇷🇺 seem to have regained some motivation and faith ...

9/ in their commanders to be able to achieve victory. This should not be underestimated.
Situation for 🇺🇦 looks bleaker than in April/May. Particularly, because Western arms deliveries are slower and remain fewer than expected.

10/ Suicide drones (#Switchblade, etc.) can supplement but not sustitute artillery. Quantity has a quality of its own, and 🇷🇺 has large quantities of artillery.
🇺🇦 in contrast suffers from shortages of ammunition and transport capability to get ammunition to the front in time.

11/ 🇷🇺 missile/cruise missile campaign against 🇺🇦 defence industry paid off, althoough it had cost Moscow most of its arsenal.
Western artillery like #m777 and #CAESAR are excellent systems, but short of the quantity 🇺🇦 needs.

12/ 🇺🇸 #HIMARS will only come in symbolic numbers, as will 🇩🇪 #PzH2000.
Ukraine's heavy MLRS were 70 BM-27 Urgan & 81 BM-30 Smerch, all of which run short on munitions (factories destroyed) and need to be replaced.
They are crucially important to provide counter-battery fire...

13/ ... into the Russian rear.
Then, 🇺🇦 has few OTR-21 Tochka left, but such things would be needed to attack 🇷🇺 railway lines.
🇺🇸 decision not to supply #ATACMS for fearing strikes into Russia was a mistake. I hope it will be corrected.

14/ I wrote in previous tweets that 🇺🇦 has the chance to stem the tide once mobilised forces have sufficient training. That still holds true, but only if they also get the firepower and mobility needed to prevail against 🇷🇺 forces.

15/ That means MBT, IFV, artillery, air-defence. 🇺🇦 can only get this in the West, and in most cases only get Western systems.
But we are much too slow and too reluctant to deliver. These systems need time to train people and build up a chain of supply.

16/ Hence decisions should have been made already to have effect in summer/authumn. We waste precious time, both in Washington, Berlin, Paris, ... name it.
Only 🇵🇱🇪🇪🇱🇻🇱🇹 go full in.
Particularly disappointed in 🇷🇴. Big mouth, now sitting on the fence.