As our new Munich Security Index, based on representative surveys in all G7 countries, shows, #Russia's invasion of Ukraine has dramatically altered public risk perceptions. A🧵... 1/8
Perhaps unsurprisingly, #Russia is now the top risk in all G7 countries, apart from Italy, while #Ukraine is seen much more positively than in November. Absolute majorities in all G7 countries believe that “we are entering a new Cold War with Russia.” 2/8
Strikingly, #Russia's full-blown war on #Ukraine has triggered a convergence of views: People in all G7 countries have become more willing to oppose Russia economically and militarily. In fact, Italians in May were more hawkish than people in the UK were in November 2022! 3/8
Respondents generally give very positive assessments of their own government’s and their allies’ responses to the Russian invasion – individually and as part of the EU, NATO and the #G7. But look at the interesting details! 4/8
However, differences between continental Europeans (+ Japan) and the English-speaking #G7 members remain - for instance when considering the delivery of heavy #weapons. Italy is a bit of an outlier in general. 5/8
Quite strikingly, the public seems less concerned about escalation than the elites. Relative (🇮🇹🇩🇪🇫🇷🇬🇧) or absolute (🇨🇦🇺🇸🇯🇵) majorities agree that “#NATO members should push back harder against Russia even if the risk of military escalation between NATO and Russia increases.” 6/8
While many citizens are undecided, in all four eFP lead nations, relative majorities (🇨🇦: 43 %, 🇬🇧: 46 %, 🇩🇪: 48 %, 🇺🇸: 49% ) think that their country “should massively increase its military presence at #NATO’s eastern border.” #NATOSummit 7/8
Next weekend, #G7 leaders will meet for their summit at Schloss Elmau. @SophEisentraut & I have written a new @MunSecConf Brief - including a special edition of the Munich Security Index, based on a representative survey in 🇨🇦🇫🇷🇩🇪🇮🇹🇯🇵🇬🇧🇺🇸 and powered by @KekstCNC. (📸: @_LSimon)
#Zeitenwende is not just a German phenomenon. Except for Canada, people in all G7 countries agree that the invasion of #Ukraine is a turning point for their country's foreign and security policy.
Russia is now seen as the top risk in all G7 countries, apart from Italy. Changes since November 2021 are significant. But while traditional security risks have "returned," non-traditional risks that have dominated the index have not lost their relevance.
How will #NATO's posture change in response to Russia's invastion of #Ukraine (and statements threatening NATO members)? What is clear already: Putin has forced NATO to massively invest in its infrastructure and strengthen its posture on the eastern flank. 1/7
With his actions, Putin will eventually bring substantial NATO forces to Russia's borders - something that he has warned of for many years (remember his complaints about NATO infrastructure moving closer to Russia) and that many NATO members also tried to avoid. 2/7
Today, Allied leaders announced that they "will now accelerate NATO's transformation for a more dangerous strategic reality." nato.int/cps/en/natohq/… 3/7
It’s time for my traditional train Twitter thread after @MunSecConf. As our Chairman @ischinger said, we’re all tired now. But the most important thing is that we had a weekend of vivid debates!
I’m glad that the title of our #MSCreport – #Westlessness – triggered some of them. We think of the MSR as a conversation starter for the conference, and it worked well this year – in particular because some thought it accurately described the zeitgeist, and others disagreed.
Are you still wondering – like my my two-year old (“Papa, was soll das heißen?"| "Dad, what does this even mean?”) – what this term is meant to convey? You can re-watch my presentation of the #MSCreport in Berlin. #Westlessnesssecurityconference.org/en/medialibrar…
On my way home from #MSC2019 - and reflecting on the debates, speeches and informal meetings of the past four days in Munich. Let me share my very personal summary - w/ a focus on the transatlantic partnership. Last year, I was quite pessimistic...
So let me start with a bit of good news. In our #MSCreport, we asked who would pick up the pieces of a disintegrating global order. At least rhetorically, the Europeans and representatives of other like-minded liberal democracies have underlined their willingness to step up. 2/
Most attendees agreed that Chancellor #Merkel gave one of the best foreign policy speeches of her career. She really hit a nerve in the audience. Merkel forcefully argued that "all of us" had to pick up the pieces together.
Although I suggest you all download our new #MSCreport (-> securityconference.de/en/publication…) and read it - let me walk you through some of its main arguments and illustrations. Some of you might remember Gramsci's famous description of the inter-war "interregnum": 1/n
"The crisis consists," Gramsci wrote, "precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this #interregnum a great variety of morbid symptons appear." Well, that seems like an apt description of today's world. 2/n
The post-Cold war period - and the optimism associated with it - has come to an end. Many of the certainties, widely shared and taken for granted in Europe since the end of the Cold, are eroding. As German Foreign Minister, @HeikoMaas, put it in June: 3/n
On my way home from #MSC2018 - and even more worried than before. When people who don't spend much time with world politics ask whether it is as bad as the media say I now respond: No, it's actually worse.
First, the world has seen a frightening amount of brinkmanship recently. Whether it's East Asia, the Middle East or even Eastern Europe - there is an increased risk of escalation. Many speeches at #MSC2018 have underscored this - in many cases, they added fuel to the fire.
Second, there was a lack of constructive ideas to solve some of the most pressing conflicts: The participants of the Normandy format didn't even meet to discuss. It's hard to imagine a good solution to the INF issue. And it's even worse when it comes to Syria or North Korea.